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BBZ Bremer Bürgerzeitung (Citizens’ Newspaper of Bremen)
DDP Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party)
DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
DMV Deutscher Metallarbeiter-Verband (German Metal Workers’ Union)
DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People’s Party)
DVP Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party)
FVP Fortschrittlichen Volkspartei (Progressive People’s Party)
IKD  Internationalen Kommunisten Deutschlands (International Communists of 
Germany)
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
MSPD  Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Majority Social 
Democratic Party of Germany)
NLP Nationalliberalen Partei (National Liberal Party)
SED  Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany)
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany)
USPD  Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social 
Democratic Party of Germany)
ZENTRUM Deutsche Zentrumspartei (German Centre Party)
ZK Zentralkomitee (Central Committee, of the SED)
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Chronology
The following chronology is intended to help the reader track and compare the historical 
developments of the German Revolution, particularly with regards to the four case studies 
of this thesis. The first column lists world events (particularly around World War I and 
revolutions in Germany’s neighbouring states), the second lists events in Germany at large 
and the next four the events in key cities: Berlin, Munich, Bremen and Hamburg. The rows 
are ordered by month (or season), except for November 1918, which is tackled day by day. 
In this month (highlighted), the events are ordered by day. The basis for this chronological 
overview was taken from The German Revolution by Pierre Broué.1 
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1 Pierre Broué, The German Revolution 1917-1923 (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006), 915-34.
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The German Revolution of 1918–1919 marks an important event in European politics with 
a significant impact on the history of Europe and of the world, yet it lacks a canonical story 
in historical scholarship.2 The revolution led to the end of World War I, transformed the 
German Kaiserreich into a fledgling democratic republic, and created a spiral of conflict 
and violence that ultimately contributed to the rise of Nazism.3 The lack of popular memory 
of this historic event led German historian Alexander Gallus to name this political 
transformation of Germany the ‘Forgotten Revolution’.4 Older German textbooks often 
jump straight from Germany’s defeat in World War I to the establishment of the Weimar 
Republic without reference to the period of upheaval and political contestation in between.5 
What remains neglected, among other things, is the key role a mass movement of sailors, 
soldiers and workers played in challenging the German Admiralty and bringing an end 
to the war. It was primarily through the political agency of ordinary people that Germany 
was transformed from an autocratic and deeply hierarchical society into a democratic 
republic with universal suffrage and social rights, yet that revolution was completely 
overshadowed by the seismic events of the rise of Nazism, the fall of the Weimar Republic 
and World War II. The centenary of the revolution offered an opportunity to reflect on this 
important event and take stock of its significance for the development of political thought. 
A wave of new publications has attempted to make the German Revolution a little less 
forgotten, and this thesis wishes to contribute to that aim.
The research presented in this book contributes to our historical understanding of 
the German Revolution, but also to the theoretical understanding of political thought in 
revolutions. The thesis focusses on the contribution of ‘ordinary people’ to the development 
of ideas and concepts in this revolution. The councils of workers, soldiers, sailors and 
peasants that were formed during the revolution provide an excellent site to study 
these ideas. Particularly in the initial phase of the revolution, these local councils were 
established outside the grip of parties or unions. Most of their members were ordinary 
workers or soldiers with very limited prior political experience. These councils and the 
debates between their members will be at the very centre of this research. 
What makes these councils particularly interesting for the purposes of this thesis, is 
that, while the German Revolution is usually labelled the Council Revolution and is seen 
as the birthplace of Council Communism, there was no prior theory of council politics. 
Moreover, this thesis challenges the idea of ‘orthodox Marxism’ as a fixed and stable ideology 
2 Parts of this introduction have been published in the volume that I co-edited with James Muldoon, The 
German Revolution and Political Theory (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
3 Mark Jones, Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 4.
4 Alexander Gallus, “Die Vergessene Revolution Von 1918/19 - Erinnerung und Deutung im Wandel,” 
in Die Vergessene Revolution von 1918/19 ed. Alexander Gallus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2010).




characterised by economic determinism and teleological development. By revisiting the 
debates in the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in four major German cities – Berlin, Bremen, 
Hamburg and Munich –this thesis highlights the heterogeneous and variable history of 
democratic and socialist thought in the German Revolution. The main debates over the 
future of Germany were not between ‘socialists’ and ‘others’ but took place among various 
groups that identified themselves as Marxists or socialists. This calls into question the view 
that the Second International (see section 1.3 below) had a single official doctrine that was 
widely accepted within the socialist parties. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
German Revolution, as background to the four in-depth case studies. 
1.1. The foretold revolution
In the early 20th century, socialists across Europe expected Germany to spearhead the 
international revolution. With the world’s largest and most organised industrial working 
class, Marx and Engels had anticipated Germany to be the most likely starting point for 
a proletarian revolution in The Communist Manifesto. The country was, in both strategic 
and symbolic terms, the centrepiece of socialist plans for ushering in an age of world 
revolution. As the case studies in this thesis will show, the German revolutionaries were 
very aware of their international importance and repeatedly acknowledged that ‘the world 
was watching’. 
But contrary to (hopeful) predictions, Germany was not the first revolutionary 
state. The extended suffering created by World War I placed enormous pressure on the 
legitimacy of state governments, which eventually led to the fall of the Russian Tsar 
in February (March in our calendar) 1917. The subsequent rise of Bolshevism sent out 
shockwaves across Europe and threatened the military elite which had been governing 
Germany throughout the war. The year 1918 witnessed a rapid intensification of political 
and social tensions that divided German society and led to increased pressure to end the 
war. Massive strikes demanding peace had occurred throughout Germany in January 
1918, and over the course of that year demands for Emperor Wilhelm II’s abdication 
intensified. While the emperor had appointed a liberal aristocrat, Prince Max von Baden, 
as the new Chancellor who would lead peace negotiations with the Allied Powers, the 
German Admiralty remained vehemently opposed to an unconditional surrender. On 24 
October 1918, Reinhardt Scheer, Chief of the Naval Staff, issued an order for the navy fleet 
in Kiel to engage in a final Todesfahrt (suicide mission) against the superior British Royal 
Navy. The sailors in Kiel refused, mutinied and were soon accompanied by revolutionary 
soldiers and workers. By the evening of 4 November 1918, the city of Kiel had been taken 
by the revolutionaries. 
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What started as a localised mutiny quickly spread across the country through workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils, leading to the abdication of the Kaiser and the declaration of a 
republic on 9 November 1918. Indicative of the divided nature of the revolutionary forces, 
two separate declarations were made on the same day. The first was by Philipp Scheidemann 
of the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany (Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, MSPD)6, who pronounced Germany a republic from a window of the Reichstag 
in Berlin, against the wishes of politically conservative MSPD party leader, Friedrich Ebert, 
who held hopes that the monarchy might still be preserved.7 The second declaration was by 
revolutionary socialist and member of the Spartacus League, Karl Liebknecht, who declared 
Germany a free socialist republic from the Royal Palace in the same city.8
The revolution took both authorities and revolutionaries by surprise, leaving 
established political parties and trade unions struggling to come to terms with rapidly 
unfolding events. It was initially met with praise by liberals and progressives, although 
there were also fears about potential violence and bloodshed. Theodor Wolff, liberal editor 
of the Berliner Tageblatt, famously wrote: 
The greatest of all revolutions, like a suddenly rising storm, has crushed the Imperial 
regime with everything that belonged to it, above and below. It can be called the greatest 
of all revolutions, because never has such a sturdily built, solidly walled Bastille been 
taken in such a siege. Only a week ago there was a military and civil administrative 
apparatus that was so branched, so interlinked, so deeply ingrained that it seemed to 
have secured its rule beyond the changing of times. The grey cars of the officers were 
speeding through the streets of Berlin, in the squares stood policemen like the pillars 
of power, a giant military organization seemed to embrace everything, a seemingly 
invincible bureaucracy sat enthroned in the offices and ministries. Yesterday morning, 
at least in Berlin, everything was still there. Yesterday afternoon, none of it existed 
anymore.9
Soldiers and workers had spontaneously formed councils which held de facto power 
across the country during the initial weeks of the revolution. The day after the republic 
6 On 8 April 1917, anti-war activists who had been excluded from the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in March, founded a split-off named the Independent 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD). 
From this moment onwards, the official name of what remained of the SPD was Majority Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (MSPD), which lasted until the reunification of (most of) the two parties 
in the fall of 1922. In this thesis, the official name and abbreviation MSPD will be used to designate the 
party after April 1917, and the abbreviation SPD is used (sporadically) to refer to the period before that. 
More on Germany’s political landscape can be found in section 1.2 of this chapter.
7 Jones, Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919, 13.
8 Gabriel Kuhn, ed. All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-
1919 (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), 27.




had been declared, elections were held among Berlin workers at Circus Busch’s theatre 
in Berlin Mitte, which led to the creation of two new institutions. The first was a six-
member Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Council of People’s Deputies), which acted as a 
provisional national government. The second was the Vollzugsrat der Arbeiter- und 
Soldatenräte Groß-Berlins (Executive Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils of 
Greater Berlin), which was chaired by the representative of the Revolutionäre Obleute 
(Revolutionary Shop Stewards), Richard Müller, and represented the power that had 
developed within the council movements. The Vollzugsrat had the authority to appoint 
and dismiss the six Volksbeauftragten and the right to supervise the operation of the 
ministries, but in practice the Rat der Volksbeauftragten assumed governmental functions 
and often disregarded resolutions made in the Executive Council. The growing discord 
between the moderate Volksbeauftragten, largely controlled by the MSPD, and the more 
radical-leaning Vollzugsrat was the source of ongoing political tension. Another source 
for such tension was the confusion about the mandate of these new institutions. Their 
formal legitimacy was based in the local council structure of Greater Berlin, yet they 
were generally considered as institutions with a (provisional) national mandate. This 
discrepancy will be further examined in Chapter 3’s case study on Berlin. 
The progressive forces’ primary political division was between the MSPD leadership, led 
by Friedrich Ebert, which sought to prevent the development of a more radical revolution 
along the lines of the Bolshevist model, and radical council delegates who pushed for 
the country’s democratisation and socialisation. The MSPD feared a Bolshevisation of the 
German Revolution and a descent into what they called ‘Russian conditions’ of violence 
and scarcity. On 9 November 1918, Ebert made a secret pact with General Groener to 
prevent radical reforms and secure the protection of the privileged position of the armed 
services. This deal was to prove decisive in the struggle over the future form of the German 
state and the relationship between the council movements and existing state authorities. 
Ebert also issued a statement calling for all government officials to remain at their posts. 
In practice, various compromises were reached between workers’ councils and local 
authorities in different local settings, with the vast majority of officials remaining in place 
and many councils exercising only ‘control’ functions over their activities.
The MSPD and the radicals were divided over their plans for the future German state. 
The Ebert leadership argued for the creation of a parliamentary republic without significant 
changes to the economic system or the military. The radical delegates, on the other hand, 
advocated for power to be placed in a council system controlled by worker delegates with 
imperative mandates, who were subject to immediate recall. They believed that a more 
extensive democratisation of the civil service, army and workplace would be necessary to 
ensure the creation of a socialist republic. This question of national assembly or council 
system was to be decided at the First German Congress of Workers and Soldiers’ Councils, 
which commenced on 16 December 1918. The weeks between the start of the revolution 
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in November and this National Congress in December are often characterised as the 
first phase of the German Revolution. This thesis will focus predominantly on this first 
phase, because it was here that the main fundamental debates about the future of German 
politics took place. In some cases, however, this ‘Berlin-focussed’ selection does not hold, 
because fundamental debates continued in other parts of the country. Some of the case 
studies will therefore extend well into the year 1919 in order to cover the important events 
and debates in those cities. 
When representatives from the councils met at the Congress, a large majority supported 
the Social Democrats’ policy of organising elections for a national parliament, which were 
to take place on 19 January 1919. The provisional government had been divided between 
delegates of the MSPD and the USPD (see section 1.2. below). Growing disputes between 
the MSPD and USPD, however, led to the USPD leaving the joint provisional government, 
which increased instability and led to more anti-government demonstrations in Berlin and 
other major cities in early January. The outcome of the Congress outraged radicals, who 
felt that the MSPD leadership had betrayed the revolution. In January 1919, many leftist 
radicals united in the newly founded German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands, KPD) and decided to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections. This 
second phase of the revolution was characterised by bloody confrontations between the 
central government and revolutionaries. As part of the ‘Spartacus Uprisings’ in January 
1919, the Majority Social Democrats’ newspaper office was occupied by armed workers, 
leading Ebert’s government to issue orders to crush the rebellion with force. Several days 
later, the Spartacus leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were captured and killed 
by a far-right paramilitary Freikorps that cooperated with government troops. The extent 
to which the MSPD ordered or approved of these specific executions remains disputed.
In the Nationalversammlung (national assembly) of 19 January 1919, a majority of 
voters supported non-socialist parties, although the MSPD achieved the highest vote of 
any party, with 163 seats and 37.9% of the vote. The assembly, which was held in Weimar 
to avoid the revolutionary tumult of Berlin, drafted a Constitution which came into effect 
in August 1919. The communists regarded the revolution as having been derailed and 
betrayed, and were dismayed by the role of the MSPD. The Majority Social Democrats, in 
turn, distanced themselves from the revolutionary origins of their government in order to 
present themselves as a serious, mature governing party. Illustrative of this contested legacy 
of the German Revolution, Germany’s founding was never celebrated on 9 November but 
with a national Verfassungstag (Constitution Day) on 11 August, commemorating the day 
President Ebert signed the new constitution in 1919.10 




1.2 An overview of the political landscape
Political theorists have not unpacked the political ideologies of participants in the German 
Revolution with the same rigour and insight as other key historical eras. While differences 
between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Russia or the Federalists and anti-Federalists 
in the US are well known in political theory, the same cannot be said about the strategic 
and ideological differences between political parties and groups – the MSPD, USPD, 
Spartacus League and Revolutionary Shop Stewards – who played significant roles in the 
German Revolution. 
The largest socialist party in Germany, the SPD, had split into a majority group (the 
MSPD) and a minority group (the USPD) in 1917 over ongoing conflicts about World War 
I. The USPD included members who represented a broad spectrum of radical political 
ideologies. The International Group (renamed Spartakusbund, Spartacus League, on 11 
November 1918) and left-wing radicals (Linksradikalen) from Bremen and Hamburg were 
formally members of the USPD, although they frequently organised independently of the 
party and split from it on 31 December 1918 to form the KPD. The Revolutionäre Obleute 
(Revolutionary Shop Stewards) were a group of organised labourers in Berlin, probably 
numbering between 80 and 100, who were formally members of the USPD, but also acted 
independently. These splits and mergers on the left contributed to a fragmented political 
landscape, which deserves some more attention. 
In the introduction to the edited volume I co-wrote with James Muldoon,11 we identified 
six main ideological formations during the first weeks of the Revolution:
1. The pro-Russian Spartacus League with the Bremen and Hamburg radicals
2. The Revolutionary Shop Stewards (left-wing USPD)
3. The Marxist ‘centre’ of Karl Kautsky and Hugo Haase (right-wing USPD)
4. The Ebert-Scheidemann-led MSPD
5. Liberal and progressive political parties
6 Conservative and restorative forces in support of the old Empire
The Spartacus League, whose most notable members were Rosa Luxemburg, Karl 
Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, Paul Levi and Leo Jogiches, were a radical USPD faction which 
had opposed the war and organised anti-war protests and strikes. Their goal during the 
revolution was to create a council republic along the Bolshevik model. They called for the 
‘replacement of all political organs and authorities of the former regime by delegates of 
the workers’ and soldiers’ councils’.12 Their programme at the outset of the revolution was 
11 Gaard Kets and James Muldoon, eds., The German Revolution and Political Theory.
12 Rosa Luxemburg, “What Does the Spartacus League Want?,”  (1918).
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to empower workers’ councils and act quickly to destroy the power base of the old elite. 
They believed that the realisation of socialism required widespread social and political 
transformation carried out by the masses. For this reason, they saw the establishment of a 
national assembly as the bourgeoisie’s attempt to limit the ongoing spread of the revolution 
and hinder efforts to transform Germany into a socialist republic. On 20 November, the 
newspaper of the Spartacus League, Die Rote Fahne, published the following:
The national assembly is a means to rob the proletariat of its power, to paralyze its class 
dynamics, and to let its socialist objective evaporate in blue haze. The alternative is to 
put all power into the hands of the proletariat, to turn the revolution into a decisive 
class struggle, and to pave the way for a socialist society. For this purpose, the political 
rule of the great masses of the workers, the dictatorship of the workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils, has to be established. One is either for or against socialism, for or against the 
national assembly – there is no in between.13
In contrast to the Spartacists, the left-wing radicals in Hamburg and Bremen had remained 
outside the USPD and in fact opposed the Spartacists who did join. The radicals organised 
around the journal Arbeiterpolitik (Workers’ Politics, founded in the summer of 1916). 
Its editor was Johann Knief, who published articles by theorists like Anton Pannekoek 
and Karl Radek. As a result, these radicals were weary of disciplined and centralised 
party leadership and instead advocated independent, bottom-up working-class action 
and thought. Instead of party and union, the International Communists of Germany 
(Internationale Kommunisten Deutschlands (IKD), as the group previously named Bremer 
Linksradikalen (Left Radicals of Bremen) called itself from 10 November 1918 onwards) 
called for the creation of ‘unity organisations’ that combined party and union. During the 
first month of the revolution, this led to a distance between the Spartacists and radicals, 
until they finally decided to merge in the final days of 1918.14 
The Revolutionäre Obleute held a similar position to the Spartacus League insofar as 
they also advocated for the establishment of a council republic, but there were differences in 
their approach to tactics and strategy. Karl Liebknecht criticised the Stewards for meeting 
secretly, acting as an underground group and failing to publicise their revolutionary 
activities. In turn, the Stewards argued that they had an organised base of workers whom 
they could turn out to protests, whereas the Spartacus League lacked a strong following 
13 Quoted in Kuhn, All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-
1919, 71.
14 Gerhard Engel, “The International Communists of Germany, 1916-1919,” in Weimar Communism as 





amongst the workers and consistently failed to mobilise them in large numbers.15 The 
Stewards were strongly rooted in the factory floors and amongst an organised and 
skilled section of the workers, particularly metal workers, who had proved significant in 
revolutionary actions in Berlin. They operated largely within the structure of the Deutscher 
Metallarbeiter-Verband (DMV, German Metal Workers’ Union). With notable members 
including Richard Müller, Ernst Däumig and Emil Barth, the Stewards held one seat on 
the Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Barth) and the chair of the Vollzugsrat (Müller). 
On 17 November 1918, they issued their political programme, which set out the 
following guidelines for the revolution:
Workers and soldiers have removed the old governmental system. In the revolutionary 
organization of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils the new state power is taking shape. 
This power must be secured and expanded so that the achievements of the revolution 
will benefit the entire working class. This cannot happen by transforming the German 
state into a bourgeois democratic republic. The German state has to become a 
proletarian republic on the grounds of a socialist economy. The wish of the bourgeoisie 
to elect and install a national assembly as soon as possible is destined to rob the workers 
of the fruits of the revolution.16
While the Spartakusbund never developed institutional designs for a council system, 
Müller and Däumig produced a number of models of a ‘pure’ council system during 1919, 
which they published in their journal, Der Arbeiter-Rat (The Workers’ Council), among 
other publications.17 Their council system was intended to replace liberal parliamentary 
institutions with a dual system of economic and political councils that would be organised 
in a pyramidal scheme. They argued that the revolutionary workers’ councils could 
become state institutions which would only be open to workers and would represent the 
dominance of the working class.
The USPD contained another faction represented by Hugo Haase, Karl Kautsky and 
Rudolf Hilferding. This right-wing faction had split from the MSPD but did not support the 
establishment of a full council system. Although they supported a national assembly, they 
also saw a role for the workers’ councils in a parliamentary republic. Hilferding argued 
that a continuation of a council system would exclude other classes from participating in 
government and was not a superior alternative to universal suffrage and parliamentary 
democracy. In his eyes, the council system excluded peasants, the unemployed, women 
15 Richard Müller, “Revolutionary Gymnastics,” in All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History 
of the German Revolution of 1918-1919, ed. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), 78; Jones, 
Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919, 82.
16 Richard Müller, “Report by the Executive Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Great Berlin,” 
ed. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 33.
17 Ralf Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution - Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movement (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015), 109.
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engaged in unpaid labour and other professions from democratic decision-making. He 
also argued that, strategically, it would likely lead to terror and civil war. In “National 
Assembly and Council Assembly”, Karl Kautsky argued for the benefits of national-
assembly elections with universal suffrage along similar lines, but saw an ongoing role for 
workers’ councils in a parliamentary republic:
it is no less important that the popular masses energetically participate in this activity, 
strengthening the power of the representatives in parliament and spurring on their zeal 
with constant pressure from without. ... Moreover, the workers’ councils are uniquely 
competent to safeguard proletariat class interests ... the actual workers’ councils would 
retain important political functions. … Therefore it is not a question of either national 
assembly or workers’ councils, but both.18
Kautsky believed that workers’ councils, in addition to advocating for the interests 
of workers, would establish an important basis to put institutionalised pressure on 
parliamentary institutions from below. The right-wing USPD supported socialisation 
but argued for a more cautious approach than the Spartacus League and emphasised the 
need for careful planning and increasing overall production levels. During the revolution, 
however, this group exercised little influence as they were isolated between moderate 
MSPD and radicals with only a limited connection to organised workers.
The party that exercised the most decisive influence over the course of the revolution 
was the MSPD. Led by Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, the MSPD controlled 
three of the Rat der Volksbeauftragten’s seats and a majority of the delegates who attended 
the National Congress in December 1918. The following pamphlet details their support for 
elections to a national assembly:
Every day that delays the constituent national assembly also delays peace, prolongs the 
occupation of German territory, and deepens the food crisis. If we want bread, we need 
peace. If we want peace, we need the constituent national assembly and freely elected 
representatives of the German people. Peace, freedom, and bread were the goals of the 
proletarian uprising of November 9. Peace, freedom, and bread were the demands that 
brought victory. Those who prevent the constituent national assembly from forming 
rob the workers of peace, freedom, and bread; they take away the immediate fruits of 
the revolution; they are counterrevolutionaries.19
Their goal was to return to peace and order through a parliamentary democracy 
supported by independent trade unions, but with little change to the army, civil service 
18 Karl Kautsky, “National Assembly and Council Assembly,” in The German Revolution and the Debate on 
Soviet Power, ed. John Riddell (New York: Anchor Foundation, 1986), 100.





or workplace. They sought to avoid comprehensive structural reforms and opted instead 
for limited social reforms such as an eight-hour workday, unemployment benefits and 
increased protections for labourers. The MSPD strove to direct the election away from 
revolutionary transformation and ‘as rapidly as possible into the calmer channel of an 
election campaign’.20
The MSPD was supported by the liberal and progressive parties of the middle class, 
who saw the MSPD as the best vehicle to deliver parliamentary elections and avoid more 
extensive economic reforms. A number of such liberal and progressive parties changed 
their name immediately after the revolution: parts of the Nationalliberale Partei (National 
Liberal Party, NLP) and the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei (Progressive People’s Party, FVP) 
combined to form the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party, DVP), while other 
members of these groups formed the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic 
Party, DDP). The liberal parties all supported calls for a national election and opposed the 
continuation of the workers’ councils. Richard Müller noted that these liberals ‘demanded 
quiet, order, security, individual freedom, freedom of conscience, protection of private 
property, protection of the middle class, etc.’21 
There was a strong influence of neo-Kantian philosophy, which had developed in 
academic circles, on liberals as well as social democrats. According to this body of thought, 
workers were new citizens who were given control over their lives through new rights to 
self-government. The Weimar Republic was based on the enlightenment ideals associated 
with this body of thought, which conceived of citizens as endowed with certain rights and 
responsibilities. Local union leader and editor Carl Lindow wrote an article in Vorwärts 
on 22 December 1918 called ‘Revolution Verpflichtet!’ (Revolution’s duties): ‘Restrictions, 
to which one voluntary decides, bear only half the weight of forced ones. Therefore be 
moderate with wage demands!’22 There was an expectation amongst liberals that workers 
would become citizens able to participate in a system of self-governance and self-control.23 
One strategy of the liberal bourgeoisie was to develop its own councils, committees 
and interest groups mimicking the working class’ revolutionary forms of organisation. 
Although the main aim of most of these organisations was to steer the revolution towards 
a national assembly and resist the power of the radical workers’ councils, there were 
groups of liberals and democrats who were genuinely interested in democratising German 
politics and saw a future for councils in the new German state.24 
20 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London: Routledge, 1988), 11.
21 Müller, “Report by the Executive Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Great Berlin,” 72.
22 Carl Lindow, “Revolution Verpflichtet!,” Vorwärts, 22 December 1918, italics in original.
23 Moritz Föllmer, “The Unscripted Revolution: Male Subjectivities in Germany, 1918-1919,” Past & Present 
240, no. 1 (2018).
24 Hans-Joachim Bieber, Bürgertum in der Revolution: Bürgerräte und Bürgerstreiks in Deutschland 1918-
1920 (Hamburg: Christians, 1992).
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Other centrist and right-leaning parties also stood for election to the national assembly. 
The MSPD joined into a coalition with the DDP and the Catholic Deutsche Zentrumspartei 
(German Centre Party, ZENTRUM) to form the first government of the Weimar era. 
Richard Müller argued that there was a degree of opportunism in the actions of many of 
the liberal and centrist parties at the time:
Only four weeks before the revolution, these people still opposed general, equal, and 
secret suffrage. Suddenly, their love for equal rights and democracy – the ‘fundamental 
rights of the people’ – knew no boundaries. This, of course, included dramatic demands 
to respect their own rights as ‘equals’; after all, each citizen had a right to express his 
opinion in speech and writing.25
Lastly, there were also groups within Germany that held restorative ambitions and 
supported the monarchy and the German Empire’s old institutions and values. The 
national-conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People’s Party, 
DNVP) drew supporters from rural populations but also from conservative forces in 
Germany’s eastern provinces. It was supported by the industrialists and Junkers, and also 
catered to anti-Semitic sentiment in the middle classes. Although it outwardly supported 
a parliamentary republic in 1918, it quickly cemented into an anti-Weimar party during 
1919. At the DNVP’s party conference on 12 June 1919, Axel von Freytagh-Loringhoven 
dismissed Weimar as a ‘gottverdammte und gottverfluchte Republik’ (damned and cursed 
republic).26 
1.3 The Second International and the roots of council theory
The German Revolution cannot only be understood as a national event, as it was also 
embedded in an international context. The most important international context, at least 
for the revolutionaries, was that of the international labour movement. Hence, in order 
to evaluate and interpret the theoretical and practical positions of the various strands 
of revolutionaries in 1918, this section provides a very general history of the Second 
International.
After the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871, the International Workingmen’s 
Association (First International) met in The Hague from 2 to 7 September 1872. During 
the congress, tensions between the association’s anarchist and Marxist currents came to a 
head. One of the main theoretical debates was over the strategy of forming socialist parties 
in order to capture state power. Karl Marx had argued that the events of the Commune 
had shown that only seizing state power could liberate the proletariat, while anarchists like 
25 Müller, “Report by the Executive Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Great Berlin,” 72.
26 Quoted in Wolfgang Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19 in der Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. Deutungen 




Mikhaill Bakunin considered the Commune an example of the potential of decentralized 
organization and the rejection of statism. The Hague Congress ended with the expulsion 
of Bakunin and his allies from the Congress, which led to the definitive organisational 
split between the anarchist and Marxist socialists. The two currents continued to organise 
separate Congresses, but both Internationals disbanded in the years that followed.
It would only be in 1889 that a new, Second International, was established. It consisted 
of socialist and social democratic parties, with the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) a dominant force. In the context of this international association, socialist parties 
throughout Europe would develop into well-structured organisations that participated 
in national elections, established trade unions, and moreover created a working-class 
culture that was connected to the daily life and work of workers all over Europe. With the 
emergence of these socialist mass parties, a large network of socialist thinkers was able to 
share their ideas and strategies through a skyrocketing number of publications linked to 
national parties or the International. One of the main theoretical journals was Die Neue 
Zeit, linked to the German SPD. Subtitled Revue des geistigen und öffentlichen Lebens 
(review of intellectual and public life), it sought to relate theoretical and strategic debates 
to the everyday life and struggles of the working class.
The outbreak of World War I signalled the end of this International. All major workers’ 
parties supported their government’s war efforts, and the socialist ideal of championing 
class struggle over international warfare was betrayed. The period before the war had seen 
the first divisions within the international. The radical wing of the labour movement had 
grown increasingly vocal in their opposition to reformism, and in some countries like the 
Netherlands and Russia this had led to organisational split-offs. In these radical groups 
formed the origins of the communist parties, and also the roots of council communism.
Council communism was a socialist current that first emerged within the German and 
Dutch sections of the Second International. These council communists were critical of 
the bureaucratisation of the Russian Revolution, believed in the self-emancipation of the 
working class and advocated the establishment of workers’ councils.27 This body of theory 
was developed by key figures such as Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Otto Rühle, 
Richard Müller and Ernst Däumig, and responded to the experiences of the Russian and 
German revolutions. 
Council theory is little known beyond the narrow confines of a seemingly dogmatic 
ideology with rigid principles based on the rejection of hierarchies, mediation and 
substitutionism. Gilles Dauvé has argued that, although council theorists rightly 
emphasised the importance of worker self-activity and the dangers of bureaucratisation, 
council theory ultimately developed into a rigid ideology of ‘councilism’.28 While there are 
27 For an overview of the main debates and principles, see Marcel Van der Linden, “On Council 
Communism,” Historical Materialism 12, no. 4 (2004).
28 Gilles Dauvé, Eclipse and Re-Emergence of the Communist Movement (London: PM Press, 2015), 95.
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a number of excellent analyses of council thought that buck this general trend, this stale 
image unfortunately still predominates today.29 One reason for this is that some of the 
principal sources on the European council movements have been their political opponents 
and critics. John Medearis has shown how V. I. Lenin, Hannah Arendt and Joseph 
Schumpeter produced distorted accounts of the councils and obscured their significance 
for contemporary politics.30 One of the earliest and still most influential negative accounts 
of council theory was provided by Lenin in his polemic against what he portrayed as a form 
of ultra-leftism and an ‘infantile disorder’.31 For Lenin, this position adhered to a ‘rigid 
doctrinairism’, which rejected all forms of leadership, maintained a principled opposition 
to participation in parliamentary elections and trade-union activity and repudiated all 
political parties or party discipline. Lenin concluded that such ‘hopelessly muddled 
thinking’ in fact led to an ‘incapacity for sustained effort, unity and organised action, 
which, if encouraged, must inevitably destroy any proletarian revolutionary movement’.32 
The authority of such negative and misrepresentative accounts of the councils has added 
to their neglect within contemporary political theory.
Although council communist theory claims to be based on the council experiences 
in Germany, these well-developed ideas on the council and council communism only 
appeared (long) after the revolution. This means that the workers, soldiers, sailors and 
peasants in Germany had no theory of council communism or well-articulated concept 
of council democracy at their disposal in November 1918. These men and women had to 
theorise and conceptualise their experiences on the spot. If council communism is indeed 
based on these experiences, we should be able to trace some of the roots of this ideology 
back to the (however crude or ‘embryonic’) concepts developed in the actual historical 
councils. 
1.4 Historiography of the German Revolution
According to national-conservatives, monarchists and later national socialists, the 
revolution was a disaster, as the above section showed. The aversion of these national 
conservatives to the revolution is not surprising, and they considered the revolutionaries 
traitors of the German Reich. The infamous legend popularised by conservatives and 
29 Exceptions include Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 
1905–1921 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Phillippe Bourinet, The Dutch and German Communist 
Left (1900-1968):  ’Neither Lenin Nor Trotsky Nor Stalin!’ - ‘All Workers Must Think for Themselves!’ 
(Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2016); Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini (eds.), Ours to Master and to Own: 
Workers’ Control from the Commune to the Present (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).
30 John Medearis, “Lost or Obscured? How V. I. Lenin, Joseph Schumpeter and Hannah Arendt 
Misunderstood the Council Movement,” Polity (2004) 36 (3), 447–476.






nationalists claimed that the German Reich could have won the war if it had not been 
stabbed in the back by the left-wing (sometimes Jewish) revolutionaries. 
Even among those involved in the revolutionary events, the revolution was never 
a source of pride or joy. Former revolutionaries’ retrospective narratives of the events 
of 1918–19 can be divided in two schools. On the one hand, you have the radicals and 
communists, who considered the revolution as either incomplete, derailed or betrayed by 
social democrats. The mother party of the German (or even European) left had not only 
abandoned its revolutionary ideal of a socialist state, but had in fact actively opposed or 
even murdered its proponents. On the other hand, you have the social democrats and 
liberals involved in the revolution, who insisted on constructing a stable democratic 
republic and were weary of their revolutionary origins, particularly the revolution’s bloody 
second and third phases. Instead of participants of the revolution, these groups created a 
narrative of themselves as founders and defenders of the republic against violent threats 
from the right and left.
These three initial narratives of the German revolution – as the threat of subversive 
enemies such as socialists of Jews (nationalists, conservatives), as failure or betrayal 
(radical left wing) and as successful aversion of ‘Russian conditions’ (moderates) – 
would come to dominate the public memory of the German revolution. Though there 
are a number of early German studies on the councils dating from the 1920s,33 studies of 
the German Revolution suffered a significant decline after the 1920s. In the years up to 
and immediately following World War II, the revolution in Germany remained a largely 
neglected topic for historians. Walter Tormin’s excellent study remains an exception.34 
Tormin was a social democratic historian and politician from Hamburg who argued in his 
dissertation that a Bolshevik takeover had never been a serious danger in Germany and 
that the councils were actually an attempt to radically democratise German society. This 
went against the dominant post-war narrative that 1918 had been a successful defence of the 
young Weimar Republic against Bolshevism. In the 1960s, West German historians such 
as Eberhard Kolb, Peter von Oertzen and Reinhard Rürup began to demonstrate that the 
German revolutionaries did not want to follow the example of the Russian Revolution, but 
to democratise authority structures and increase citizen control over social institutions.35 
33 Eduard Bernstein, Die Deutsche Revolution von 1918/19. Geschichte der Entstehung und Ersten 
Arbeitsperiode der Deutschen Republik (Berlin: Verlag für Gesellschaft und Erziehung, 1921); Franz 
Gutmann, Das Rätesystem: Seine Verfechter und Seine Probleme (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922); 
Richard Müller, Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik (Vienna: Malik Verlag, 1924); Arthur Rosenberg, A History 
of the German Republic (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1936).
34 Walter Tormin, Zwischen Rätediktatur und Sozialer Demokratie: Die Geschichte der Rätebewegung in der 
Deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1954).
35 Eberhard Kolb, Die Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918-1919 (Düsseldorf: Kommission für 
Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 1962); Peter von Oertzen, Betriebsräte 
in der Novemberrevolution. Eine Politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der 
Betrieblichen und Wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 1963); Reinhard Rürup, Probleme der Revolution in Deutschland 1918/19 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1968).
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The wave of publications in the 1960s coincided with the councils’ 50th anniversary 
and was inspired by the growth of the student and democratic movements at the time. 
These publications sought new interpretations of the revolutionary movements as a way 
of exploring different possibilities for democratic socialist politics (not coincidentally, 
historians like Von Oertzen and Rürup were active social democrats). The main narrative 
of this wave of studies was that the revolution had been a missed opportunity that had not 
fulfilled its potential to democratize German society. After this short burst of publications, 
there was another decline in historical scholarship. The 1980s’ Historikerstreit narrowed 
historical debates down to the era of national socialism, to which the revolution of 1918 
was at best a marginal phenomenon.36 With the exception of a few important studies by 
Ulrich Kluge,37 Wolfgang Mommsen38 and Heinrich August Winkler,39 there has only 
recently been a revival of historical interest in the German Revolution.40
While the public and academic attention for the Novemberrevolution was fairly 
limited, historians in the GDR not only found an audience in academic journals but also 
in newspapers and magazines. Their analysis fitted the official narrative of the socialist 
state, which considered itself the continuation and completion of what had been started 
in November 1918.41 One of the most important publications was the volume Vorwärts 
und nicht vergessen, commissioned and edited by the scientific bureau of the GDR’s ruling 
party, the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED).42 The 
book collected the detailed personal experiences of revolutionaries, with a strong focus 
on (communist) party activities and the foundation of the KPD. From the perspective 
of the East-German state, the Novemberrevolution mainly served as an example of the 
need for worker unity. According to GDR historians, the revolution’s failure resulted from 
struggles between the various workers’ parties, and as such legitimated the existence of 
the SED.43
In contrast to the wave of research in the 1960s, when historians were interested in 
broader questions about the democratic potential of the council movement and in the 
general outcomes of these council experiments, contemporary studies have been more 
36 Wolfgang Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie (Berlin: Europa 
Verlag, 2017).
37 Ulrich Kluge, Soldatenräte und Revolution. Studien zur Militärpolitik in Deutschland 1918/19 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975).
38 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Die Deutsche Revolution 1918/19,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4, no. 3 (1978).
39 Heinrich August Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der 
Weimar Republik 1918 bis 1924 (Berlin and Bonn: JHW Dietz Nachf, 1984).
40 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19 in der Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. Deutungen von der Weimarer 
Republik bis ins 21. Jahrhundert; Revolution und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland 1918-1920,  (Essen: 
Klartext, 2013).
41 Gallus, “Die Vergessene Revolution von 1918/19 - Erinnerung und Deutung im Wandel,” 24.
42 Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen. Erlebnisberichte 
Aktiver Teilnehmer der Novemberrevolution 1918/1919 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1960).




fragmented in scope and outlook, focusing more on individuals. Ralf Hoffrogge published 
a ground-breaking study of Richard Müller and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards.44 Mark 
Jones examined the role of fear and violence in the German Revolution with a meticulous 
study of newspapers and ego-documents written during the events.45 And William A. 
Pelz highlighted the important role of ordinary citizens in the uprising, stressing that the 
council movements were animated by the passions and desires of everyday workers.46 
The revolution’s centenary in 2018 marked another wave of new publications. 
Interestingly, the general narrative was very positive. The revolution was seen as a revolt for 
freedom,47 as a friendly and utopian effort by dreamy Munich poets48 and as the peaceful 
birth of German democracy.49 Volker Stalmann, in a recent historiographical overview, 
highlighted some promising new pathways for historical research.50 He recognizes the 
issue of gender and the revolutionary subject (a topic that was brilliantly picked up by 
Moritz Föllmer),51 questions of media and communications, and questions of culture, 
symbolism and rhetoric. 
Yet little of this historical research on the German Revolution has focussed on the 
political theories of the Revolution or examined its contribution to contemporary debates. 
An edited volume, edited by James Muldoon and myself, was a first attempt to bridge 
these fields of political theory and the history of the revolution,52 and focussed on well-
known figures from the revolution and on well-established political ideas and theorists 
that played important roles. 
This thesis aims to go beyond leading figures and eloquent theorists, and analyse 
the role of common revolutionaries and their ideas in the revolutionary councils. I will 
combine the 1960s studies’ broader perspective with modern historiography’s attention 
to individuals. My focus will be on ordinary revolutionaries who participated in the 
revolution’s debates, and my aim to trace the development of their thoughts and arguments. 
This will result in a broader perspective on particular categories of revolutionaries 
(common revolutionaries, intermediaries and professional thinkers) and their roles and 
relations during the revolution. Who were exactly these men and women who took a seat 
in the council? What did they think about these experiences? And what happened to their 
44 Ralf Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movements (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015).
45 Jones, Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919.
46 Pelz, A People’s History of the German Revolution 1918-1919.
47 Joachim Käppner, 1918 - Aufstand für die Freiheit. Die Revolution der Besonnenen (München: Piper 
Verlag, 2017).
48 Volker Weidermann, Träumer. Als die Dichter die Macht Übernahmen (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 
2017).
49 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie.
50 Volker Stalmann, “Die Wiederentdeckung der Revolution von 1918/19: Forschungsstand und 
Forschungsperspektiven,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 64, no. 6 (2016).
51 Föllmer, “The Unscripted Revolution: Male Subjectivities in Germany, 1918-1919.”
52 Kets and Muldoon, The German Revolution and Political Theory.
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ideas? Whereas existing research has mostly focussed on what people did, the contribution 
of this thesis is to highlight what they thought. 
1.5 Research questions
While historians have long discovered that history is not made by rulers and kings but by 
ordinary people, this democratisation has not yet reached the history of political thought. 
With this thesis, my aim is to fill this lacuna and provide a first idea about what such a 
history of political thought could look like. This thesis thus engages with ordinary rank-
and-file members of the councils who are not part of the traditional history books. It seeks 
to analyse how these people developed their ideas about politics in the councils of workers 
and soldiers in four major cities in Germany. The cases shed light on how the workers and 
soldiers who took part in the council movement related to its intellectual and political 
leaders, and they also clarify the role of intermediaries in this process. By closely studying 
the council debates, we learn how council members conceptualised their own experiences 
and expectations in these new political institutions. The theoretical contribution of this 
thesis will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter 2, but this brief outline introduces the 
main questions animating this book.
In order to reach these aims, the main research question of this thesis is:
What is the role of, and mutual relationship between, intellectuals, intermediaries 
and common revolutionaries in the development of ideas about democracy in the 
German Revolution of 1918–19?
The answer to this question will improve our understanding of the actors, events and 
processes of the German Revolution. More generally, it will enable a new perspective on 
the history of political thought, one that is sensitive to the development and contestation 
of political ideas at the very basis of our democratic society. In order to answer the main 
research question, an additional set of sub-questions will guide the case studies:
How were councils established during the revolution, and who was able to influence 
this process?
How were the councils conceptualised and contested by various groups in relation to 
existing political institutions?





1.6 The four case studies
In order to answer the questions posed above, this thesis will zoom in on four large cities 
and the debates that took place in their local councils during the German Revolution. 
This section will introduce the four cases and argue why they help us understand the 
development of political thought during the revolution. 
Apart from justifying my choice of geographical focal points, I should briefly reflect 
on temporal delineations as well. Any historical event is a construct, the result of people 
(historians or others) consciously demarcating facts that are part of this event from those that 
are not. For some events these demarcations are clear (a declaration of war or the signing of a 
peace treaty – although even in those cases one could argue, for example, that the war started 
earlier or lasted longer), and for others they are fuzzy and open to debate (the Industrial 
Revolution or the end of the French Revolution, for instance). In the historiography of the 
German Revolution, there is not much debate about when (or where) the revolution began. 
The sailors’ revolt in Kiel and its spread to other cities early in the second week of November 
1918 is a rather clear starting point of the chain of events that started the revolution. Still, 
a recent volume on the German Revolution argues that the revolution really started in 
the middle of the war.53 According to the editors, the year 1916 marked the beginning of 
a growing social protest movement combined with an increasing political and ideological 
articulation of revolutionary language. Though this thesis will not reach that far back, I will 
cover some of the main (local) events and movements leading up to those early weeks of 
November for all of the four cases to provide context. Nevertheless, the thesis will focus on 
what in historiography is categorised as the revolution’s first and second phase.
The first phase covers the months of November and December 1918, when the main 
debates and struggles over the political and social future of the new republic took place. 
Because of these fundamental debates in the councils and other institutions, this is the 
most important phase for this study into revolutionary actors and the development of 
their ideas. The second phase stretches from December 1918 to the spring of 1919. In this 
period, at least on the national level, many important decisions about Germany’s future 
begin to be contested by disappointed groups in society and defended by others. This 
phase also saw ‘the growing radicalisation of the rank and file (mostly workers) … who 
had expected more democratic impulses from the revolution’.54 It is also in this period 
that the peaceful revolution starts to develop into violent conflict, mostly as the result of 
government responses to the perceived threat of radicalising masses.55 The second phase 
ends with the violent attack on the Munich Council Republic in May 1919, and this also 
ends the temporal scope of this thesis.
53 Germany 1916-23: A Revolution in Context,  (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015).
54 Ibid., 11.
55 Jones, Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919.
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Some authors also distinguish a third phase covering the period between the 
suppression of the Munich Republic until May 1920, which saw a spiral of violence in both 
the military and right-wing Freikorps, as well as in the die-hard revolutionary groups, 
ending with violent clashes in the Ruhr region. In an international context, a case can 
even be made for stretching this third phase of social unrest until 1923. It is true that in 
the years between 1919 and 1923, much like a peat-moor fire, local uprisings and fights 
between revolutionaries and the armed forces of the young Weimar Republic would pop 
up constantly. The Weinhauer, McElligott and Heinsohn volume (2015) has convincingly 
shown that there is merit to locate the German Revolution in such a broad temporal 
context.56 However, in terms of the development of ideas within the councils of workers 
and soldiers, the first and second phase (from November 1918 to May 1919) will be the 
focus of this thesis. 
In terms of spatial demarcation, there have been efforts to relate the 1918 revolution 
to that in Russia,57 or to other European council experiences,58 but most of the literature 
focusses on the revolution as a national one. This thesis acknowledges the revolution’s 
international and transnational elements, and individual chapters will stress– for example 
– the impact of Dutch theorists on the Bremen leftist radicals, that of Russian revolutionary 
ideas, or the relation between the soviet in Munich and the revolutionary atmosphere in 
Budapest and Vienna.59 Nevertheless, the scope of the thesis is not international, nor will it be 
narrowly national: even though the four cases are inherently related, and there is continuous 
interaction between events in the major cities, the focus will be explicitly on four cases.
Most studies of the revolution have a strong focus on the events, actors and ideas 
in the capital, Berlin. It is beyond doubt that Berlin played an important part, as it 
harboured the national government, the new national assembly, the major assemblies of 
council representatives, and certainly decisions in Berlin were intended to regulate the 
entire state. But although one of the four case studies will analyse the council debates 
in Berlin, there are good reasons to shift our gaze beyond the capital as well. First of 
all, the revolution was never a Berlin revolution: it started in the north-western harbour 
cities and it ended in the southern state of Bavaria. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
revolution ran profoundly different courses in different local contexts. And lastly, the 
council organisation that marked the German Revolution led to a decentralized system 
56 Germany 1916-23: A Revolution in Context.
57 Helmut Neubauer, ed. Deutschland und die Russische Revolution, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968); Erich 
Matthias, “Die Rückwirkung der Russischen Oktoberrevolution auf die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung,” 
in Deutschland und die Russische Revolution, ed. Helmut Neubauer (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968).
58 F.L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 (Wildwood House, 1972); Germany 1916-23: A 
Revolution in Context; Donny Gluckstein, Western Soviets. Workers’ Councils Versus Parliament 1915-
1920 (London: Bookmarks, 1985).
59 See section 4.11 of this thesis for a more elaborate description of the Austrian and Hungarian council 




of representation based in the local context. On this local level, often on factory floors 
or in the city’s barracks, representatives were elected and decisions were taken. These 
representatives were then delegated to a higher (provincial or national) level to discuss 
those decisions and synchronise developments with other cities. Taken together, this 
means that any thesis interested in the development of political ideas within councils 
must take the local level as its point of reference.
The fact that four cities were selected implies that dozens of other potential cases were 
not. Cases like Kiel and Wilhelmshaven would have been rather similar to those of Bremen 
and Hamburg, but without the meaningful extra layer of the autonomous city-state. 
Brunswick would be a very interesting case, with the council republic that was established 
by Spartacists in March 1919, but it is relatively comparable to Munich, albeit on a smaller 
scale. With its strong intellectual and artistic milieu, however, Munich provides a more 
interesting case in light of the aims of this thesis. Many more local revolutionary histories 
would certainly be worth studying, but as a thesis cannot hope to cover all German cities 
in depth, I will focus on these four major German cities.
Berlin is the most obvious choice, for reasons already stated. What is interesting in 
Berlin is the direct relation between the local and the national level, between city politics 
and the nation’s future. My case study of Berlin will focus on its council congress, where 
delegates from the entire country assembled to discuss the new republic’s political and 
social institutions. 
Bremen and Hamburg were chosen because of their position in the German Reich. 
These two Hanseatic cities were both so-called Free States, and therefore had long 
traditions of relatively autonomous local political institutions. This resulted in sharp 
debates about the relation between revolutionary councils and traditional political forms. 
As such, the debates in these local councils prefigured the debates that would later take 
place on a national level in Berlin. What makes Bremen particularly interesting is the 
existence of a radicalised workers movement consisting mostly of metal workers and some 
teachers who were influenced by prominent radical thinkers such as Anton Pannekoek 
and Karl Radek. Moreover, for a brief moment Bremen established itself as an independent 
council republic. My case study aims to find out how this local history influenced the local 
council’s debates. Of particular interest in Hamburg is the role of radicalised soldiers, 
as one of the most remarkable decisions in the German Revolution arguably was the 
democratisation of the army. Though this decision was made at the Council Congress in 
Berlin, it originated in Hamburg (and hence became known as the Hamburger Punkte). An 
analysis of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in Hamburg will shed light on the origins of 
ideas regarding democracy and the army. 
The revolution not only marked the end of German Emperor Wilhelm, but also the 
century-long reign of the Wittelsbach dynasty in Bavaria. The case of revolutionary 
Munich provides this thesis with some interesting opportunities. First of all, as Munich 
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was a cultural and intellectual hotbed in the early 20th century, this left its mark on the 
city’s revolutionary movement. Many artists, writers and intellectuals joined the councils, 
and the local leader of the revolution was Kurt Eisner, a remarkable man with remarkable 
ideas that did not fit any of the political parties very well. This case thus present an 
opportunity to analyse the effect of such a peculiar intellectual revolutionary leader 
on the development of council politics. Furthermore, the revolution developed along 
uncommon lines, because Kurt Eisner was murdered just before Munich would become a 
parliamentary republic. In response to the murder, Munich was declared a soviet republic 
(in direct reference to the Russian councils), with power based in the workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils. This first anarchist council republic was followed by a second communist-led 
council republic. These elements provide a rich body of debates and texts that can shed 
light on the development and transfer of ideas about council politics.
1.7 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of what revolutions are and how they have been 
conceptualised and studied in academic literature. I then proceed by describing the 
key actors in revolutions and how network theory can help conceptualise the roles of 
various actors. The third section of that chapter will explain the historical tradition of 
studying concepts and ideologies, and the fourth section highlights Gramsci’s concept of 
intellectuals. 
After this theoretical chapter, I present the four case studies, starting with Chapter 3 
on Berlin, where the local perspective is contrasted with the broader perspective of Berlin 
as the capital. After that comes Chapter 4, in which the city of Munich takes centre stage. 
Chapter 5 describes the events, actors and ideas of the council republic of Bremen, and 
Chapter 6 deals with the councils in Hamburg – where no such republic was established.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I will summarize the main findings of the four cases 










The history of our society is a history of revolutions. Throughout history, protests, 
strikes, revolts and revolutions have contested existing power structures, injustices and 
everyday experiences of oppression and exploitation. This thesis analyses one of these 
many revolutions, one that challenged the structure of German politics and society in 
1918. In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of that analysis will be presented and 
discussed. The first section will delve into theories and definitions of revolution in order 
to establish what it is exactly what we mean when we call the events of November 1918 
a revolution. The second section investigates various agents of revolutions, categorizing 
them into three main groups: common revolutionaries, intermediaries, and professional 
thinkers. This section will also identify the role of ideas in the relationships between these 
groups. 
The third section then asks how we can understand and analyse political thought. It 
will present an outline of the meaning of concepts and ideologies, and explain how these 
will analysed in this thesis. The final section relates the role of revolutionary actors to the 
production of ideas by providing a Gramscian notion of intellectuals that will be used in 
this thesis to make sense of the mental activities of revolutionaries.
2.1 What are revolutions?
In order to investigate how ideas developed and travelled in the German Revolution, we 
must first of all ask: what is a revolution? Many scholars have answered this question 
differently over the past century. Jack A. Goldstone, a leading political scientist, has 
divided the theories of revolutions into three,60 and later four,61 generations. Briefly 
put, in the first half of the 20th century, the first generation collected and described the 
major stages of revolutions, without an interest in theorizing the events. After World 
War II, a second generation of scholars emerged who did develop broader theories to 
understand revolutions. Goldstone, following Theda Skocpol,62 roughly demarcates three 
of these theoretical strands by their respective focus on psychology, sociology or political 
science. The first strand (including theorists like Gurr and Davies) aimed to understand 
revolutions from the perspective of mass psychology and the role of anger or deprivation 
in terms of economical or political opportunities. A second strand had a sociological 
background, and was aimed at the structural, systemic causes of revolutions. At the heart 
of the explanations of authors like Johnson, Jessop and Hart was social instability, related 
to the distribution of political, cultural or economic resources in systems and subsystems. 
The third strand of thought was based on political science and the notions of pluralism 
60 Jack A. Goldstone, “Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation,” World Politics 32, no. 3 (1980).
61 “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revlutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 4 (2001).
62 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, 




and power struggle. Authors like Tilly and Huntington are included in this strand, which 
considered revolutions the ultimate power struggles between competing social groups 
with alternative claims to sovereignty.63 
The third generation developed in the late 1960s and 1970s, and shifted the attention to 
more complex concurrences of various conflicts, including that between city and countryside, 
between elites and between states. The most influential work in this generation was the 
monumental State and Social Revolutions by Theda Skocpol, in which she defines revolutions 
as ‘rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures’ that are ‘accompanied 
and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below’.64 This definition shows that 
what Skocpol considers revolutions are social revolutions that transform both the political 
and the social realm – setting them apart from rebellions or protest movements. Moreover, 
she argued that a considerable amount of popular mobilization is required, setting social 
revolutions apart from, for example, coups d’état. The work of Skocpol and many other ‘third-
generation’ revolutions scholars have focussed on the ‘great revolutions’, generally including 
England (1640), France (1789), Russia (1917) and China (1949), and their analyses generally 
followed the Marx-inspired sociological explanatory mechanism of transformative class 
struggle in an instable capitalist political and economic context. Although this perspective 
added much to our understanding of revolutions and how they occur, it omits at least two 
important elements. First, with ‘class’ considered a black box, neither multi-class coalitions 
nor intra-class struggles were considered to play a part in revolutions. Second, these scholars 
were not interested in revolutionary ideas, ideologies, or competing conceptions of the 
good.65 This started to change in the late 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s, which saw revolutions 
occurred that did not fit the theories of the third generation. The revolutions in Iran and 
Afghanistan made clear that the omission of ideology and religion was problematic, and the 
plethora of revolutions in Africa proved that the traditional focus on ‘great revolutions’ was 
too strict and Eurocentric.
A fourth generation sought to do justice to this diversity of causes of, and processes 
in, revolutions, as opposed to the more static and ‘large’ structural causes of the third 
generation. Based on these new insights, Goldstone proposes a new definition:
An effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political 
authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-
institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities.66
63 Goldstone, “Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation.”
64 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. 4.




Three elements of this definition stand out: first of all, that a struggle over conceptions 
of justice should inform the attempt to challenge a political regime. Secondly, that a mass 
movement should actively support that contesting conception of justice and be willing to 
take to the streets for it. Thirdly, that this contestation occurs outside the traditional realm 
of institutionalised politics. A revolution is not (just) an election; it always also involves 
other – non-institutional – actions such as strikes, demonstrations, looting, protests or 
violence. According to Goldstone, this thin definition is one that most fourth-generation 
scholars of revolutions can adhere to. 
Recently, in response to new empirical research on the Arab revolutions of the 21st 
century, George Lawson has argued that the fourth generation has been effective in its 
critique of the third generation, but that it has not yet realised its own agenda.67 He argues 
that, firstly, instead of the current focus on revolutions’ necessary ‘attributes’, revolutions 
should be conceived more as ‘emergent processes’. Secondly, revolutionary theory should 
take agency more seriously through a stronger focus on relations and networks, and their 
contestation over meanings and political institutions. Thirdly, the study of revolutions 
should have an intersocietal approach.
Reflecting on these theoretical insights, this dissertation is supportive of the aims of 
the fourth generation. I will emphasise the agency of individual actors and study their 
place and function in various networks of revolutionaries. The role of social constellations 
such as class will play a role in this, for example because many of the actors identified 
themselves as part of that class and because their conception of what the revolution was and 
how it should evolve was informed by this conception of class. Nevertheless, ‘the working 
class’ is not a black box, and this research will show that many of the contestations over 
meaning will take place within the working class. The focus of this thesis will be on the 
role of revolutionary ideas and these actors’ narratives in their networks. These networks 
will be elaborated in the next section on the agents of revolution.
Goldstone’s definition can be said to provide a traditional political-scientific perspective 
on revolutions, with a focus on power, political institutions and the mobilization of masses. 
Although ideas and concepts play a role in this perspective, one important dimension of 
the political is missing: political culture. Recent scholars have begun to pave the way for 
more research into the political culture of the German Revolution.68 Indeed, an analysis 
of the political culture of the 1918–1919 councils would surely provide a very welcome 
addition (and possibly contrast) to, for example, Thomas Mergel’s work on the Weimar 
67 George Lawson, “Within and Beyond the “Fourth Generation” of Revolutionary Theory,” Sociological 
Theory 34, no. 2 (2016).
68 Cf, for example: Gallus, “Die Vergessene Revolution von 1918/19 - Erinnerung und Deutung im 
Wandel.”; Stalmann, “Die Wiederentdeckung der Revolution Von 1918/19: Forschungsstand und 
Forschungsperspektiven.”; A great example of a more politico-cultural perspective is provided in: 




Republic.69 Although this thesis will briefly touch upon some elements of political culture 
when it helps understand the events and development of ideas in the councils, it will not 
be a structural element of my research. This thesis is more along the lines of traditional 
political science and political history – with a focus on power relations, political institutions 
and the development of ideas about this by various actors in the revolution. 
In a recent attempt to bridge the descriptive discipline of history and the comparative 
discipline of political science, Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein have proposed to 
consider revolutions as ‘scripted’ events.70 Whereas historians have generally stressed 
the uniqueness of particular revolutions and criticized political scientists’ attempts to 
generalise core features of revolutions (see above), political scientists have in turn argued 
that a theory of revolution is needed in order to understand how they work and why they 
succeed or fail. Baker and Edelstein suggest that the concept of a ‘script’ can serve both 
groups. Revolutionaries, they argue, strongly draw on past experiences and memories of 
previous revolutions in order to create a narrative of their own events. This script sets the 
scene, sheds light on the main characters and describes their relations. The script is the 
projection of a narrative, but it can be reconstituted through enactment and re-enactment. 
Though the actors play their parts within this prior framework, they can follow the lines, 
improvise or even change the script. What is interesting about such a script is that it is 
both reflective of past experiences and formative of new ones. It constitutes a continuous 
contestation of meanings, narratives, subject positions and relations. This dynamic, 
agency-centred perspective of revolution leaves room for ‘thin’ generalisations that fit the 
comparative agenda of political scientists while avoiding overgeneralisations and catering 
to the unique context of particular revolutions.
The edited volume by Baker and Edelstein does not include a chapter on the German 
Revolution, but the previously mentioned research by Moritz Föllmer has used the concept 
of script to study male subjectivities in the revolution.71 His conclusion, however, was that 
the German Revolution was unscripted. Marxist theory did not provide anything that 
could be used as a fitting script, and although references were made to the revolutions in 
France and Russia, they did not provide a script in the sense of a framework that could 
guide the acts of German revolutionaries. Another potential example, the revolutions of 
1848, was also not part of the revolutionary repertoire of 1918–1919. Föllmer thus concludes 
that the German Revolution had no script to follow: ‘intellectuals were overwhelmingly 
struggling to keep pace with the revolutionary dynamic rather than anticipating or 
shaping it, as Baker and Edelstein’s model would suggest’.72 Notably, Föllmer appears to 
69 Thomas Mergel, Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Kommunikation, 
symbolische Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Reichstag, (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2005).
70 Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions,  (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015).




suggest that writing the script must be the work of a particular group of revolutionaries: 
the intellectuals. But what exactly is the role of intellectuals in revolutions, and how is this 
group related to other revolutionary actors?
2.2 Agents of revolutions
In the previous section, Charles Tilly was mentioned as one of the structuralist political 
scientists who examined revolutions from the perspective of groups competing for 
sovereignty and state power. But Tilly was more than a mere structuralist, and his 
perspective on revolutions changed over the course of his career. In his earlier works, 
most notably in From Mobilization to Revolution, Tilly aimed to find those structuralist 
explanations for revolutions by developing a theory of resource mobilization by social 
movements.73 He developed a causal model explaining how collective interests are fostered 
in organisations and how organisation can lead to mobilisation (through control over 
resources), which in turn leads to collective action in pursuit of the collective interests.74 
The problem of such a model for the aims of this thesis is that it aggregates interests and 
ideas on the group level. In order for the abstract model to function, there is no room for 
in-group heterogeneity, for contestations of ideas within these groups or for insights in 
relation between various sub-groups within the larger class. 
In his later works, however, Tilly went beyond his structuralist perspective by 
examining processes75 and networks of actors.76 Other structuralist theorists, such as 
Goldstone77 and Skocpol,78 underwent a similar change of perspective in order to include 
networks of actors in their analyses of social movements and revolutions. What, then, are 
networks, how do they work, and how can they help us understand processes within the 
German Revolution? 
One of the main reasons that social scientists such as Tilly, Goldstone or Skocpol had 
considerable difficulties understanding and explaining the nature of social movements 
was that these movements were often highly heterogeneous and variable,79 diffuse 
combinations of events, groups, people and ideas that proved difficult to structure or define. 
73 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
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75 Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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77 Jack A. Goldstone, “From Structure to Agency to Process: The Evolution of Charles Tilly’s Theories of 
Social Action as Reflected in His Analyses of Contentious Politics,” American Sociologist 41 (2010).
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Recent studies in the social sciences have focussed on this variable nature by perceiving 
social movements as networks that are not primarily or inherently coherent or stable, 
and investigating particular entities and their relations.80 In the context of revolutionary 
Germany, one can expect the make-up of these networks to undergo rapid changes. 
Moreover, the German labour movement at that time should be considered as part of an 
international theoretical and activist community.81 For any investigation into the transfer 
of ideas between (groups of) actors in the German Revolution, paying attention to the 
revolutionary movement’s social network and its types of actors and relationships is a 
prerequisite.82 
One of the core concepts in network research is centrality. Any actor can be described 
through three main categories of centrality: degree centrality, betweenness centrality and 
eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality explains the number of other actors to which a 
particular actor is linked. An actor can be described by the number of other actors that 
know them (the indegree) or by the number of actors they know (the outdegree). The 
relation between two actors can be relatively equal, which is termed ‘nondirectional’, 
or unequal, which is called directional. This is not only meant to describe sheer power, 
but also the transfer of ideas between actor A and B, for example. Betweenness centrality 
describes an actor who functions as link between two groups of actors.83 In this dissertation, 
this type of actor is of particular interest, as I expect that the transfer of ideas between 
professional thinkers and common revolutionaries in the German Revolution will largely 
take place through a group of intermediaries such as party leaders, journal editors or 
union stewards. The function of this group of intermediaries is similar to that of ‘cultural 
intermediaries’ as theorised by Bourdieu and other sociologists.84 Eigenvector centrality, 
lastly, expresses the relations of an actor with particularly important or central actors.85 
This form of centrality can be expected to occur in the network of professional thinkers. 
Most theoreticians of the council communist movement were in close contact with each 
other, and many other actors will have known them as well. 
80 Bas Hendrikx, “Scenes from a Movement. An Actor-Network Analysis of the Global Rise of the Homeless 
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As already noted above, this thesis demarcates three groups of actors in the networks 
of revolutionaries in the German Revolution. These groups are never fixed, and, as we will 
see, actors may move from one group to another over the course of the revolution. The 
first group is that of professional thinkers, who lived by the production and articulation 
of ideas: intellectuals, academics, party ideologues and theorists. The second group is that 
of the common revolutionaries. These actors played an active part in the revolutionary 
events and debates (generally as member of one of the councils), but were not paid for 
their intellectual work. They worked in factories, small shops, barracks or on the land, 
and although they were often compensated for their participation in council politics, they 
were not professional producers of ideas. A third group consists of intermediaries who 
‘traded’ ideas between the other two groups, think of local party leaders, journal editors, 
journalists, union representatives – people who mediated between the production and 
consumption of ideas. 
But what was the role of ideas in these networks? Where did they come from, and how 
were they disseminated, contested or used in the networks? In order to begin answering 
those questions, it is necessary to examine what ideas are. The traditional way to relate 
the history of ideas to social history has been the conceptual history approach developed 
in Bielefeld around the work of historian Reinhart Koselleck.86 Koselleck’s monumental 
project of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe aimed to understand the relation between the 
development of historical concepts and developments in their social context. Koselleck 
showed that changes in political concepts and changes in social history were strongly 
interrelated by describing how the arrival of modernity in Europe had fundamentally 
changed the meaning of almost all available political concepts. Contemporary social 
history has changed since Koselleck’s time, now focussing on small groups, networks and 
particular historical events rather than on the large structures that determine society. This 
new social history, based on network theory, provides an excellent link to the transfer of 
political ideas within groups. Once we conceive of the German revolutionary movements 
as ‘heterogeneous and fragmented phenomena, which internally contain a multitude of 
differentiated meanings, forms of action, and modes of organization and which often 
consume a large part of their energies in the effort to bind such differences together’,87 it 
becomes feasible to treat this movement as the arena in which the struggle with and over 
political concepts takes place.
86 Marten Düring and Florian Kerschbaumer, “Quantifizierung und Visualisierung. Anknüpfungspunkte 
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2.3 Studying concepts and ideologies
This section will explain what concepts are, how they can be studied and how we can 
position and understand their role within more coherent frameworks like ideologies or 
world views. The historical school related to the aforementioned Reinhart Koselleck has 
become known as Begriffsgeschichte. This strand of historical research originated in the late 
1960s in the context of what is now known as the linguistic turn. In this period, three works 
were published that would notably alter historical ontology and epistemology. Koselleck 
published the introductory article to his grand project Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe under 
the title ‘Richtlinien’,88 Michel Foucault presented his Archéologie du Savoir89 and Quentin 
Skinner produced his article ‘Meaning and Understanding’.90 These three publications 
contributed to the insights of social constructivism, the idea that social reality is generated 
by the way we think and talk about it. Koselleck strikingly formulated how this applied to 
the study of concepts: ‘A concept is not simply indicative of the relations which it covers; 
it is also a factor within them.’91 
Concepts are constitutive in the sense that they create particular spaces of 
conceivability. Koselleck distinguishes two types of spaces: the space of experience and 
the horizon of expectation. In the space of experience (Erfahrungsraum), concepts can 
accumulate individual and collective experiences in the form of memories over time, and 
thus influence or limit the agent’s current behaviour. This means that concepts can also 
lose meaning: experiences can be forgotten, memories erased. A concept can be seen as 
a part of the past taking shape in the present, thus influencing the agent’s actions. The 
horizon of expectation (Erwartungshorizont), on the other hand, constitutes the other 
side of the historical present, our gaze towards the future. This horizon is structured 
by the expectations, hopes and fears that any individual has at a given point in time. 
Experience and expectation are entirely intertwined: there could be no expectations 
without experiences, nor experiences without any expectations. Not only do the two 
intersect in the historical present, they constitute and are constituted by the concepts 
used by historical actors. As concepts order the experience of actors, they shape actors’ 
identity and position as subjects. As Jason Edwards wrote: ‘It is in this way that Koselleck’s 
Begriffsgeschichte points to the role of social and political concepts as transformative tools, 
capable of changing relations in social and political institutions and practices.’92
88 Reinhart Koselleck, “Richtlinien für das Lexikon Politisch-Sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit,” Archiv für 
Begriffsgeschichte 11 (1967).
89 Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du Savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1986).
90 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and theory 8 (1969).
91 Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History,” in: Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
92 Jason Edwards, “The Ideological Interpellation of Individuals as Combatants: An Encounter between 
Reinhart Koselleck and Michel Foucault,” Journal of Political Ideologies 12 (2007).
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Central to Koselleck’s account of concepts is the idea that they are always subject to 
socio-political contestation. This notion of inherent conflict can be traced back to the 
influence of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), who believed that political ideas and concepts 
have a ‘fundamentally polemic meaning’ and acquire meaning in war or revolution.93 The 
‘correct’ use and meaning of concepts is subject to continuous conflict that flares up in 
times of upheaval. Koselleck calls these Kampfsbegriffe: concepts people struggle with and 
over.94 Michael Freeden, as will be elaborated below, puts this inherent contestation over 
concepts in the broader perspective of ideologies. He argues that ideologies always aim to 
do the exact opposite: decontest concepts. Once a concept is situated within an ideology, 
that particular understanding will be presented as the only one: ‘this is what liberty means, 
and that is what justice means’.95 So even though the essential contestability of concepts is 
at the centre of analysis for historians of concepts, historians of ideologies must take into 
account that the function of ideology is exactly to end this contestation and provide a set 
understanding of concepts in order to legitimize itself. Freeden concludes: ‘Competing 
ideologies are hence struggles over the socially legitimated meanings of political concepts 
and the sustaining arrangements they form, in an attempt to establish a “correct” usage’.96 
In practice, this means that even though concepts are essentially contested, any political 
actor who wishes to deploy those concepts in the framework of a coherent ideology must 
pretend that their meaning is fixed. In the context of the German Revolution, this means 
that even those who contest the existing political order and its justification or legitimacy, 
or contest the very possibility of such permanent order, still aspire to conceptual order. 
As Freeden puts it, ‘permanent revolutionaries and anarchists dream of establishing their 
own settled patterns’.97
Freeden’s positioning of the study of ideology at the very core of political theory results 
from the assumption that political thought is made up of building blocks in the form of 
political concepts. The most useful way to study these concepts, according to Freeden, is 
not to study them abstractly or in isolation. Instead, we should investigate concepts within 
the networks and patterns in which they are used: ideologies. Freeden defines ideologies 
as ‘systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which 
individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those 
who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding’.98 
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Conceptual building blocks can be arranged and shuffled in innumerable ways, resulting 
in a broad variety of political views and political Weltanschauungen, which can then be 
differentiated by their use of concepts and the relationships between said concepts in such 
a cluster or ‘network’. Some of those relations between concepts are durable and can be seen 
as part of the core of that ideology. Additionally, there are short-term peripheral conceptual 
linkages that can rapidly change. These account for the complex and ‘slippery’ nature of 
ideologies as a subject of study. This implies that ideologies have a basic core and constellation 
of concepts that have remained largely intact over time. Without the presence of these specific 
core concepts and relations that particular ideology would unrecognizable.99 For example, it 
would make no sense to speak of democracy if there is no core element linking the concepts of 
‘rule’ and ‘people’. This perspective on ideologies as inherently variable combinations of political 
concepts allows for historical investigations into the development of these combinations and 
relations over time. Moreover, it counteracts the traditional tendency of political theorists to 
study political thought in the minds of ‘Great Thinkers’ by emphasizing the relation between 
thought and action, and by studying ideologies and their use in the everyday political world of 
its adherents. It is exactly in their everyday use that ideologies develop and show their variable 
nature. By studying ideologies as central to political thought, it is possible to avoid what Rolf 
Reichardt has aptly called ‘ideengeschichtlichen Gipfelwanderung’ –only jumping through 
intellectual history from peak to peak without paying attention to the development and use 
of those ideas in the valleys, resulting in a very limited understanding of those concepts.100 
Though these peaks represent the production of great political ideas that has been of interest to 
most intellectual and political historians, what is lacking is a perspective on the consumption of 
these ideas – which is what the valleys represent. What happens with political ideas after they 
have been produced? What is done with these ideas? Shifting our gaze from the peaks to the 
valleys of political thought provides us with a more complete and arguably more interesting 
overview of the history of political ideas. 
But studying ideas in the context of ideologues presents the researcher with a problem: 
ideologies are not primarily produced by individuals. Political ideas produced by individual 
professional theorists can play an important role, but no one can assume substantial 
individual control over large parts of any ideology. Sociologist Robert Wuthnow partiallly 
acknowledges this when he states:
Great Works of art and literature, philosophy and social criticism, like great sermons, 
always relate in an enigmatic fashion to their social environment. They draw resources, 
insights, and inspiration from that environment: they reflect it, speak to it, and make 
themselves relevant to it.101
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The articulation of ideology based on production, selection and institutionalization 
processes is not located within a small elitist group of ideological avant-gardists, it 
occurs throughout the societies in which the ideology takes shape. Though the ideas of 
professional thinkers will resonate within political discourse and some of the ideas will 
become institutionalized within an ideology, these ideas are only meaningful insofar as 
they are understood together with the ideological milieu in which they are located.102
This thesis focusses on the development, articulation and contestation of political 
concepts in the context of the German Revolution. Of particular interest is the emergence 
of the ideology of council communism. The German Revolution, as was shown earlier, was 
unscripted. This means that there was no guiding framework to which the revolutionaries 
could adhere. Moreover, one of the core concepts of the revolutionary debates, that of the 
council, had not yet been theorised and still had to be developed during the revolution. 
The experiences with councils in the German Revolution, and the reflection of those 
experiences in the concept of the council (or: council democracy) would inform the 
development of council communist ideology in the years after the revolution. Analysing 
the debates in Germany will provide a better understanding of how core concepts of this 
ideology originated in the revolution, and examine how the experiences and political 
thought of the common revolutionaries related to the theorisation of professional thinkers. 
2.4 On intellectuals
Section 2.2 listed the three categories of actors this thesis will focus on: common 
revolutionaries, intermediaries and professional thinkers. The latter category is often 
conflated with the term intellectuals: people from well-off families who went to prestigious 
schools and universities in order to take up a spiritual or intellectual vocation. In one way, 
then, one could say that the category of professional thinkers (people who earn their living 
with the production of ideas) does include these traditional intellectuals. However, in the 
case of the German Revolution, and in a broader sense the German labour movement, this 
traditional view of intellectuals does not suffice. The educational system of late 19th- and 
early 20th-century Germany (like the rest of society) was hierarchically ordered. People 
from a working-class background had no chance of reaching the higher echelons. 
From 1900 onwards, the German workers movement produced a group of intellectuals 
who did not fit the traditional type: autodidact thinkers who did not work in churches 
or universities but mostly in journalism. These were people from working-class families 
who, through personal effort and experience at social democratic journals, newspapers 
and magazines, obtained the status of geistige Arbeiter (thinking, spiritual or intellectual 
workers). While they would often still work in factories during the day, this new class of 




intellectuals would be asked to speak at local social democratic meetings, write for the 
papers and have discussions with other intellectuals. Though some of these people would 
eventually be able to live off the production of their ideas, certainly not all of them did.103 
This particular history of geistige Arbeiter in the German labour movement is related to 
what Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci conceptualised as ‘organic intellectuals’. Whereas 
traditional intellectuals, according to Gramsci, appear to be isolated from their social 
class or background (consider clergy or traditional academics) and perceive themselves 
as independent from ruling powers, the new, organic class of intellectuals is interwoven 
with their class and explicitly produces ideas in order to benefit that class. For Gramsci, 
class struggle thus is not only a struggle over the means of production, but also a struggle 
of and over ideas.104 
Crucial in Gramsci’s understanding of intellectuals is that intellectual capacity is 
not restricted to a particular type of people. Everyone, according to Gramsci, can be 
an intellectual. Even the most repetitive and ‘unschooled’ factory jobs require some 
intellectual capacities. Moreover, work in the capitalist context structurally produces 
skills, knowledge and hence intellect of some sort.105 This means that we have to look at the 
term differently. Firstly, we should recognise that ‘the intellectual’ is a role and not a social 
class. This means that, in the German revolutionary context, we should expect to see many 
worker-intellectuals: people who do not earn their (primary) wage by producing ideas, but 
do obtain the status of intellectual. Secondly, we have to recognise that even those who 
do not reach this status can still be expected to participate in intellectual exchanges. In 
the analysis of council debates, where mostly ordinary workers and soldiers discussed the 
future of German society, this is of crucial importance.
Based on this new conception of intellectuals and their role and performance in the 
German working class, we can expect that individuals can ‘travel’ between our three 
categories of participants. For example: A worker who also writes for a local social 
democratic outlet can be a ‘common revolutionary’ at the beginning of the revolution, 
serve as an intermediary when they become the editor of a newspaper, and end up as a 
‘professional thinker’ when they manage to obtain a wage from the party for that work 
– all the while remaining an ‘organic intellectual’ in the Gramscian sense. This serves 
as a reminder that the three categories are helpful analytical tools in categorizing the 
German Revolution’s the participants, but historical reality will generally prove to be 
more complex and flexible. 
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The fourth generation of revolution scholars has stressed the importance of studying 
agency in addition to more structural developments in revolution. This explains why 
my research questions, presented in the previous chapter, include further investigating 
these agents of revolution. I will use the insights from network theory to analyse the 
heterogeneous relations between (groups of) revolutionary agents and the role of ideas 
played in them. Moreover, as fourth-generation scholars have emphasised that revolutions 
involve a struggle over ideas and concepts as well as power, this thesis aims to analyse the 
development of concepts in the revolutionary councils of the German Revolution. From 
the literature on Begriffsgeschichte, I take the assumption that concepts contain shared 
experiences and provide an outlook on future politics – something that will become 
apparent in the analysis of council debates. The continuous contestation of (fighting) 
concepts like democracy, representation, power, legitimacy and equality will be at the very 
centre of this thesis. Furthermore, Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual stresses 
the important insight that political thought is not only produced by a selective group 
of professional thinkers, but that we can expect this contestation of ideas to take place 
among a broad variety of actors, including those not generally studied as producers of 
political ideas. 
Existing literature fails to account for the bottom-up production and contestation 
of political concepts in revolutions. This thesis, based on the theoretical assumptions 
presented above, aims to fill this lacuna by analysing these processes at work in the German 
Revolution of 1918–1919 through four case studies. The first step will be to look at the 
council debates in the capital of the German Reich, Berlin. Munich, Bremen and Hamburg 
follow after that. Together, these cases will not only show the variety and heterogeneity of 
revolutionary processes and ideas in Germany, but also contribute to our understanding 











In this chapter, I will analyse the history of the council movement and the relations between 
professional thinkers and the common revolutionaries in Berlin. The revolutionary events 
in Berlin have received a lot of attention in previous research. Many histories of the 
German Revolution predominantly focus on the actors, decisions and actions in Berlin, 
and not without reason. As the capital of the German Reich, the city would function as the 
centre of the revolution. As the central council congresses, main revolutionary institutions 
and the new revolutionary government would all be located in Berlin, I will start with 
this case study, before shifting our gaze to three cases from what is generally considered 
the periphery: Bremen, Hamburg and Munich. One of the aims of this thesis will be to 
demonstrate that this dichotomy between centre and periphery is not a very useful way to 
conceive of and understand the revolution. In many instances, the events, decisions and 
ideas in Berlin were prefigured in (one of) the other big cities, and Berlin served mostly as 
the confluence site. 
Revolutionary Berlin can be analysed from at least three perspectives.106 The first 
is that of micro-level politics on the factory floor and in the barracks. The second 
perspective is that of ‘Greater Berlin’ as a city in which revolutionary events and actors 
were embedded in their local context, particularly the local network of Revolutionäre 
Obleute (Revolutionary Shop Stewards). A third perspective is that of Berlin as a central 
site of confluence, where actors and ideas from all over Germany gathered and clashed, 
and where the new government and the central council organisation were located. Let’s 
call this the perspective of Berlin-as-capital. This chapter will take into account all three 
of these (inherently intertwined) levels, but focus on the third level, more concretely on 
the first National Council Congress that took place between 16 and 20 December 1918. 
As such, this case study also serves as the national background to the three more locally 
focussed cases.
By carefully studying the emergence of councils in the revolution, the role of the 
Revolutionäre Obleute in Berlin and the assembly of council delegates from Germany at 
the Council Congress, I will explain how the emergence of ‘organic intellectuals’ is related 
to the concept of council politics. Moreover, I will argue that the negative conception of 
the Council Congress as the councils self-destructing at the hands of mindless MSPD 
delegates is not entirely justified. 
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3.2 Pre-history of revolutionary Berlin
To elucidate this moment in history, diving into the factory and local levels is crucial, 
because the factory and the city hosted the big strikes that played such an important role 
in the development of councils in Berlin.
The capital of Germany, Berlin was an important industrial centre with a high level 
of unionization, particularly in the metal industry, where 85% of the its workers were 
members of the corresponding metal union (Deutsche Metalarbeiterverband, DMV). 
There were almost 40 engineering factories of more than 1,000 workers, with large 
conglomerates as AEG, Siemens and Schwartzkopf among them.107 Politically, the city had 
been strongly in the hands of the SPD, which obtained three quarters of the city’s votes in 
the 1912 general elections (against a 35% national average).108 
It was also in this metal industry that the council movement originated and catalysed 
during the war years. Two groups are generally distinguished as the main actors in the 
war-time mass strikes that led to the development of the councils in Berlin. The first 
was the Spartacus League, established in early 1916. Evolving around figures like Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the group operated on a openly political strategy, in 
stark confrontation with the SPD. Although the lead figures of this group became widely 
known during and after the war, the organisation itself had little influence on the Berlin 
workers. It lacked both the party base of the SPD and a network of trustees in the unions 
or factories. The second major group in the mass strikes were the Revolutionäre Obleute. 
This group’s strategy was very different from the Spartacists’. It tried to remain below the 
radar and instead slowly and steadily built a network of radical workers in Berlin’s metal 
works. It operated through trustees inside the factories who knew and represented the 
workers in the department and on the shop floors. 
The rise of this group of Obleute was related to the ‘Burgfrieden’ truce between the 
SPD and the unions. During the war, this arrangement assured the ruling powers that the 
official socialist organisations would temporarily pause their class struggle and instead 
help organise their masses for the war effort. But the war was very unpopular, and the 
growing contention about this among workers needed a valve. The workers in Berlin’s 
300 armament factories had a vital position and were willing to use it to pressure the 
government to hear their demands. The DMV leadership, however, wanted to stay true to 
the Burgfrieden truce and refused to exploit their bargaining power by organising strikes. 
It was this vacuum that the Obleute were able to step into.109 
The first political mass strike during World War I took place on 28 June 1916. This 






to demand Karl Liebknecht’s release from prison after his arrest at a May Day speech 
that year. However, it was not the Spartacus League that organised this strike, but the 
Obleute. Richard Müller, one of the main figures of the Obleute, called for the political 
mass strike on the morning of the trial against Liebknecht. Even though it was organised 
and announced only a night before 28 June, the result was enormous: 55,000 workers took 
to the streets to demand Liebknecht’s release. This was possible due to the network of 
trustees who were able to mobilise the workers of their local departments or factories.110 
Though the strike did not meet its main objective (Liebknecht was sentenced to prison), 
it did mark an important point in the history leading up to the revolution, because it 
showed the potential of the organised masses from Berlin’s factories (also to the leaders of 
the Obleute). Whereas the Obleute had been preoccupied with class struggle on the level 
of the factory (wages, working conditions, etc.), they now got the confidence to engage 
in broader, more political struggles on the streets.111 Something had also changed in the 
minds of many workers. Instead of communicating their grievances to their party and 
union officials in the hope that it would be dealt with in parliament, as had been the 
tradition of many SPD members over the past few years, war-time events and discontent 
over Burgfrieden politics turned workers towards nonparliamentary alternatives. 
In early April 1917, a group of parliamentarians were expelled from the SPD for 
their criticism of the Burgfrieden truce, and used this moment to establish a new social 
democratic party with their supporters, the USPD (Independent Social Democratic 
Party). The party was a strange combination of all kinds of groups that felt that they no 
longer fitted in the old SPD, including the most radical militant embers but also that 
party’s pacifist and reformist sections. The new party became the political home of both 
the Obleute and the Spartacists, even though neither felt completely at ease in this new 
organisation, and both aimed to remain as independent as possible.112 
One week after the UPSD had been established, the second political mass strike 
occurred. The winter of 1916–1917 had been harsh, with rapid inflation and a dramatic 
increase in food shortages. Moreover, a new Hilfsdienstgesetzt in November 1916 declared 
that all workers could be ordered to work in armaments factories without any further 
legal protection. The combination of hunger and this attack on workers’ rights led to a new 
wave of discontent among the Berlin workers. The Obleute, led by Richard Müller, used 
their power in the DMV to adopt a resolution that rejected the new law. But the objections 
of the Berlin metalworkers were ineffective, and the law went into effect in December 
1916, fuelling the feeling of underrepresentation among large parts of the Berlin factory 
workers. 
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Apart from the establishment of the USPD, two other events heightened the tensions 
among Berlin’s workers. The first one was the news about the fall of the Tsar in Russia after 
women’s demonstrations in March 1917. If even the Tsar could be toppled by working men 
and women, what could be possible in Germany? The second event was the rationing of 
bread. The Obleute felt that the time was ripe for another mass strike and wanted to do 
this with the DMV. The union had a general assembly scheduled for 15 April, which the 
Obleute wanted to use to call for a mass strike. However, the authorities got hold of the 
plans and tried to prevent it by arresting Müller on 13 April. Although this temporarily 
disrupted the organisation of the Obleute, it also led to the call to strike for Müller’s 
release. On 16 April, 200,000 people marched through Berlin, and in many other German 
cities as well. On that day, Leipzig saw the emergence of the first German workers’ council 
as the strikers’ collective organising body. In Berlin, something similar happened when 
striking workers of various factories elected councils.113 This strike wave, like the previous 
one, did not lead to any concrete results, as it was smashed by the police. Nevertheless, 
in retrospect the emergence of factory councils and the organising capacities of the 
Revolutionäre Obleute were important developments that would have a significant impact 
on the events of November 1918. 
The first revolution in Russia had sparked enthusiasm for the German strike wave of 
April 1917, and the second, Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 had a similar effect. The 
Obleute printed leaflets to inform the Berlin workers about the Russian revolution.114 Early 
in December 1917, Lenin and Trotsky appealed to the German people to revolt against 
their ‘imperial and war-prolonging’ rulers, and these addresses were reprinted in social 
democratic papers. Müller responded by discussing with the USPD’s leaders the possibility 
to call for a new mass strike that would be able to topple the German government. Among 
the Revolutionäre Obleute, the feeling was that the workers in Berlin’s metal works were 
surely open to such a call. Even though the USPD leadership refused to openly call for a 
strike, the now radicalised Shop Stewards decided to go ahead with their strike plan. The 
date for the strike was set, 28 January 1918, and even though the Shop Stewards’ secret 
plan was thwarted by the Spartacists’ calls for a strike a few days before the 28th, it could 
not be stopped by the authorities. Messages about mass strikes arriving from Vienna and 
other cities further ignited the Berlin workers and on 28 January 1918, the protests and 
strikes leapt over to the rest of Germany.115 
After stopping their work at the armament factories, workers elected over 400 delegates, 
who assembled that afternoon for a first meeting in the beautiful Gewerkschaftshaus on 
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the Engeldamm in Berlin’s city centre. These delegates represented over 400,000 workers, 
and they unanimously demanded not only peace without annexations, but also the 
participation of workers’ representatives from all sides in the peace negotiations. Moreover, 
the delegates demanded a better distribution of food and the democratisation of the 
German state.116 This made the strike no longer just about the war and its consequences 
(the shortages) but gave it a broader political – indeed revolutionary – aim: demanding the 
democratisation of the state meant the fall of the current authorities. An Aktionsausschuß 
(Action Committee) made up almost exclusively of Obleute was elected from among the 
delegates and answered only to the delegates, not the unions or parties, not politicians, 
bureaucrats or parliamentarians. These were rank-and-file workers electing some of their 
own to lead with a strict mandate and legitimacy – this was the beginning of council 
politics.117 
There was an interesting gender aspect to the strikes in April 1917 and January 1918. 
As most of the ordinary male workers were at the front in the years 1917 and 1918, women 
had taken over most of their former factory jobs, while simultaneously running their 
households. Often overlooked is the fact that, because of this, the strikes were for a large 
part the work of women. This is visible on the images of the demonstrations and in the 
contemporary reports.118 In the Action Committee, however, only one of the delegates was 
female: Cläre Casper (5 February 1894 – 16 June 1976). She was also the only female Shop 
Steward.119 Her father was a carriage-driver, her mother a housemaid. Casper would later 
be active as a weapons smuggler in preparation for the revolution in November 1918.
Richard Müller, leader of the Shop Stewards, was elected chair of the assembly and 
tried to cooperate with both USPD and MSPD, although the latter was very reluctant. 
The next day, despite the local authorities’ repression of all workers’ assemblies, over half 
a million workers in Berlin were on strike. The Aktionsausschuß was declared illegal and 
requested to report themselves to the police, something they of course ignored while they 
continued to meet and lead the strike efforts for a few more days. When the military 
threatened to step in by occupying factories and smashing the workers’ assemblies, the 
Action Committee’s Shop Stewards decided they did not want to risk that and agreed with 
the MSPD (which had been in favour of ending the strike from the very beginning) and 
USPD to end the strike on 3 February 1918, without any significant gains. According to 
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Müller, to the workers this felt not like a defeat, but rather a retreat, ‘so that they could 
make a stronger push later’.120 This surely seems like a proper (retrospective) reading of the 
January Strike: the workers had experienced the power of councils in action, and felt that 
they had been able to stop the armament machinery altogether and even forced the MSPD 
to participate in a strike against their will, all by empowering the factories’ rank and file 
through a network of councils and delegates.121 
The January mass strikes also resulted in more publicity for the Obleute. As for the 
leaders of the Obleute, most of them (including Müller) were drafted for military service 
on the farthest possible front (as was the usual treatment for rebellious individuals during 
the Burgfrieden truce). Simultaneously, the now more visible Obleute started to attract 
sympathisers, of which writer Ernst Däumig was the most important example. He had 
been the editor of the main social democratic daily Vorwärts and would later become one 
of the main theorists of the council system. Däumig and Müller became friends, and they 
would cooperate both as leaders of the Shop Stewards and as theorists defending a ‘pure 
council system’.122 
During the spring and early summer of 1918, the German military authorities 
attempted to force a spring offensive to create an breakthrough in the stalemate war, but 
despite strong efforts, the offensive did not result in a decisive victory. The situation even 
worsened when a first wave of a new virus, now known as the Spanish Flu, reached the 
frontline. While ordinary flu viruses generally affect children and old people more than 
healthy young adults, this variety seemed to be especially vicious in young men with 
strong immune systems – researchers believe the virus turned patients’ immune systems 
against them. For Germany, which had just sent a new wave of fresh young men to the 
battlefield, this meant that they were more affected by the pandemic than their opponents, 
leading to more than a million infected German soldiers in May and July 1918, compared 
to 50,000 patients among the British forces in a similar period.123 This further worsened 
Germany’s position in the field, but more importantly, it depleted what was left of morale. 
3.3 The revolution arrives in Berlin
After the three strike waves during the war, workers in Berlin had become aware of 
their strong position and their potential in any revolt against the emperor and the war. 
Moreover, they had been radicalised by their experiences, and a growing part of Berlin’s 
working class was convinced that the only way out of the war and the food shortages was 
to overthrow the ruling political and imperial elite. One would therefore expect Berlin 
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to be the epicentre of any revolution in Germany, yet the revolution did not start there. 
And even after the revolution started, Berlin was remarkably hesitant to allow it into the 
city. One of the main explanations for this was the difficult relation between the two main 
revolutionary groups: the Shop Stewards and the Spartacists. 
The lagging start of the revolution in Berlin was not the result of a lack of planning. 
As Müller was still at the front during the summer of 1918, his appointed substitute, 
Emil Barth, had begun to invest (presumably with Russian funds) in weaponry that was 
smuggled to the workers in the factories with the help of many women. One of those 
women was Cläre Casper (previously mentioned as the Action Committee’s only female 
representative during the January strikes). Buying and smuggling these weapons was a 
dangerous activity, and even in early November the Shop Stewards still felt they did not 
have as many weapons as they thought they needed for a proper revolt – especially since 
they expected a strong counter-revolution from the armed forces loyal to the emperor.124
The first mutinies broke out in late October 1918, after the Supreme Marine Command 
ordered sailors to face the British Royal Navy. Although the military leaders knew they did 
not stand a chance, they considered it a matter of honour to at least try a final push. But the 
sailors refused to execute orders they considered a Todesfahrt, and mutinied. About 600 
of the rebellious sailors were arrested and transferred to Kiel, together with all other big 
ships in the imperial fleet. The mix of revolting sailors and the workers in the port city’s 
big (military) metal works was explosive. Already on 1 November, the night the sailors 
arrived ashore, 250 of them met with local USPD and MSPD representatives to discuss 
freeing their arrested comrades. The next day there were about 500, and on 3 November 
even more. During these meetings, the crowd’s demands radicalised. Aside from to their 
comrades’ release, they began to demand the end of ‘Militarismus’ and the overthrow of 
the ruling classes. The next days, the rapid politicisation continued as workers joined the 
demonstrations of sailors and soldiers, demanding peace and the fall of the emperor. After 
the arrests of more sailors and the exchange of shots between demonstrating sailors and 
local police, more and more units joined the mutiny and added demands such as universal 
suffrage and the fall of the Hohenzollern Dynasty.125 
In an attempt to soothe tensions in Kiel, Reichskanzler Prince Max von Baden had 
sent MSPD leaders Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Noske to talk to the protesters. They were 
greeted with cheers by the rebellious sailors and soon found that there was nothing to 
salvage for the emperor. More than 40,000 heavily armed soldiers, sailors and workers 
controlled both the city and the heavy artillery of the battleships, draped in red flags. In 
the Union Hall, Noske met with 40 representatives of the workers, soldiers and sailors, 
and they drafted 14 points, including the political demand articulated in the days before: 
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replacing the Emperor with a Peoples’ Republic that had universal suffrage. Noske was 
elected as chair of the workers’ and soldiers’ council of Kiel, and the revolution had 
begun.126
 In the meantime, in Berlin, the Shop Stewards had finally picked a date for their armed 
uprising: they scheduled to have enough weapons on 11 November, so that would be the 
date. When a delegate from Kiel arrived in Berlin on 3 November and asked the Shop 
Stewards to support the revolt in Kiel by starting the uprising in Berlin immediately, Müller 
and Barth refused. Over the next days, even when messages kept coming in about the 
spread of the revolution throughout Germany, they still refused – to the great frustration 
of the Spartacists, who wanted direct action but lacked access to the Shop Stewards’ vast 
networks. On the evening of 8 November, the Stewards’ hand was finally forced when Ernst 
Däumig was arrested by the police with all the carefully drafted plans for 11 November 
in his suitcase. Now that the authorities were aware of their strategy, waiting any longer 
was impossible. The Workers’ Council assembled that night and decided to call for a mass 
strike the next day. On the morning of 9 November 1918, workers marched towards the 
barracks throughout the city. Soon, red flags were hoisted over the barracks, and soldiers 
joined the marching workers.127 
That day, the emperor fled to the Netherlands, and Germany was declared a republic 
– twice. The first declaration was by the MSPD’s Philip Scheidemann, against the wishes 
of his more conservative ally Friedrich Ebert, who had just been appointed chancellor 
and had wanted to declare Germany a republic when he spoke to a crowd from a window 
of the Reichstag building. Ebert was furious, yelling: ‘You have no right to proclaim the 
republic!’128 At the Royal Palace in Berlin, meanwhile, Spartacist Karl Liebknecht declared 
Germany to be a socialist republic. This image of the two independent declarations reveals 
a lot about the revolution and its main actors’ different positions. It shows that there was 
no clear revolutionary script, and that the expectations about this revolution between 
moderates and radicals were divergent from the very start. One thing seemed clear 
enough: the old regime was gone. Let me revisit the famous commentary (cited in Chapter 
1) by the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, Theodor Wolff:
The greatest of all revolutions, like a suddenly rising storm, has crushed the Imperial 
regime with everything that belonged to it, above and below. It can be called the greatest 
of all revolutions, because never has such a sturdily built, solidly walled Bastille been 
taken in such a siege. Only a week ago there was a military and civil administrative 
apparatus that was so branched, so interlinked, so deeply ingrained that it seemed to 
have secured its rule beyond the changing of times. The grey cars of the officers were 
126 Ibid., 111.
127 Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movements, 65-69.
128 Chris Harman, The Lost Revolution. Germany 1918 to 1923 (London: Bookmarks, 1985), 46.
66
Chapter 3
speeding through the streets of Berlin, in the squares stood policemen like the pillars 
of power, a giant military organization seemed to embrace everything, a seemingly 
invincible bureaucracy sat enthroned in the offices and ministries. Yesterday morning, 
at least in Berlin, everything was still there. Yesterday afternoon, none of it existed 
anymore.129
Although this depiction vividly shows what the revolutionary processes of that first day 
looked like for a relative outsider, it is not altogether accurate. Whereas much of the 
military and security forces were indeed now in the hands of revolutionaries, and most 
traditional political institutions were disassembled, the old bureaucracy was still there. 
On the afternoon of 9 November, Reichskanzler Prince Max von Baden saw no other 
option than to declare the Emperor’s abdication, even though there was no legal basis for 
such an act. Furthermore, he passed the function of Reichskanzler to the leader of the MSPD, 
Friedrich Ebert. In this power vacuum, councils were established all over Germany. Peter 
von Oertzen has distinguished two types of councils, one originating in the factories and 
one created by the two socialist parties (or unions). The first type could be found in the major 
industrial cities throughout the empire and was based on a federative design of delegates 
who were elected to Executive bodies (Aktionsausschusse) on the factory floor (Betriebsräte). 
The party-instigated workers’ councils mainly arose in smaller cities and provincial towns, 
where workers were not able to organize based on their factory floors. Here, it was mainly 
the MSPD who was able to jump into the power vacuum and organize workers in councils.130 
In Berlin, like the rest of Germany, the revolution was generally leaderless. There 
was no central coordination to organize the movement of workers, soldiers and other 
revolutionaries through the city, and there was no script that could be followed. 
Everywhere in the city, revolutionaries had to improvise according to their circumstances. 
But the events of 9 November were not altogether without structure. As the result of the 
past experiences with political mass strikes, the networks of trustees on the factory floors 
knew what was expected of them. The Obleute were able to mobilize the workers of their 
factories. Between eight and ten that morning, all workers in all major factories and 
workplaces were out on the streets. Because of the secret but precise planning, many of 
the processions that day were well-armed due to the purchase and distribution of weapons 
over the previous few months. This increased the workers’ actual power position, but more 
than that it increased their confidence and self-consciousness, strengthening the feeling 
that this was no ordinary mass strike, but an armed uprising.131
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When an assembly of soldiers’ councils met with the Shop Stewards in the Reichstag 
on that first day of the revolution, they decided that workers’ and soldiers’ councils would 
be elected throughout Berlin on the next day, and their representatives would meet in the 
largest building that could host such an enormous assembly: the permanent theatre of 
Circus Busch.132 In the meantime, the MSPD had entered into negotiations with the USPD 
to form a temporary government of social democrats. The radicals (with the Shop Stewards 
behind Müller and the Spartacists behind Liebknecht) refused to cooperate with the MSPD 
and therefore rejected a role in the government. Nevertheless, they were able to negotiate 
a statement that all political power was based in the workers’ and soldiers’ councils. The 
government was called the Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Council of People’s Deputies) and 
consisted of three members from each party: Friedrich Ebert (chair), Philipp Scheidemann 
and Otto Landsberg for the MSPD; Hugo Haasse, Emil Barth and Wilhelm Dittmann for the 
USPD.133
The next morning, Sunday 10 November 1918, the elections for the workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils were supposed to take place. But Müller had drafted the regulations in great haste 
and amidst the chaos of the Reichstag during a revolution. A first problem was that, since 
it was a Sunday, there were no workers in the factories that morning. Moreover, the rules 
did not specify how councils should be formed, only that every 1,000 workers could send 
one delegate, and that workers from smaller companies should jointly elect a delegate. 
That afternoon, about 3,000 representatives from Berlin’s workplaces and barracks met 
in the big hall of Circus Busch. Though no one bothered to check the legitimacy of the 
representatives’ mandates,134 they confirmed the Rat der Volksbeauftragten as the new 
provisional government and elected an Executive Council (Vollzugsrat) of 28 members 
that would consist of 7 members of each party, plus 14 representatives of the soldiers’ 
councils. Even though it was elected and legitimated only by Berlin’s councils, it would act 
as the provisional representative body of the whole country’s councils until an assembly of 
all German councils could take place.135
The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Spartacists had intended the Executive Council 
to originate in, and be an extension of, the councils. But the (MSPD-oriented) soldiers’ 
councils insisted that the Executive Council would be organized by party lines, with an 
equal representation of MSPD and USPD delegates. This means that the council delegates 
already effectively returned their power to the old party organizations at their first meeting 
in Circus Busch: both governing bodies (Executive Council and Rat der Volksbeauftragten) 
were going to be based on party affiliation. Even though the Obleute still had six of the 
132 Ibid., 72.
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seven USPD-seats in the Executive Council and Richard Müller was its chairperson, this 
was a setback for the radical left. Moreover, since the Executive Council considered itself the 
highest institution in revolutionary Germany, Müller was now effectively head of state.136 
However, as the assembly in Circus Busch had not clearly separated the competences of the 
two bodies, a period of continuous power struggles followed, and the MSPD’s politically and 
governmentally more experienced leadership would soon come to dominate state affairs. 
3.4 The First National Congress of Councils
The Executive Council provisionally represented all councils in the German Reich, but 
had only been elected by the Berlin councils. This democratic problem was to be solved 
with the assembly of the first National Congress of Councils (Reichsrätekongress) on 16 
December 1918, when all German councils would have a chance to discuss the future of 
the new republic for the first time since the revolution more than a month earlier. 
The main issues on the agenda were the socialization of the economy, the election of 
a superior council institution (Central Council) and deciding between councils or a 
national assembly.137 Sabine Roß, in her handbook on the Reichsrätekongresse, observes 
that the majority of the delegates’ political education and experience in social democratic 
institutions (party schools, local parliamentary fractions, party conferences) was visible 
in their behaviour. The congress was organized along the lines of the past decades’ social 
democratic party work: the delegates were divided in factions with whips and chairs that 
limited individual delegates’ manoeuvring room. The work in plenary sessions was prepared 
in smaller committees and working groups, and meetings followed the familiar process 
when it came to speakers, motions and procedures. In the revolution’s new institutions, 
the delegates could have opted for any set of procedures they wished, but they chose these 
familiar forms. This parliamentary mimicry was not imposed, but self-chosen.138 
Ralf Hoffrogge states that, by the first National Council Congress, there were many 
councils, but there was nothing resembling a council system (even though many people at 
the time did use that term). Councils surfaced organically amid the chaos of a crumbling 
state apparatus; they did not result from ‘theoretical calculation’.139 As was stated earlier, 
councils throughout the country were established in different ways, and their election and 
democratic legitimacy varied greatly. When the Executive Council organized the elections 
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for the first Reichrätekongress, the guidelines in their call to vote on 25 November 1918 were 
summary: delegates were to be elected based on the existing councils, since there was no time 
to elect new councils throughout the country. Elections were to be based on proportional 
representation. There was no mention of an age limit, nor was the right to vote and be elected 
explicitly given to both sexes. Because all elected delegates were over 20 years old, and two 
of them were women, we can deduce that the age limit used in the guidelines for national 
elections (over 20 years old) was probably also used in these elections, and that women (in 
at least two districts) had passive (and probably active) voting rights. Also important is that, 
for the first time, active military personnel would be eligible to vote. One delegate would be 
elected for every 100,000 soldiers, and one delegate per 200,000 citizens, in order to limit 
the total number of Congress delegates to 500. Elements of the election procedures were 
probably also based on the Rat der Volksbeauftragten’s new national regulations from 30 
November 1918, which stipulated general, direct, equal and secret elections. Since these 
basic principles were discussed regularly during the first weeks of the revolution, we can 
assume that the Central Council based their guidelines on them.140
The existing councils of workers and soldiers that were to elect delegates to the National 
Council Congress were themselves elected in very different ways, which resulted in a broad 
variety in terms of the elected delegates’ background and legitimacy. To provide a clearer 
view, Eberhard Kolb distinguished two types of workers’ councils. The first was established 
by existing parties and unions, its composition resulting from negotiations between these 
organizations. The delegates that these councils sent to Berlin were generally first appointed 
by the parties and then confirmed by an assembly. The second type of workers’ council 
originated in the big factories and functioned outside the sphere of influence of parties or 
unions, operating more like a factory council (Betriebsrat). This type of bottom-up council 
was common in the biggest industrial cities, such as Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin.141 The 
MSPD and the unions preferred the first type of workers’ council, whereas the USPD, with 
the Revolutionary Shop Stewards as its main drivers, preferred councils organized as factory 
councils.142 The editors of the beautiful guide Es lebe das Neue! Berlin in der Revolution 
1918/19 claim that the weakness and unpopularity of Berlin’s radical left is proven by the 
fact that Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht did not manage to obtain mandates for 
the Congress.143 It seems, however, that the editors misunderstood the functioning of the 
Berlin councils, which were firmly based in the workplace: since neither Luxemburg nor 
Liebknecht worked in those factories, they could not be elected – this in contrast to many 
other ‘political leaders’ who were elected in districts where councils of the first type were 
more common, so that ‘a number of famous former members of the Reichstag and Landtag’ 
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could be recognized in the assembly hall of the Congress.144 At the start of the Congress, a 
motion was filed to allow Luxemburg and Liebknecht to join the assembly as ‘guests with an 
advisory vote’, but this was rejected by a majority of the delegates.145 
The elections for the first National Council Congress were a resounding victory for the 
MSPD. Their faction held over 60% of the delegates, whereas the USPD’s obtained about 
20%. The Democratic faction had a share of about 6%, the Soldiers 5%, and a group called 
United Revolutionaries 2,5%. The leader of the MSPD faction was Hermann Lüdemann, a 
38-year-old engineer from Berlin. The USPD was led by an editor from Leipzig of only 27 
years old, Kurt Geyer. The leader of the United Revolutionaries was also an editor: 38-year-
old Heinrich Lauffenberg, who played an important role in the councils in Hamburg. 
The 28 delegates that united themselves in the Democratic faction, were chaired by the 
46-year-old Wilhelm Schmidthals, who leased a manor estate in Berslau. The soldiers’ 
faction had only 25 of the Congress’ 83 soldiers in its ranks, since most of the soldiers 
joined one of the party factions (mostly the MSPD).146 
Regarding the delegates’ demographics, Roß provides general characteristics that 
help understand the Congress’ debates. The most striking fact is the underrepresentation 
of women: only two out of almost 500 delegates. Although the problem with women’s 
representation in the councils can be seen on all levels, this is absolutely depressing from 
a democratic viewpoint, particularly since women had been so important in the workers’ 
movement during the war years – both as workers and as activists. One of the explanations 
(apart from blatant sexism) is that many workers tended to vote for more experienced 
comrades in the party, from union cadres or on the work floor. Generally, these were men 
who had worked in the factories and risen in the workplace hierarchies before being sent 
to the front. This also explains the average age of the delegates: 39. This was not old in the 
context of traditional political careers in Imperial Germany, but the Novemberrevolution 
has always been depicted as a revolution of young, radicalized workers and soldiers. It is 
very probable that the same mechanism of electing more experienced comrades is one of 
the main reasons for this relatively high average age.147 Between the different factions, the 
average age differed slightly. The two socialist parties had a comparable average age (40 for 
MSPD and 39 for USPD), while the United Revolutionaries were younger, with an average 
age of 36, and the soldiers’ faction had the lowest average of 32.148 
In her handbook, Roß also shows that around half of the delegates only completed the 
Volksschule (primary school). This is related to the fact that many of the delegates stemmed 
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from workers’ families, and the educational system in Imperial Germany was strongly tied to 
social caste. Interestingly, around 5% of the delegates had a Ph.D. from a German university. 
Roß assumes that this might be the result of the Councils of Intellectual Workers, which 
had successfully been established in November and had apparently been able to get some 
of their delegates elected for the Congress.149 Of all factions, the Democratic one had the 
highest average education (31% of the delegates had an advanced education), while among 
the socialist parties this number was around 10%. Regarding the delegates’ occupations, 
many were traditional workers in industries like metal (13%) or wood (5%), or they were 
printers, cutters and painters. Though some had ‘bürgerliche’ occupations like teacher or 
Angestellte (white-collar worker), the majority, almost 40%, were Arbeiterbeambte: people 
with jobs in the workers’ parties or unions. This high rate is related to the history of social 
democracy in Germany, where members of the SPD had been excluded from many forms 
of employment, and as membership of parliaments or other representative institutions 
was unpaid (until 1907), representatives needed another source of income, so many (local) 
socialist parliamentarians and union officials were employed by their own party or union.150 
This history is visible in the demography of the delegates at the Congress. 
The National Council Congress started on 16 December 1918 in the conference hall of 
Berlin’s Abgeordnetenhaus (house of representatives), already filled to the very last chair 
by ten in the morning. The hall was decorated in symbolic red drapes, golden shields and 
fir branches. When Richard Müller, leader of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and formal 
head of state, opened the Congress, he referred to the symbolism of this location:
Here in this hall, at this site, where the strongest pillars of the old, guilty, overthrown 
governmental power met, the representatives of Germany’s workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils today meet to lay the foundation of the German Socialist Republic; here in 
this hall, where the most brutal bosses, the Prussian captains of war and industry, once 
tried – and unfortunately often managed – to put the German people in shackles, here 
at this site of formerly sharpest reaction you should secure the achievements of the 
revolution, firmly anchoring the political power conquered by the workers and soldiers 
forever and showing the German working people the way to freedom, happiness and 
wellbeing.151
This Congress with all the marginalized outcasts and their representatives, at this location 
in the very heart of the former Empire, was the ultimate symbol of the democratic 
ambitions of the new state. 
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3.5 Democratisation of the Army
Ralf Hoffrogge has described the first National Council Congress as an improvisation 
after a ‘radical democratic turn’,152 and one could argue that it was in the democratization 
of the military that the Congress took its most radical decisions. The decision was initiated 
by ‘extraparliamentary’ pressure from the Berliner Volksmarinedivision (Berlin People’s 
Marine Division) and was eventually taken against the strong advice and wishes of the 
MSPD leadership. It started with a meeting of various military units and regiments at the 
Royal Palace, the centuries-long residences of the House of Hohenzollern, on 17 December 
1918. The soldiers and sailors drafted a statement that they wanted to present to the 
Congress the next day, stating that they support the socialist republic and its government 
and presenting three demands: first, there should be a superior soldiers’ council that 
should have command over the entire army; second, all insignia should be banned and all 
officers disarmed; and third, responsibility for the troops and their discipline should be in 
hands of the soldiers’ councils.153
Late that afternoon, around the end of the day’s Congress meeting, the doors behind 
the Congress presidium opened and a delegation of the soldiers entered carrying banners, 
stating: ‘All power of command is in the hand of soldiers!’, ‘Only comrades elected by us 
can represent us!’ and ‘Immediate disarmament of all officers!’ The chair of the meeting, 
Friedrich Seger (a tailor and editor from Leipzig), allowed the delegation to read their 
demands. Afterwards, Seger asked the soldiers to have some patience, and, although the 
delegation expressed dissatisfaction, their demands would only be discussed the next 
day.154 
The next morning, the Council Congress continued, and the first item on the agenda 
was the Berlin soldiers’ list of demands. Walther Lamp’l (1891–1933), member of the 
MSPD and chair of the soldiers’ council in Hamburg, was the first speaker. Lamp’l 
was a war veteran with a background in philosophy, law and economy, and PhD in 
Staatswissenschaften (political science). He also had a colourful past as a salesman and 
real-estate agent in Mexico, and was elected as a delegate to the soldiers’ council from the 
military hospital where he was recovering from a serious injury.155 Lamp’l explained that 
in Hamburg, the workers’ and soldiers’ councils had already discussed this topic over the 
past weeks, after a counter-revolutionary coup attempt by high-ranked officers. After the 
failed coup, the Hamburg soldiers’ council came up with these radical demands to obtain 
democratic control over the city’s military divisions, and they had also explicitly ordered 
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their delegates to the National Council Congress to find support for their military policy. 
The programme consisted of seven points, which Lamp’l proposed to the Congress in 
response to the Berlin soldiers’ demands from the day before:
1. The People’s Delegates exercise command over the Army and Navy under the control 
of the Executive Council.
2. As a symbol of the smashing of militarism and the abolition of Kadavergehorsam 
(absolute blind obedience), we order the removal of all rank insignia and a ban on 
non-official weaponry.
3. The soldiers’ councils are responsible for ensuring the troops’ reliability and discipline. 
…
4. … The Congress demands the abolition of the nobility and all orders and decorations.
5. The soldiers choose their own leaders. Former officers who enjoy the trust of the 
majority of their troops can be re-elected. 
6. Officers ... who serve in the military bureaucracy can remain in their positions in the 
interest of demobilization if they declare that they will not act against the revolution.
7. The abolition of the standing army and the establishment of the People’s Militia 
(Volkswehr) are to be accelerated.
After consultation with Friedrich Ebert the night before, Lamp’l added a final point: 
8. The above sentences are guidelines, the final executive orders should be taken by the 
Council of People’s Delegates under control of the Executive Council in accordance 
with the soldiers’ councils.
Many of these points were almost literally taken from the social democratic Erfurter 
Programm of 1891, and the revolutionaries’ conception of a Volkswehr was primarily 
conceived as a counter concept against the standing army that was associated with the 
strong, centralized and hierarchical state structure of the Prussian State, where the 
monopoly on violence had always been used against the people top-down. The Volkswehr 
was to be a people’s militia under democratic control to defend the democratic (or socialist) 
state.156 During the Congress meeting, almost all delegates appeared to support Lamp’l’s 
seven points, but the delegates wanted the soldiers in the Congress to have a thorough look 
at the demands. A committee was established made up of Haase, Ebert, representatives 
of the soldiers’ delegation, and the soldiers’ faction in the Congress that would work out 
the details. Even though Ebert was a strong opponent of the soldiers’ radical demands, 
he also feared losing their support in these crucial weeks. And when Haase returned to 
inform the Congress about the committee’s deliberations, he reported that it unanimously 




supported all points. What’s more, the eighth point had been changed: the seven points 
were no longer just guidelines, but decisions. It seems that the pressure from the Soldiers’ 
representatives had been strong and Ebert had given in.157 After hearing Haase’s report, 
the Congress agreed, and the eighth point was removed from the proposal. The other 
seven points were accepted almost unanimously, and the Council Congress had taken a 
first significant and very radical decision to thoroughly democratize the army and navy.158 
In this case, the MSPD delegates deviated from the wishes of their party leadership, 
and the soldier delegates who were usually loyal to the MSPD attributed more value 
to their identity as soldiers than their more recent party affiliations (most of them had 
only become politicized in the previous couple of weeks and had no history in the social 
democratic milieu).159 As a result of this victory of the more radical Congress delegates, 
the Council of People’s Deputies and the Army High Command (Obersten Heeresleitung) 
were now bound to this programme of military democratization. But the People’s Deputies 
would completely ignore it. What the Congress did not know at that time was that, during 
the first days of the revolution, Ebert had already secretly agreed with General Wilhelm 
Groener that the MSPD leadership and the existing officer corps would support each other 
in the new political situation in order to maintain order, stability and continuity. In the 
weeks after the National Congress, nothing changed in the organization of the armed 
forces, and after the January 1919 struggles in Berlin, the power of officers was restored 
at the expense of that of soldiers’ councils. After the March 1919 strikes, the army killed 
around 1,200 people. As a result of the continuously tighter cooperation with the right-
wing militias of the Freikorps, the German army evolved into the opposite of a democratic 
institution, becoming a Fremdkörper (foreign body) in the Weimar Republic. In 1933, 
when Hitler secured his generals that they would maintain their power of command, he 
explicitly referred to the 1918–1919 democratization attempt: that would never happen 
again.160 
3.6 Socializing the economy
Another victory for the radicals (and, hence, a defeat for Ebert) was the decision of the 
National Council Congress to immediately start socializing mature industries, especially 
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mining.161 Socializing the economy had been one of the core values of social democracy 
for a long time, and during the revolution this had been one of the recurring demands 
from below. In an attempt to appease this demand, Ebert had installed a committee that 
included theorists Karl Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding to investigate and make a proposal 
for socialization.162 This was mainly a delay tactic in order to slowly push aside the idea of 
democratizing the economy. At the Congress, the MSPD leadership attempted to remove 
the issue from the agenda, but eventually the Congress decided to listen to Hilferding’s 
speech about the committee’s findings.163 
After the speech, Emil Barth decided to seize the moment and push a motion to 
immediately begin socialization. His speech, which was applauded by large parts of the 
delegates, suggested that the Congress decree that socialization start the very next day and 
figure out the details along the way. What the masses wanted was an act by this congress, 
he argued, a tangible result that they would notice on their work floor, and a decree to 
bring the parts of the economy under democratic control would be exactly such an act. 
The Congress considered the mining industry most opportune to socialize, since coal 
was the primary source of energy for the entirety of Germany and the concentration of 
capital in this industry was very high, which made the industry mature to socialize.164 
Moreover, Hilferding argued, the power of German capital and banks was largely based 
on this industry, so a social ownership of this industry would strongly limit the power of 
capital.165 The Congress decided that the Council of People’s Deputies should be in charge 
of selecting other industries that could be socialized, and that the exact management of 
operations should be left to expert professionals. 
In his speech, Hilferding conceptualized socialization not as the takeover of factories 
by the workers, since that would lead to (unfair) competition between these worker 
cooperatives, and hence preserve capitalist relationships. Rather, the management of an 
industry’s entire production should be transferred to society as a whole.166 For this to 
be possible, the production of the facility must be very high – if there was going to be 
socialization, there should be something to socialize. Therefore, Hilferding encouraged 
the workers in all industries to maintain – or even increase – their productivity, so that 
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socialization could be successful. His speech was rewarded with lively support and 
applause. MSPD delegate Ernst Mehlig (1882–1926), chair of the Dortmund Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council and editor of a party journal, expressed his support for Hilferding’s 
plans, and stressed that this was not the time for strikes and walkouts, but for an increase 
in production. In response, USPD-delegate and editor of the Düsseldorf Volkszeitung 
Peter Berten (1873–1960) argued that it was nonsense to expect the capitalists to await this 
increase in production and then hand over the facilities to the state – socialization should 
start immediately, and the increase in productivity would come later.167 
Even the democratic faction, represented by its chair Wilhelm Schmidthals (1873–
1951, a self-declared ‘small agricultural capitalist’ who leased a manor in Silesia) generally 
supported for Hilferding’s talk. Although the democrats opposed any socialization 
of agricultural businesses, they understood that the time was right to move from large 
to small landownership. Moreover, they supported the idea of bringing big industrial 
companies under societal control.168 
USPD delegate Emil Barth entered the debate as well, passionately explaining how he 
had personally tried to avoid an economic crash by urging Berlin workers to remain in the 
factories the previous weeks. If the industry would not be socialized on very short notice, 
it would no longer be possible to ask the workers to do so. This argument earned lively 
support ‘from the majority’. The miners deserved to know that those ‘black diamonds’ they 
dug up from the earth with their hard labour would benefit society and not profit some 
capitalist, Barth argued. These workers would not believe the Congress or government if 
it made mere promises of future socialization – they expected immediate action, direct 
proof. If the Congress would not deliver on that, the workers would have the right to act 
on behalf of their own interests.169 
Heinrich Schliestedt (1883–1938), a USPD delegate and local metal-union representative 
in Remscheid, filed a motion that ordered the government to immediately start socializing 
the mining industry. With political power in the hands of the socialists, it was time to 
seize economic power as well – after which political power could ‘return to the devil’, he 
stated. He also demanded that workers’ councils would be incorporated in the companies’ 
management – it should not be the case that the same bosses had the same dictatorial 
power in socialized industries, so management should transfer to the councils. 
Soldier representative for the MSPD Siegfried Marck (1889–1957) also differentiated 
between the political revolution of 9 November and the social revolution that would 
follow. Marck, a private university teacher with a PhD from Breslau and elected through 
Army-department A, quoted Karl Marx to argue that Germany should form an example 
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of socialism’ on their own, and it would be up to Germany to ‘show how Marxism is 
really carried out’. He applauded Hilferding’s speech and stressed the need to operate 
with ‘scientific prudence and self-criticism’.170 Actor and representative of the German 
theatre workers’ organization, Gustav Rickelt (1862–1946), who was a MSPD delegate, 
cited another author, Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘Teach me how to laugh, you people!’ He 
reasoned that the theatre should also be socialized if the new socialist society was to fulfil 
its promise of spiritually and intellectually enlightening the people. If this Vergeistung der 
Menschheit (literally ‘spiritualization of humanity’) was to be successful, theatre should 
belong to the people so that the new society could not only work towards unalienated 
work, but also towards pleasure and meaningful culture for all.171 
After the debate (which ended rather abruptly because everyone appeared to agree 
that immediate socialization was necessary, leaving a desperate miners’ representative 
without the opportunity to share his opinion), Hilferding was asked to offer a conclusion 
and promptly supported the motion to immediately start the socialization of all mature 
industries, particularly mining.172 This motion was approved almost unanimously (some 
opponents apparently dared not stand up when the cross-check was done), and so, after 
the democratization of the army, this was the second major topic on which the Congress 
decided against the will of the MSPD leadership. Two important and radical steps towards 
a more democratic society had been taken. 
Following a similar tactic to the one regarding the democratization of the army, the 
Council of People’s Delegates ignored the motion and did not start the socialization 
‘immediately’. After continuous internal disagreements, Kautsky and Hilferding’s 
socialization committee fell apart in March 1919. The national assembly, which was also 
bound to the motion approved in the Congress, showed no intentions of bringing mining 
(or any other industry) under popular control either. Article 156 in the new Weimar 
constitution allowed for socialization after a parliamentary decision, but it was never 
used. In 1949, this article was transferred to the West-German constitution under Article 
15, legally allowing the socialization of important industries, and this article is still part of 
the German constitution – even though it has never been used. Still, as Ralf Hoffrogge has 
argued, it is a direct result of the Council Congress of December 1918 that the socialization 








3.7 Councils versus Parliament?
With the decisions to immediately socialize the mining industry and democratize the 
army, the radical left had won two important political battles at the National Council 
Congress. Still, the left looked back on the Congress with disappointment and despair in 
retrospect. The main choice to make was the political form of the new socialist republic. 
This was the question looming over the entire revolutionary process in the previous 
weeks, and it had been the main reason to assemble all council representatives in this 
Congress. After fierce debates, the Council Congress decided to establish a national 
assembly, effectively abolishing their own position of power. This led to the famous 
remark of Richard Müller after he returned from the Congress: ‘This central congress 
was Germany’s first revolutionary tribunal, but there was no revolutionary atmosphere at 
all. My expectations were none too high going in, but I had no idea that this congress was 
going to turn into a political suicide club.’174 
With the flight of the emperor and the proclamation of the republic (be it socialist or 
otherwise), some elements of the new state form had already become givens. Moreover, 
universal suffrage (also for women and soldiers) was not part of any debate, nor were 
the lifting of censorship, the freedom of press and assembly and the end of the war. The 
revolutionaries had simply taken most of these rights and freedoms, which had not been 
part of any national debate.175 But many other foundational elements of the new state 
still had to be decided. The main question had now become: what will be the form of 
republican democracy and who can decide on that? Hoffrogge distinguishes two positions 
regarding these questions. First, the MSPD and Democrats pointed out that, as the 
Council Congress lacked democratic legitimacy, it should decide to organize elections 
for a truly representative parliament, the national assembly, which would then create a 
new constitution. Second, most of the USPD and the United Revolutionaries defended 
the councils as new and truly democratic organs of the revolution and the new state, as 
opposed to the old, bourgeois political model of a parliament.176 
In his introduction to the new edition of the Congress’ minutes, Hoffrogge convincingly 
argues that the difference between these two positions was not only partisan but also 
discursive. Defenders of the national assembly used concepts like legitimacy to refer to the 
representation of the broader national population (so not only the workers represented in 
the Council Congress), whereas defenders of the council system considered the Congress 
the legitimate institution to decide on the future of Germany exactly because it excluded 
174 Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the 
Origins of the Council Movements, 95.
175 “Reich, Räte und Republik - Die Stenografischen Berichte des Ersten Reichsrätekongresses 1918,” 19.
176 Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the 
Origins of the Council Movements, 18-21.
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the former ruling class. The question was who exactly constituted the demos of the new 
political society. The fact that the radical left used the concept of the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ to demarcate the exclusion of bosses and capitalists definitely widened the gap 
between them and the MSPD. The discursive link between a dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the council system limited support for the latter among those in the MSPD who had 
initially felt sympathetic towards the councils. Hoffrogge calls this the Kampf der Begriffe 
(struggle of concepts) that was being fought at the Congress, and the supporters of the 
national assembly would win it.177
In fact, the decision to elect a national assembly had been taken well before the 
Congress opened. The date for the elections had even already been picked by the Council 
of People’s Deputies, and various MSPD leaders used print media in the days leading up 
to the Congress to express that a debate on the national assembly at the Congress would 
mostly be a waste of time.178 The debate on the big questions only started on the morning 
of the fourth day of the Congress, Thursday 19 December 1918, with two speeches followed 
by a general debate. The first was by Max Cohen, an MSPD member of the Executive 
Council. His first claim, after suggesting that he had not been unsympathetic to the 
councils of the revolutions, was that the councils could not represent the general will but 
only partial wills. Socialism had always strived for democratic representation based on 
universal, equal, secret elections, and only a national assembly could deliver that. Even 
the Bolsheviks’ success during the first Russian Revolution was due to their demand of 
peace and the establishment of a national constituency. Cohen’s second claim was that a 
national assembly would be not only truly democratic, but also truly Marxist. Bolshevism 
and its attendant dictatorship of the proletariat were opposed to anything Marx stood for, 
argued Cohen. In well-functioning democracies, socialism could be established trough 
elections, as Marx himself had stated. What was needed now was a national assembly to 
establish a socialist majority that could implement socialism. The revolution’s councils 
had been instrumental in keeping order and preventing it all from falling apart, but now 
they should make way for a national assembly to create a new constitution for Germany. 
Cohen ended by filing a motion to hold elections for the national assembly on Sunday 19 
January 1919.179
Ernst Däumig acted as co-referent and started his talk with a motion stating that 
the councils should remain the foundation of the German socialist republic and hold 
the highest legislative and executive power. Only a newly elected national congress of 
177 “Reich, Räte und Republik - Die Stenografischen Berichte des Ersten Reichsrätekongresses 1918.”
178 Oertzen, Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. Eine Politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über 
Ideengehalt und Struktur der Betrieblichen und Wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Revolution 
1918/19, 198-99.
179 Braeg and Hoffrogge, Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte Deutschlands. 16.-20. 
Dezember 1918 Berlin. Stenografische Berichte. Neuausgabe zum 100. Geburtstag., 326-40.
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councils could adopt a new constitution.180 He warned the delegates that their jubilation 
for the national assembly was simultaneously a death sentence for the council system, 
the very system that had brought them to this Congress, and he called them a politischen 
Selbstmörderklub (political suicide club). According to Däumig, Cohen proposed a 
bourgeois form of democracy instead of a proletarian democracy. Cohen’s suggestion that 
these two forms could coexist was an illusion, just like the idea of a socialist majority 
in the national assembly. It would be ridiculous to have a great German revolution but 
then hold on to the old political system when there was a new political form at hand. 
Däumig could simply not believe that this Congress would come to a decision that would 
mean ‘political self-castration’. Had this Congress been a truly revolutionary parliament, 
he said, it would have proclaimed itself the national assembly, with the masses of workers 
and soldiers behind it, and taken the fate of Germany in its own hands. He referred to the 
examples of the English, French, American and Russian revolutions to show that these 
revolutionaries trusted themselves with the power they had seized. He argued that the 
German revolutionaries lacked that self-esteem due to the Untertanenideologie (ideology 
of subordinates) that had been nurtured over the past decades. 
As for the concept of dictatorship that seemed to frighten so many delegates, Däumig 
claimed that Germany had already been a dictatorship, with a small economic minority 
ruling over the working majority. The return of a parliament with those same rulers in it 
would mean to return to that dictatorship, to the bourgeois class’ rule over the working 
class. Däumig did acknowledge that the current council elections had been unsystematic 
and that a proper system should be introduced for the entire country. After such a unitary 
election system for the councils, a national assembly could be summoned, but based on 
those councils.181
In the debate that followed, a large majority was in favour of the national assembly. 
Many of the MSPD delegates stressed the need for order and security after all the 
upheaval. August Haas (1881–1945), a metalworkers’ union representative, stated that 
social democracy had always strived for equal suffrage, and that this had now finally been 
put into law. This was the time to trust that the masses did stand behind them and would 
vote social democratic, so that orderly and secure conditions could be achieved.182 The 
democratic faction, represented by Berlin teacher and chair of the teachers’ association 
Wilhelm Flügel (1878–1934), expressed support for the revolution’s achievements wished 
to cooperate on its further development. Hence, they supported the national assembly that 






Berlin – Councils in the Capital
3
One of the delegates that opposed the national assembly was Fritz Heckert (1884–
1936), a union secretary and USPD delegate and very active member of many workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils from Chemnitz, who complained that many people had been citing 
Marx to defend the national assembly, but that those delegates apparently forgot Marx’s 
most important words: that the liberation of the working class could only be the work of 
the working class itself. Had the defenders of parliament forgotten that there had been 
110 SPD members in the Reichstag and that the majority of these members had promised 
that the German working class would soon be lifted out of their misery before sending 
those very people into the slaughterhouse of the world war? Even if the majority of the 
new national assembly would be social democratic, the institution itself would still be 
reactionary.184 
After the lunch break, the Congress debated a new proposal for the relations between 
the Council of People’s Deputies and a new institution to represent the councils (Zentralrat 
– Central Council), but the United Revolutionary faction was denied time to study 
the proposal and prepare for a debate. In response, they left the Congress, making the 
majority in favour of a national assembly even larger.185 Even Walther Lamp’l, the leader 
of Hamburg’s Soldiers’ Council who had radically proposed the democratization of the 
army, supported the elections for a national assembly. Without the support of the radical 
soldiers, the left wing of the USPD was completely isolated. Desperate and tired, Ernst 
Däumig concluded: ‘Oh, the German Revolution is just a comedy.’186 When the Congress 
finally got to vote, it was not about whether there would be a national assembly, but when. 
The soonest possible date was chosen, 19 January 1919, as the MSPD had already stated 
before the whole debate began. 
3.8 Leaders and followers in the Berlin Councils
The historiography of the Berlin councils generally has a strong focus on the role of the 
Spartacists and their frustration with the MSPD and USPD in the councils. After Ralf 
Hoffrogge’s research, it has become clear that, even though the Spartacists were a loud 
voice in the revolution, the main carriers of the council idea were the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards around Richard Müller, who formed the backbone of the council movement 
before and during the revolution. Shifting our focus onto this network also explains the 
importance of the workers’ councils being based on the shop floor instead of in parties 
and unions. This became very visible in the First National Council Congress, where the 
Spartacists’ leaders (who were not workers and hence could not be elected to the Congress) 






Ernst Däumig took up the role of intellectual leaders during the revolution, they were 
what Gramsci would call organic intellectuals, leading thinkers that emerge during the 
revolution. This differentiates them from people like Luxemburg and Liebknecht, who 
already were intellectual leaders before the revolution and attempted to take up that role 
during the events of November and December 1918 too. 
The case of the council movement makes clear how the councils organically emerged 
with these organic intellectuals during the struggle. The councils that developed in the 
strike movement within the network of Revolutionary Shop Stewards were not products 
of any pre-scripted plan or blueprint; they were born from those struggles. During the 
debates in the National Council Congress, the advocates of the councils clearly had 
difficulties finding the proper arguments for them and used problematic concepts like 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ to make their case. I argue that the organic, unscripted 
nature of this form of the council made it difficult for its proponents to conceptualize 
it. The concept of a national assembly, however, was much more thought-through and 
had been part and parcel of the social democratic discourse for decades. A representative 
institution based on universal, equal suffrage was what socialism had been struggling for 
in the previous years and had been part of the discourse of the social democratic milieu. 
Many delegates will have recognized this concept, so the MSPD leadership could refer to 
it without any problems. 
The debates at the Congress show how these political discussions were at their 
core conceptual struggles over the meaning of democracy, dictatorship, legitimacy, 
representation and so on. The revolutionaries were not only struggling over political 
power, taking over the army and seizing of the means of production, but also struggling 
over concepts. In the debate about the national assembly, one could argue with Gramsci 
that the lack of conceptual development of how exactly council politics could be conceived, 
legitimized and defended resulted in the choice for parliamentary politics over the council 
system. Much of this conceptual labour on councils would be done well after the revolution, 
when the window of opportunity had already closed. 
Recurring conclusions in the historiography of the German Revolution, and the 
National Council Congress in particular, are that the councils destroyed their own future 
by establishing a national assembly, and that this was the result of the strong discipline 
in the MSPD faction. Although the councils clearly diminished the powerful position 
they had immediately after 9 November, we must also recognize that establishing a well-
functioning parliament based on truly fair elections had been a major goal of social 
democracy for a long time, so its achievement was a victory for the majority of social 
democratic delegates. Particularly considering the underdeveloped concept of council 
democracy, as pointed out above, it is not surprising that these delegates opted for the 
democratic concept they were intellectually familiar with. Moreover, the votes for the 
democratization of the army and the socialization of the economy show that the delegates 
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were not marionets to the MSPD leadership. In both cases, ideas that came from the rank 
and file and were popular among the masses of soldiers and workers were frankly debated 
and chosen by the delegates despite pressure from their leaders. The fact that those 
leaders eventually ignored those decisions has degraded those victories, but one must still 
conclude that the delegates were not mindless followers of party leadership.
Council communist ideology – as developed in the years after the revolution – drew 
a strong dichotomy between councils (as the only proper political form for the working 
class) and other representative institutions such as parliaments and unions. The analysis 
of the debates at the National Council Congress shows that this either/or dichotomy 
between councils and parliament (the question of councils versus national assembly) 
was indeed present. Although not all defenders of a national assembly were opposed to 
an institutionalisation of the councils (in a subordinate role to the parliament), most 
advocates of council rule appeared to principally exclude any form of parliamentary 
representation in the new republic. 
In the next chapters, we will see that this dichotomy was not the same in the rest 
of Germany. The next chapter, about Munich, will show that the leading figure of the 
revolutionaries there, Kurt Eisner, developed ideas about how a parliament could be 
combined with a (dominant) council structure. Moreover, the case of Munich highlights 
how many of the debates and events that we encountered on the national level in Berlin 
were prefigured in the Bavarian capital (as well as in Bremen and Hamburg, as will become 
clear in the subsequent chapters). The chapter therefore also challenges the traditional 
focus on Berlin as the centre of the revolution. So let us shift our gaze southwards, and 









The federal state of Bavaria is nowadays known as the conservative and catholic south 
of Germany, which might make it surprising to some that it was once, for a short period 
of time, a Soviet Republic ruled by local soldiers, workers and peasants. This chapter 
will dive into this peculiar history to retrieve the concepts, ideas and ideologies of the 
actors involved during and after the revolution. In the previous chapter, we saw how the 
National Council Congress in Berlin debated and decided the future of Germany. Hence, 
the traditional historiographical focus on Berlin as the epicentre of the German revolution 
is not surprising. 
In this chapter, I aim to challenge this focus, however. The three other cases that make 
up the core of this thesis – Munich, Bremen and Hamburg – not only prefigured the events 
in Berlin chronologically (the revolution occurred there before it arrived in the capital), 
but also substantially. By that I mean that many of the debates on the national level were 
preceded by similar debates and decisions on the local level. Shifting our gaze from the 
capital to the three local cases allows us to take a better look at what I would call the work 
floor of the revolution. As we will see in the upcoming chapters, it is in these ‘peripheral’ 
cities that the lion’s share of the development and contestations of ideas took place. 
Moreover, the type of revolutionary agents in Munich, Bremen and Hamburg was 
different. From the perspective of Berlin-as-city we recognized local council activists 
such as the Revolutionäre Obleute, who were generally rank-and-file revolutionaries 
without prior experience in politics. From the perspective of Berlin-as-capital, however, 
we distinguished many participants of the National Council Congress who were either 
established theorists or trained party and union representatives. Many of the conceptual 
clashes analysed in the previous chapter were between and among professional thinkers 
and their group of cultural or political intermediaries. In Munich, we can expect that 
the participating agents were more often from the category of common rank-and-file 
revolutionaries. Although the Munich functioned as the centre of revolutionary Bavaria, 
we will meet many revolutionaries without prior experience in politics. Although there 
will of course also be plenty of professional intellectuals and intermediaries from the 
party cadres, these will not be as dominant as they were on the national level in Berlin. 
Nevertheless, Kurt Eisner, who led the revolution in Munich, was a professional intellectual 
if ever there was one. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will describe the local context and 
history of Bavaria before World War I, and the next will dive into the processes that led up 
to the revolution. Section 4.4 then analyses the initial revolutionary events and the role of 
various main actors, after which section 4.5 dissects three different drafts of the statutes 
for Bavaria’s council elections, which very clearly show the contestations over the meaning 
of council democracy. Then, in more or less chronological order, I will analyse the debates 
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of some of the main council institutions on two major topics under the Eisner regime: the 
composition of the demos and the relation between parliament and councils. After that, I 
will describe the effects of the murder of Kurt Eisner on Bavarian revolutionary politics. 
The final three sections discuss the major conceptual clashes in the post-Eisner council 
republics: questions of representation and sovereignty, the relation between councils and 
parliament (again) and the international relations with other council republics. 
4.2 Pre-revolutionary situation
In 1806, the Kurfürst of Bavaria, Maximilian IV Joseph, declared himself King of Bavaria 
with the help of his ally Napoleon – automatically making Bavaria a kingdom. This 
reinstated the power of the mighty aristocratic family of Wittelsbach that had ruled the 
state (and many others!) since the 12th century. He changed his name to Maximilian I 
Joseph and remained king until his death in 1825. The kingdom survived the turbulent 
year of 1848, albeit with considerable concessions to the upcoming bourgeoisie in the 
form of liberal reforms such as more freedom of the press and broader suffrage. In 1870, 
the kingdom joined (although somewhat hesitantly and notwithstanding much internal 
protest) the North German Confederation (1867–1871) that would become the German 
Empire a year later (1871–1918). 
The constitution that was drafted in 1818 by König Max, as Maximilian I was generally 
called, served as the foundation for the constitutional monarchy right up until the 
revolution of 1918. It had a bicameral system in which the first chamber consisted of royal 
appointees and representatives of the church and nobility. The second chamber was based 
on an indirect form of census suffrage. Ludwig I (who succeeded Maximilian I in 1825), 
however, managed to effectively undo any proper influence of these chambers, though his 
son, Maximilian II, in 1848 declared that he was proud to call himself a constitutional 
monarch, and under his rule all laws required the countersign of the cabinet of ministers.187
After Maximilian II’s early death in 1864, his son Ludwig II took over the crown at 
the age of just 18. His successful efforts to make Bavaria part of the German Empire led 
to tensions with some of the political elite, and his increased aloofness from local politics 
eventually resulted in a dramatic split between the ministers and the king. Ludwig II was 
first put under the ‘guardianship’ of his uncle Luitpold and finally deposed a few days 
later in 1886 following a diagnosis of ‘insanity’. He was found dead in a lake the next day, 
with the official autopsy declaring it suicide, though that is still contested. His brother and 
successor Otto I had also been diagnosed with a serious Geisteskrankheit in the preceding 
months, so Uncle Luitpold maintained his position as de facto ruler of Bavaria under the 
187 Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015).
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title Prinzregent (Prince Regent). Although in strictly legal or political terms, these events 
had no effect on the constitutional arrangements of the monarchy, they did significantly 
change the perception of the king as a political symbol in Bavaria. The absence of a visible, 
sovereign king (as had already been the case under Ludwig II) combined with the image 
of mentally ill rulers damaged the monarchist symbolism of the King having ‘God’s 
blessing’.188 This would have significant effects on the revolutionary atmosphere in Bavaria.
Under the ‘boring’ Luitpold, the monarchy was increasingly limited to a ceremonial 
function, while the actual governance of the state was in the hands of a cabinet of ministers. 
Bavarian politics was in the hands of roughly two major groups: the Liberals and the 
Zentrum (Centre) Party. In the Chamber of Deputies, these two groups had largely been 
equal in terms of seats: 71 Liberals versus 81 Centre between 1887 and 1893 and 67 versus 
74 between 1893 and 1899. By the beginning of the 20th century, this changed significantly: 
whereas the Centre Party managed to retain their electoral position (mostly because of 
their good local networks through the Catholic Church), Bavaria’s rapid urbanisation and 
modernisation had reduced the Liberal faction by almost a half: 22 Liberal seats versus 
83 for Zentrum in 1899–1904. The main causes of this exodus from the Liberals were two 
new political actors: the Social Democrats (SPD, 11 seats) and the Bayerische Bauernbund 
(BBB, Bavarian Peasants League), which, with some additional peasant associations, 
earned a total of 13 seats).189 Still, Zentrum remained the most important political party 
right until the revolution: in the Landtag of 1912–1918, it held 87 seats, while the SPD held 
30, the Liberals 28, and the various peasant parties 13 seats collectively.190 
Notwithstanding the antisocialist laws that suppressed socialist parties and 
organisations throughout the Empire, the working class in Germany was increasingly 
drawn towards the ‘underground’ labour movement. In fact, what attracted people to 
emerging social democracy was much more than just the party and social democratic 
ideology. The socialists had managed to establish a shadow civil society of socialist sports 
clubs, reading groups, chess clubs, theatres, and so on. For many in the working class, 
social democracy had thus become part of the very fabric of their everyday life, both at 
work and in their sparse leisure time.191 It was in this underground labour movement 
that word-of-mouth socialist propaganda was able to radicalise the Bavarian working 
class. One of the pivotal figures in this process was the Völkische SPD leader Georg von 
Vollmar. With his background as a ‘Catholic, a crippled war veteran, and a talented orator 
188 Karl Möckl, “Gesellschaft und Politik Während der ära des Prinzregenten Luitpold,” in Bayern im 
Umbruch: Die Revolution von 1918, ihre Voraussetzungen, ihr Verlauf und ihre Folgen, ed. Karl Bosl 
(Berlin, Boston: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1969), 9.
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in rich Bavarian dialect’,192 Vollmar was able to make a wide range of workers feel at home 
in the Bavarian Social Democratic Party, also because his ideas were accessible. Instead 
of the increasingly militant language of, for example the Hamburg and Bremen sections 
of the SPD, Vollmar believed that the language of class struggle was unwarranted and 
unnecessary in the Bavarian context, and instead stressed the possibility of a peaceful 
transition to socialism. As a result, the SPD in the southern German state had a reformist 
programme, demanding universal suffrage and a unicameral parliamentary democratic 
system. 
The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century saw Munich develop into a city 
of artists. The Wittelsbachs had supported various art forms in the city, and the increasing 
group of artists attracted bohemians, eccentrics, theosophists, anthroposophists and 
all kinds of culturally and intellectually curious people. Kandinsky painted in Munich. 
Lenin wrote his What Is to Be Done? in Munich, and Oswald Sprengler his Untergang 
des Abendlandes. Rudolf Steiner staged plays and lectures, Thomas Mann lived there, 
Simplicissimus was published in the city. The district of Schwabing (popularly called 
Schwabylon) was the cultural epicentre, with one in five houses being an artist’s studio. The 
atmosphere in Munich was steamy, and radical ideas about art, satire, music and writing 
were often linked with radical ideas about politics.193 The very capital of the conservative 
Catholic state of Bavaria had developed a progressive, radical atmosphere that would be 
fertile ground for revolutionary ideas. 
4.3 The revolution’s dress rehearsal
The October Revolution was not generally considered a revolutionary example that 
Germany could or should follow (there were barely any Bolsheviks in Germany), and its 
main effect was the rapid increase of willingness to protest and take collective action. When 
the German elite insisted on a peace treaty that included annexations, this went against 
the wishes of many workers, sparking a wave of protests and strikes in January 1918 that 
swept across Germany and demanded bread and immediate peace without annexations. 
Led by metalworkers and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards in Berlin, workers took to the 
streets everywhere.194 
In Munich, the January Strike was prepared by the USPD – the Unabhängige 
(independent) SPD¸ an anti-war split-off from April 1917 – around Kurt Eisner and Ernst 
Toller. Eisner was a left-wing writer, journalist, editor and poet from a Jewish family with 
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a considerable SPD career in Bavaria, where he had lived since 1910. His opposition to 
the war resulted in a break with the MSPD (the Majority SPD, the party that remained 
after the USPD split off) and his entry into the USPD, where he soon became a welcome 
speaker, particularly among the youth movement. Eisner had a broad network both within 
the workers’ movement and in Munich’s lively intellectual and artistic circles. Toller had 
a similar background in a well-off bourgeois Jewish family. He had volunteered to join 
the war efforts, but suffered a mental breakdown in 1916, after which he decided to study 
philosophy and literature, and became immersed in Munich’s intellectual and artistic 
circles. He got involved in left-wing debates as well, developed revolutionary socialist 
and pacifist ideas and regularly met with Eisner and others to discuss politics. He joined 
the USPD in late 1917. Both men were able to write and speak with a poetic-rhetorical 
fervour that excited workers.195 When the news reached Munich that the Berlin workers 
were striking and joined by workers in Kiel and Hamburg, Eisner pressed his USPD to 
participate. He was invited to a meeting of the workers of the Krupp armament factory 
on 29 January 1918 together with Sonja Lerch (born Sarah Sonja Rabinowitz), who had 
participated in the 1905 Revolution in St. Petersburg, where the workers’ councils had 
originated.196 Lerch was a socialist activist in the Jewish Workers’ Association in Odessa 
and obtained her PhD with a study of the workers’ movement in Russia and the revolution 
of 1905. Lerch worked as a Privatdozent at the university in Munich and was one of the 
main speakers (with Eisner and Toller) during the January strikes.
Eisner claims that he only answered workers’ questions during his visit to the Krupp 
factory and made no attempt to lead them. According to his own principles, workers could 
only lead themselves, and he could only facilitate.197 Nevertheless, a resolution written and 
signed by Eisner (and accepted by the workers) called for a general strike two days later, 
on 31 January. On 30 January, Eisner travelled from factory to factory and union house 
to union house to ask workers and their representatives to participate in the strike – with 
success.198 
On Thursday 31 January, several thousand Munich workers walked out of their 
(weapons) factories and joined the strikes taking place in Berlin and other German cities. 
The USPD in Berlin had not considered the strike as a preamble for a revolution, but 
rather as a political lever to demand peace and better nourishment. In Munich, this was 
different. Eisner considered the mass strike an instrument to ‘conquer power for German 
democracy’.199 For him, it was clear that this time the mass action was not only aimed 
195 Albert Earle Gurganus, Kurt Eisner. A Modern Life (Rochester, New York: Camden House, 2018), 356-
57.
196 Georg Köglmeier, Die Zentralen Rätegremien in Bayern 1918/19. Legitimation - Orgnisation - Funktion 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 16.
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at peace and bread, but at the ‘ultimate’ goal.200 Eisner was one of the main speakers at 
the gathering during the strike, and even though at that point he was not widely known 
among Munich’s working class, the police considered him one of the strike’s leaders and 
arrested him that same night. Eisner would spend the next nine months in jail for high 
treason. Other leaders, including Lerch, were also arrested and imprisoned.201 
After the imprisonment of Eisner and the others, the Munich strike continued for 
several more days, even peaking at 8.000 strikers on the day after the leaders\ imprisonment. 
The importance of January 1918’s Munich events for those in November 1918 does not lie 
in the workers’ demands (which were not met), nor in the short-term outcomes – like in 
the rest of the Empire, the strike was bloodily crushed by military and police forces, and 
most of the strike leaders were arrested – the importance lies in the particular form of 
organisation that the workers in Munich used. In factories, workers elected councils of 
representatives that operated mostly independently of the unions or party leadership.202 
These first experiments with councils and workers’ self-organisation can in hindsight be 
considered as a dress rehearsal for the revolutionary events in November.
4.4 The ‘shotgun wedding’ of a unified left: Kurt Eisner’s free 
state
The revolutionary tensions that had grown all over the German Empire had a strong 
impact on the Kingdom of Bavaria. After the January strike, the calls for peace without 
annexations and the abdications of the Emperor and the Bavarian King Ludwig203 had 
only grown. In a final attempt to save the Bavarian monarchy from revolution, on 2 
November the state government and parliament agreed on a substantial reform package – 
including proportional representation, reform of the Reichsrat and parliament – that had 
been prepared by MSPD leader Erhard Auer (1874–1945) and the MSPD’s legal adviser 
Maximilian Süssheim (1876–1933). The reform package would have probably been enough 
to smother most revolutionary movements had it not been for the war. The situation in 
Bavaria even foreshadowed the national political developments when on 7 November, its 
government changed to a truly broad coalition: the Centre Party, Democrats and Social 
Democrats. 
200 Gurganus, Kurt Eisner. A Modern Life, 358.
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203 Ludwig II was succeeded by his brother Otto, whose mental illness (‘melancholia’) made him unfit to 
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While the MSPD participated in the new coalition to achieve reforms, the USPD 
pursued a revolutionary strategy. On 3 November, the USPD organised an election 
meeting on Munich’s festival grounds, Theresienwiese.204 Speaking for the USPD, Kurt 
Eisner denounced the reforms as ‘insincere and insufficient’, and declared that Bavarians 
would form their own republic and work together with Austria to attain peace, even if 
it meant breaking with Berlin. This speech, openly calling for peace through revolution 
and suggesting a Bavarian-Austrian state separated from the Reich, was received with 
absolute horror by the MSPD. Erhard Auer believed this to mean the ‘insane and criminal’ 
‘demolition’ of the German Reich.205 This is what the split of social democracy in its most 
concrete form came down to: the MSPD took governmental responsibility to reform 
Bavaria into a constitutional monarchy, while the USPD strategized for revolution.206 
News of councils being formed by soldiers and workers had travelled to Munich from 
Stuttgart and Kiel on 5 November, and even before that Eisner’s USPD had expressed the 
wish for councils. At this stage, it was unclear what the exact form and function of the 
councils should be. It seems that Eisner mainly considered the councils a means for the 
people to control existing democratic institutions. At a USPD meeting in October, the 
police recorded a speech in which he stated that ‘the people should be given the possibility 
to exercise control in the offices of the civil service, the government and political parties 
to see whether these work in a truly democratic spirit.’207
On 7 November 1918 (the first anniversary of the Russian revolution), over 60.000 people 
answered the call from Eisner’s USPD to gather on Theresienwiese. Instead of celebrating a 
royal wedding, this crowd demanded immediate peace and the democratisation of German 
society. According to attending journalist Victor Klemperer, this meeting was ‘truly a 
Bavarian people’s assembly, clearly composed of workers, tradesmen, shopkeepers’.208 
Eisner had promoted and prepared the meeting tirelessly, continuously calling for 
collaborative mass action of workers, soldiers and peasants.209 While the MSPD was keen 
to limit the demands for democratic reforms, the USPD leadership had other plans. At the 
meeting, Eisner called for a socialist council system, while the MSPD representative Auer 
supported the announced reforms. While the MSPD and their supporters marched from 
the Theresienwiese to the Friedensengel (angel of peace) monument, the USPD crowd – 
led by Eisner – headed to the city barracks to invite regiments of soldiers to join them in 
a revolution. 
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Although the authorities were quite aware of the USPD’s recent radicalisation around 
Eisner and even knew about plans for revolution – Eisner had visited some barracks the 
week before – the King had ordered his police force to exercise restraint in order not 
to anger the masses and endanger the precarious political transformations.210 But at this 
point, police observers had already noticed a thousand soldiers rallying around red flags, 
supported by sailors (in landlocked Munich), peasants and factory workers.211 During 
his usual afternoon walk in the English Gardens, the King himself was approached by a 
group of workers who lifted their headgear and said: ‘Majestät, genga’s heim, Revolution 
is!’ (Go home, your majesty, it’s a revolution!)212 Ludwig, perplexed, rushed back to his 
palace. Throughout the part of the city where the barracks and military buildings were, 
delegations of the marching soldiers, workers, women and peasants entered barracks and 
announced the revolution. After a while, the windows of the barracks opened and a red 
flag was flown. With very little opposition (only the final barracks, the Türkenkaserne, 
was defended with tear gas and stray bullets), all military positions in the city were now 
controlled by the revolutionaries.213 
When the king returned to his palace, he noted that most of his staff and guards had 
disappeared. His Minister of War had to tell him that no city troops were available to 
defend him, and that no outside help was to be expected, since the rest of the Reich was 
in revolt as well. Dressed in civilian clothes, the king and his family hastily boarded their 
cars and left their kingdom – never to return. But the state would not long be without a 
government. Already at Theresienwiese, the soldiers gathering around Eisner had built 
their own soldiers’ council, and at every barrack they visited they urged the soldiers to 
do the same. The workers had also organised in a workers’ council, with Kurt Eisner as 
chair.214 
Representatives of the soldiers’ councils and workers’ councils returned from their 
successful march to the barracks and organised meetings at the Mathäserbräu beerhall 
in the city centre. Here, the central Arbeiterrat and Soldatenrat were established. The 
two councils met and declared themselves, the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, the new 
rulers of Bavaria. Among their first actions to secure the revolution were to occupy major 
junctions of transport and communication, as well as major newspapers and publishing 
houses around the city.215 The Council itself, supported by armed soldiers, marched to 
the Landtag building and seated itself on the benches of the lower house, accompanied 
by representatives of the peasants. Eisner positioned himself in the president’s chair 
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on the podium and announced the birth of a republic, the Free State of Bavaria, after 
which he proclaimed: ‘Now we must proceed to the formation of a government. We must 
hold elections. He who addresses you now presumes your consent that he shall act as 
provisional prime minister.’216 The Eisner regime was then established to loud cheers and 
applause from the attending revolutionaries. 
The assembled workers, soldiers and peasants had at this point no clear or shared 
understanding of what the role and function of the newly established council would be. Eisner 
also had no well-articulated concept of the council at his disposal, but the occupation of the 
Landtag indicates that he saw the councils as temporary replacements for the city parliament 
until a new national assembly was elected based on general, equal and secret voting.217 This 
shows at least two important aspect of Eisner’s council concept at this time: first that the 
councils were not only revolutionary instruments but forms of political representation, 
and second that Eisner did not envision a Council Republic, but a parliamentary system.218 
Still, the workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ councils were considered what Marx would call a 
‘working body’219 combining executive and legislative power.220 With this, the first contours 
of a concept of council rule were constructed. After that night’s assembly in the Landtag, 
Eisner is believed to have stated: ‘Isn’t it wondrous that we achieved a revolution without 
spilling a drop of blood? That’s never happened in history.’221
The next morning, Eisner invited MSPD leader Auer to join a coalition government, 
and Auer agreed. Even though Auer had never seen the need for a revolution, especially 
after the promised reforms of the monarchy, he was unable to reject an opportunity for 
the MSPD to help rule the new Freistaat. And so that afternoon, Eisner was able to open 
the first meeting of the Provisional National Council of the Bavarian People’s State in 
the Landtag.222 From then on, Eisner expected Bavaria to not only be liberated from the 
monarchy but also from the ‘fratricidal war between socialists’.223 The revolution would 
bring about the ‘reunification of the working masses’ in Bavaria224 – yet this newly unified 
Left was more a shotgun wedding than a marriage of love.225 In his opening speech, Eisner 
promised the establishment of a national assembly in a calmer future and stressed that 
the current task of the Bavarian people was to rule via the direct democratic impulses of 
the councils. This was further institutionalised by the declaration that the workers’ and 
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soldiers’ council would be complemented by the Bauernrat (peasants’ council), and that 
the government would be made up of all socialist (MSPD and USPD) ministers (plus one 
non-affiliated expert minister to stress connection to the existing bureaucracy).226 Eisner 
himself was both prime minister and foreign minister, Erhard Auer was minister of the 
interior, and the minister of finance was Edgar Jaffé, economics professor and officially 
non-affiliated, although his sympathy lay with the USPD. This meant that in fact the party 
that had opposed the revolution, the MSPD, was now the party supplying most of the 
ministers for the provisional government (five out of nine), while the executors of the 
revolution, the USPD, were able to only deliver three ministers (including Eisner). This 
was mainly the result of the fact that the USPD had always been a small and disorganised 
group in Munich, so there were simply not many party members able and willing to 
perform these roles.227 
As for the workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ councils, these saw their initially prominent 
role diminished with the establishment of the government and the National Council. 
Even though the council delegates do not seem to have noticed it, their councils becoming 
part of the National Council meant a decisive step towards a parliamentary rather than a 
council system. Although this tension would only pop up again in Munich later, one could 
conclude that the role of councils was essentially already over on the second day of the 
revolution.228 Moreover, both the councils and Eisner had called on the state bureaucracy 
to continue their work as usual (which was the case in almost every revolutionary German 
city), which further limited the councils’ room to participate in constructing a new order. 
Still, Eisner considered the councils a fundamental part of his concept of ‘new democracy’ 
and tried to incorporate them in this new order. On 15 November, the new government 
(represented by Eisner) declared a programme for the new ‘people’s state’ that was published 
in the Bayerische Staatszeitung two days later. With eloquence and a sense of drama, the 
proclamation stated that ‘Bavaria is liberated’ and that ‘life finally has sense and purpose’ 
now that everyone was able to ‘participate in community work’. Eisner declared that the 
government had already started to institutionalise the revolution’s great transformations, 
and that the government subjected itself to critical judgement by granting complete freedom 
of the press. Bavaria would be a ‘lively’ instead of a merely ‘formal’ democracy, and before 
the establishment of a constituent national assembly, there should be a ‘democratisation 
of the public spirit’ and institutions. Eisner aimed for a ‘parliamentarisation’ of existing 
organisations and seemed to suggest a Nebenparlament (co-parliament). 229 
In this Nebenparlament, all kinds of civil society organisations and associations, 
including professional representative bodies, would assemble in a parliament to 
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deliberate.230 It is unclear whether the central parliament would be the one based on 
councils or the future National Assembly that had been promised at the first meeting 
on 8 November.231 The exact functioning of this additional parliament remained unclear, 
but it is assumed that it would replace the former Upper House. The relations between 
the two parliaments and the government remained vague as well. Notwithstanding all 
these obscurities regarding the ‘new democracy’, it seems evident that Eisner envisioned a 
radically new political, social and economic model for Bavaria. 
His desire for radical change is illustrated by his plan to reform the entire school system 
in terms of both curriculum and pedagogy. This had been on the wish list of democrats 
and (all strands of) socialists for a long time. These groups shared the aim to undo the 
dominance of the Catholic Church on the educational system. 232 This also involved a 
democratisation of school management.233 Moreover, Eisner envisioned radical reforms of 
the legal system and judiciary, the tax system, and the army. The democratisation of the 
army had considerable successes, with the insignia of officers being removed from their 
uniforms, the relaxation of military discipline for guards and the new custom to playfully 
address officers as Oberkameraden (superior comrades).234 Nevertheless, most of the 
plans for radical change in Bavaria remained just that, plans. The democratic aspirations 
remained largely hypothetical, since the Eisner government operated as an executive and 
legislative body with little to no influence or control by the National Council.
The Eisner government’s proclamation also expressed the long-standing socialist wish 
to socialize the economy but stressed two immediate obstacles: first, as years of war had 
left the economy in complete disarray, there was little left to actually socialise. Second, 
the international situation was such that a single nation could not socialise its economy 
without disastrous consequences, so socialisation could only start when a ‘Völkerbund 
der Weltdemokratien’ (League of World Democracies) was established to organise it on a 
global scale.235 
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4.5 A tale of three drafts
The Zentralarbeiterrat (Central Workers’ Council) was a combination of the Revolutionären 
Arbeiterrat (consisting of around 50 members, mostly radical left) and the Münchener 
Arbeiterrat, the central body of the delegates elected in the workplaces (Betreibsräte), and it 
expressed its concerns over the proceedings in Berlin in a letter to their ‘leader’ and ‘comrade’ 
Eisner on 18 November. They first inquired whether the intended National Assembly in 
Berlin would also be binding in the state of Bavaria, in which case they wanted to express 
their ‘sharpest protest’ in the name of the revolution. Moreover, they articulated their 
uncertainty about their role in the programme of the new Bavarian government. The Central 
Workers’ Council did not appear to be opposed to the establishment of a national parliament 
in principle, but it did state that this could only happen after a ‘temporary dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ and the ‘completion of the revolution’.236 In the first weeks of the revolution 
in Bavaria, the government in Munich received many letters from concerned or vacillating 
councils all over Bavaria about their functioning, rights and finances. For example, Nicolaus 
Müller from Hohenwart asked how council delegates were to be trained and how the various 
councils should cooperate.237 Another letter arrived from the Volksrat (people’s council) of 
Miesbach, asking whether the government was aware any other ‘people’s councils’ had been 
established or how those people’s councils functioned. The government responded that it 
had not heard of any other people’s councils and that they advised following the guidelines 
they would soon publish.238 There is at least one other example of a Volksrat in Bavaria, in 
the municipality of Tegernsee – fewer than 15 kilometres southwest of Miesbach. This one 
was established on 11 December 1918 with explicit reference to the council in Miesbach. 
It appears that there was a workers’ council first, but that it changed its name to Volksrat 
to represent the entire population.239 The establishment of these people’s councils probably 
resulted from these small communities that did not identify as workers but still wanted to 
participate in council politics to represent their interests in the capital. 
This correspondence shows two important aspects of the establishment of councils in 
Bavaria. Firstly, it shows that councils were established locally, bottom-up, all across the 
Land, with only limited connections between them. Secondly, and relatedly, it shows that 
there was a great variety of councils and that they requested guidelines from the central 
government in Munich on how to operate. 
While the Central Workers’ Council appears to have played a waiting game in 
developing their relation to Eisner’s government, the Soldiers’ Council acted more 
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proactively to secure some of their initial aims. Already on 9 November, the Soldiers’ 
Council wrote up five points regarding the organisation of the army that were discussed 
in the cabinet meeting. The third point demanded all officers be democratically elected.240 
Although this seems radical, it would be incorporated in the Hamburger Punkte (Hamburg 
Points) that Hamburg Soldiers’ delegate Walther Lamp’l brought forward during the first 
Reichsrätekonferenz in December 1918.241 
The uncertainty of the Central Workers’ Council about their relation to the government 
and its programme was first addressed in the cabinet meeting of 20 November. Interestingly, 
the government drafted two different outlines for a bill regarding the workers’ councils, 
and Revolutionary Workers’ Council wrote up a third independently. Dated 18 November 
1918, the first draft came from the Ministry of the Interior (hence from the hand of the 
MSPD’s Erhard Auer). The second, dated two days later, came from the Foreign Ministry 
(hence from the hand of Kurt Eisner). As can be expected, both the contents and tone of 
the three documents differ greatly. In the following section, I will analyse their differences 
by going through their most important articles in order to explain the various concepts of 
council politics that were contested in this revolutionary period. 
In Auer’s ‘Draft Statute for the Workers’ and Peasants’ Councils’ of 18 November, 
the second article immediately states that the councils have no Vollzugsgewalt (executive 
power), and that they should avoid any interference in the workings of the state or local 
governments. The article continues: 
The workers’ and peasants’ councils are therefore mainly auxiliary facilities that support 
the legally appointed bodies and authorities in maintaining police order or fulfilling 
other tasks. For the rest, they shall limit themselves to expressing and representing to 
the authorities concerned the desires and suggestions that they consider to be in the 
interest of the general wellbeing.242
If the councils had any aspirations for power in the new Bavarian Republic, this should 
wake them up from that dream.
Eisner’s draft of 20 November, which opens with the statement that ‘the purpose and 
assignment of the workers’ councils is to involve the masses of the proletariat directly in 
political cooperation’, provides a sharp contrast.243 The same article also states that the 
councils are the site where the proletarian masses’ wishes, suggestions and grievances are 
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structurally collecting and expressed – a function akin to that in Auer’s draft. Furthermore, 
Eisner states that the councils will form the revolutionary foundation of the new government 
system until the national assembly is in place. The councils should not try to mimic the 
political form of bourgeois parliaments, which were mere ‘hotbeds of vanity, pushiness, 
profiteering’, but instead should be a creative, productive force for the community. One of 
the main functions of the councils ought to be to actively ensure (through propaganda) a 
new democratic socialist spirit takes root in both state and society, so that the next elections 
(it is unclear of which body) will confirm the current provisional order of things.244 
The second article of Eisner’s draft aims to organise the relationship between the 
councils and other, traditional institutions. Local councils have extensive powers of 
control over all their district’s issues and institutions. It remains unexplained what exactly 
this Kontrollrecht (power of control) entails, but councils and existing institutions should 
cooperatively take ‘all the measures necessary for the transformation’.245 Though the 
exact relationship between the old authorities and the new remains clouded, it is clear 
the councils eventually ought to be the dominant force: the existing institutions cannot 
refuse their demands. In case of conflict, the council can file a complaint with the central 
revolutionary government (probably the one in Munich), which will then decide on the 
matter in consultation with the council. The relation between local councils and the 
Central Workers’ Council and government in Munich remains vague (‘they should be in 
closest communication) and unresolved. 
The third draft, written by the Revolutionary Workers’ Council on 19 November, was 
mainly aimed at establishing councils for the working class in Bavaria’s capital of Munich. 
Delegates from all workplaces would be sent to the Munich Workers’ Council, which in 
turn would send delegates to a Zentralarbeiterrat (Central Workers’ Council) that would 
have 50 members. The Zentralarbeiterrat represented the councils’ ‘revolutionary power’, 
but was not intended to have executive power. This executive power should rest with the 
ministries, which would be accountable to parliament, although it is unclear what kind 
of parliament was meant. The Zentralarbeiterrat should control the ministries though a 
‘pairing’ system: a Volkskommisar (people’s commissioner) would be sent to each ministry, 
attend all the minister’s meetings and serve as a liaison between Zentralarbeiterrat and 
ministry. This draft also provided the practical guideline that every workplace with at 
least 100 workers could send one delegate, and every workplace of over 1000 people could 
send two. As for outside of the capital, one brief instruction was supposed to suffice: ‘in all 
towns and cities of Bavaria, proceedings should be along the same principles’.246 
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These three drafts were created in response to the local councils’ call for more 
coordinated policy. They partially contradicted one another and more importantly 
expressed very different notions of what the new republic should look like. One might 
expect a huge public clash of ideas resulted between the council-democratic and 
parliamentarian tendencies, but nothing like that occurred. The minutes of the council of 
ministers show that the negotiations took quite some time, but there is no evidence of any 
fierce debate. Between 18 and 26 November, the issue was on the agenda almost every day, 
although some days the decision was that ‘these guidelines should soon be discussed’.247 
Finally, on 26 November, after anonymous support from the executive committees of 
the councils of workers, soldiers and peasants, the council of ministers approved new 
guidelines. These final guidelines were a compromise between Auer’s and Eisner’s drafts 
– the draft of the revolutionary workers’ council was apparently not taken into account.248 
The guidelines were split into two parts, the first for the workers’ councils and the second 
for the peasants’ councils.
The first part consisted of 10 articles. The first stated that every community should have 
a workers’ or peasants’ council. The second, taken directly and completely from Eisner’s 
draft, stated that the councils were supposed to give the working masses a voice and a 
hand in Bavarian politics. The third article was copied from Auer’s proposal and explained 
which workers and peasants could be elected onto the councils. The fourth article was 
entirely new and aimed to structure the communal councils’ election of Vertrauensleute 
(‘trustees’) who would be delegated to Vollzugsausschüße (executive committees) on 
the district level. Interestingly, the guidelines sought to prescribe tight and continual 
relationships between the local councils and the ‘social-democratic organisations and 
unions’. Here, Auer seems to have brought the SPD into a position to obtain more control 
over the local councils. 
Article VI was an interesting compromise between Eisner’s and Auer’s drafts: it 
mentions the councils as the foundation of the new government system, but only until the 
national assembly decides the final state structure. This tied in with a conception of the 
council as a temporary form of politics that was capable of transitioning a revolutionary 
period into a more stable and durable situation. The rest of the article described the 
intended limited capacities of the council, which again reveals that Auer had the upper 
hand: the councils had the right to have their proposals and complaints heard by the local 
government – not a word about (co-)determination rights or other genuine executive or 
legislative powers. Article VIII (after Article VII’s somewhat misplaced intermezzo about 
countering illicit and contraband trade) left no doubt that the councils’ influence should 
remain checked. Both the councils and their executive committees had no executive 
247 Ministerrat vom 19. XI. 18, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv MA 99512.
248 Köglmeier, Die Zentralen Rätegremien in Bayern 1918/19. Legitimation - Orgnisation - Funktion, 70-71.
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power, and they should ‘avoid any intervention in state or communal governance’. Should 
the councils experience that their work in the general interest was being obstructed by 
government institutions, they could direct their complaints to the government of the 
People’s State of Bavaria.249 
The final substantial article, X, interestingly demanded that the councils should be 
ready to defend the government of the People’s State when necessary (in close cooperation 
with the soldiers’ councils).250 It is not clear whether this referred to the formation of 
militia or more organisational issues, but what is interesting is that the text refers not 
to the People’s State as such, but to its government. This implies that the councils, while 
they were denied any serious impact on the government, were still required to serve that 
government in case of emergency. Considering the MSPD’s fear of attacks from both left 
and right, this article was probably intended to at least formally take the councils out of 
the hands of the revolutionary left – in case it wanted to topple the state government. 
The second part of the declaration consisted of guidelines for the formation and 
functioning of peasants’ councils. Its first two articles resembled the ones for workers’ 
councils: every community should have a peasants’ and/or a workers’ council, and these 
should actively involve the rural population in political and economic cooperation. Article 
III stated that elections should be organised through popular assemblies and by universal 
suffrage. The fourth article clarified the instrumental relationship between the workers 
and peasants: to maintain order in the cities, the peasants’ councils needed to ensure the 
proper delivery of food to urban and military centres. 
Article V showed the restricted political rights of the peasants’ councils. Just like the 
workers’ councils, they had the right to be informed, but should abstain from any interference 
with ongoing governance, let alone have any executive powers. The councils’ structure was 
identical to the one envisioned for the workers’ councils: a federative pyramidal design in 
which representatives of the communal councils were delegated to higher-level councils, 
with the central peasants’ council (Landtag) that was seated in Munich on top. 
Meanwhile, on 26 November, Munich’s Soldiers’ Council agreed on provisional 
regulations for soldiers’ councils. In this document, the soldiers proclaim a ‘new spirit in 
the army’ in which trust between free soldiers and their leaders is key. This was ensured 
by a system of councils of elected soldiers that represent the interests of the collective 
and individual wellbeing and that also make soldiers conscious of their military duties. 
The councils had a Gehorsamspflicht (duty of obedience) towards higher institutions and 
(‘in this transitory period’) emphatically no right to appoint or depose military leaders, 
nor did they have any right the interfere in non-military affairs. The soldiers’ councils 
did have the right to propose appointments or dismissals to the military leaders, and the 
249 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 28 November 1918 (Nr. 277).
250 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 28 November 1918 (Nr. 277).
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right to receive requests (e.g. for leave) and complaints. Moreover, they obtained the right 
to appoint a judge in the military courts. The military leadership explicitly maintained 
the right of command and the right to discipline officers.251 Although these regulations 
provided soldiers with more influence over their work, this was not the democratisation 
of the army (with elected officers) that radicals had demanded, and in fact the leadership 
remained much of its former powers. 
Reflecting on these three drafts, a particular conception of council democracy surfaces. 
The radical democratic elements that communists and anarchists had proposed (executive 
power for workers’ and peasants’ councils, soldiers’ councils to elect officers) were lost 
in the ‘compromise’ with the MSPD. What remained was a conception of the council 
as a political instrument to involve workers, peasants and soldiers in the governance of 
their direct environment by being a focal point for their wants and complaints. Without 
any proper powers except to be a listening ear, in these guidelines the councils became 
something more like ombudsmen than instruments of self-governance. 
At 4:30 on the afternoon of the day that the new council guidelines were published, 
November 28, Prime Minister Eisner spoke at a meeting of the Workers’, Soldiers’ and 
Peasants’ Council. Before reflecting on his trip to Berlin, he took the time to once more 
stress the importance of the councils in the new government structure. The difference 
between the guidelines and Eisner’s speech is astonishing. Eisner claimed that the call for 
a national assembly was mainly the work of a handful of noisy former MPs who wanted 
their position back. Eisner called the councils, not a national assembly, the basis of the 
new state, and a parliament could only be installed after this basis had been secured. 
Calls for a national assembly were, according to Eisner, dictated by the hope that it would 
eliminate the masses’ ‘lively participation’ in politics and reinstate the leaders instead. If 
there would ever be a national assembly, it could only be the creation of the councils, not 
the other way around.252 
Eisner also responded to a complaint from Nürnberg that the government had accepted 
other occupational organisations (such as the Catholic Women Teachers’ Association) 
to be represented in the Provisional National Council. According to Eisner, including 
representative organisations from the broadest range of classes was indispensable. As long 
as these non-working-class organisations were willing to cooperate in line with ‘socialist 
and democratic ideas’, they should have a right to be heard – but no more than that: ‘We 
need them, we need their skilled professional activities, but we will not give them room 
251 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 5 December 1918 (Nr. 283).
252 Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des Arbeiter-, Soldaten- und Bauernrates vom 28. November 
1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 1918/1919, 
Beilagen-Band, (München, 1919), Beilage 1: pp. 1-11. 
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for any political determination or political powers.’253 Non-working-class people and 
groups should be heard in this assembly in order to test the potential and limits of direct 
democratic and socialist ideas in transforming the Bavarian community. 
In the minutes of the meeting, there was no sign of any protest or criticism – quite the 
opposite, his speech was frequently interrupted by applause and people shouting support 
like ‘Bravo!’, ‘Sehr richtig!’, ‘Sehr wahr!’ or ‘Sehr gut!’ No one mentioned the discrepancy 
between the very limited conception of the councils in the new guidelines and the image 
Eisner drew of the councils as the centre of power in the new Bavarian People’s State. Under 
the new regulations, that limited conception of political representation Eisner seemed to 
envision for non-working-class organisations would in fact be applicable to the councils. 
Eisner’s conception of democracy is worth a little more attention. In various speeches, 
he equated it to the masses’ participation in politics. The councils, he believed, were 
institutionalisations of this aspiration to involve ordinary people in government. Eisner 
distinguished his participatory conception of democracy from a representative conception 
such as a traditional parliament. This is similar to the distinction that council communist 
theorists like Gorter, Pannekoek and Rühle would make in the following years: politics 
should empower people, making them literally govern themselves instead of slavishly 
following leaders or remaining ‘impotent spectators’.254 However, whereas these later 
theorists extended this argument by stating that any form of parliamentarism obstructs 
democratic rule, Eisner appeared to make a less radical argument. In some speeches, Eisner 
saw a future role for a parliament as long as it would have its foundation in the councils.255 
In other words, there could be legitimate representative forms of politics as long as they 
were based in participatory practices. Eisner’s conception of participatory democracy was 
inextricably linked to the economic sphere: the participation of ordinary workers in the 
organisation of the workplace had to precede any form of political representation. This 
conception of politics demanded the involvement of the people (more precisely: workers) 
in all spheres of life, and there could only be legitimate representation in parliament after 
this was accomplished.
253 Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des Arbeiter-, Soldaten- und Bauernrates vom 28. November 
1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 1918/1919, 
Beilagen-Band, (München, 1919), Beilage 1: pp. 1-11.
254 Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen des bayerischen Soldatenräte vom 30. November bis 
3. Dezember 1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 
1918/1919, Beilagen-Band, (München, 1919), Beilage 2: pp. 13-126.
255 Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des Arbeiter-, Soldaten- und Bauernrates vom 28. November 
1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 1918/1919, 
Beilagen-Band, (München, 1919), Beilage 1: pp. 1-11; Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen 
des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern, zweite öffentliche Sitzung, Freitag, den 13. 
Dezember 1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 
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In a speech to the provisional national council on 13 December 1918, Eisner introduced 
a new term for Bavaria’s new political system: productive democracy. In sharp contrast 
to the kind of ‘merely formal legal democracy’ embodied by the old parliament, this 
‘lively, active’ democracy was based on the principle of equality, institutionalized in the 
three councils (of workers, soldiers and peasants) and markedly involved professional 
organisations. This once again shows how, for Eisner, democracy was entangled with the 
workplace and embedded in the daily working lives of the population. This is also what 
links his concepts of democracy and socialism: only this lively, participatory, ‘productive’ 
form of democracy can lead to socialism. Socialism, in slightly different words, is ‘the 
productive democracy of a working people’s community’.256 
As stated before, Eisner’s conception of participatory democracy based on the councils 
did not match the councils’ formal position described in the guidelines of late November. 
The provisional national council’s role was very limited in these first few weeks of the 
revolution, which led historian Allan Mitchell to conclude that its main purpose was to 
legitimise the position of the cabinet.257 Even though the fact that the provisional council was 
not involved in any meaningful decision-making in the first month of its formal existence 
seems to support Mitchell’s conclusion, it seems only right to stress the council’s purposes 
outside of the direct political or economic realm. In the government’s programme of 15 
November, Eisner stated that the revolution had to entail a democratisation of culture. He 
mentioned examples of opening up the position of teacher to people without degree, giving 
pupils the right to co-determine their curricula, making academic resources available to 
the broader public and getting the masses involved in the arts.258 
A vivid example of what the new government must have had in mind here must have 
been the Revolutionsfeier that was organised by the workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ council 
on 17 November. Seats in the National (previously Royal) Theatre were distributed by lottery 
amongst council members, so that rank-and-file representatives sat amongst ministers, party 
leaders and professors.259 The festivities included illustrative pieces of music and a speech by 
the revolution’s new star, Kurt Eisner, and the night ended with a big singalong of Gesang der 
Völker (The Peoples’ Hymn), written by none other than Eisner himself.260 Apart from the 
fact that the entire evening was quite the Eisner show, it did bring ordinary people in contact 
256 Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates 
Bayern, zweite öffentliche Sitzung, Freitag, den 13. Dezember 1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen 
Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im Jahre 1918/1919 (I. Band), available via: http://mdz-nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00009665-7. 
257 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 112.
258 Programm der neuen Regierung, in Bayerische Staatszeitung, 17 November 1918 (Nr. 268).
259 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 51.
260 The music of the hymn was taken from an old Dutch song commemorating the 16th-century victory of 
the Dutch over their Spanish oppressors (“Wilt heden nu treden”). Interestingly enough, another part 
of the programme was Beethoven’s “Overture to Egmont”, which commemorates the start of the Dutch 
revolt against Spain. 
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with the plays of Goethe, poetry, the music of Beethoven and Händel, and speeches about 
the meaning of democracy, revolution and socialism. The response of the audience was very 
positive, with some observers even suggesting restaging it to enlighten the Bavarian youth.261 
4.6 Inclusive democratic politics – constituting the demos
Women in Germany had organised since the late 19th century to demand better rights. In 
Bavaria, this resulted in associations that aimed to improve education for women. In 1908, 
Anita Augspurg und Lida Gustava Heymann established the Bayerischen Landesverein für 
Frauenstimmrecht (Bavarian State Association for Women’s Suffrage) in Munich. Augspurg 
(1857–1943) was a lawyer and women’s rights activist in Munich. Heymann (1868–1943) 
was her life partner from Hamburg, where she had previously founded a women’s centre 
and fought for women’s education. As a peace and women’s rights activist she had also 
founded the Verband für Frauenstimmrecht (Union for Women’s Suffrage) in Hamburg. On 
24 September 1912, Augspurg and Heymann organised a large demonstration for women’s 
suffrage in Munich, after the example of the British suffragettes. During the parade, which 
was characterised as cosy and pleasant, the middle-class women encountered a working-
class woman who is reported to have said: ‘How nice it is that the rich ladies should want 
to work for us now!’262 Although this first demonstration organised by women resulted 
in attention for women’s rights, its long-term impact was limited, remaining the only 
German demonstration for women’s suffrage until after the revolution.263
The revolution in Bavaria was a crucial turning point for women’s suffrage. The new 
People’s State of Bavaria introduced equal political rights for women, as the declaration of 
Eisner on 8 November had made clear: ‘a constitutive national assembly, to which all men 
and women of age have the right to vote, will be established as soon as possible’.264 This 
was the beginning of equal voting rights in Bavaria, unprecedented in all Germany.265 But 
the emancipatory struggle of Bavarian women did not end there. Primarily, there was the 
problem of women’s virtual absence in the councils. Since the new republic was intended 
to be based on these councils, this suggested women would remain powerless. This issue 
surfaced all over Germany, and very similar points were raised in cities like Hamburg and 
Bremen as well. Whereas women had worked in factories for much of the war, now that their 
husbands and sons started to return home, 40.000 Bavarian women were expelled from the 
workplace and as a result effectively denied political inclusion via workers’ councils.266 
261 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 113.
262 Richard J. Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany 1894-1933 (London and Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1976), 90.
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264 Bayerische Staatszeitung, 9 November 1918 (Nr 261).
265 Schaupp, Der Kurze Frühling der Räterepublik. Ein Tagebuch der Bayerischen Revolution, 83.
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Women were also excluded due to their perceived political illiteracy, not only by men, 
but women themselves too. At a meeting on 19 November, Heymann called for a women’s 
assembly. That night around 8 p.m., she demanded the establishment of a women’s council 
that represented women’s interests but also helped ‘educate politically unoriented women’.267 
Moreover, this women’s council should lobby for including women as candidates in the 
elections for a national parliament.268 This meeting of progressive Bavarian women would 
be the origin of the Bund sozialistischer Frauen (Federation of Socialist Women, formally 
established in December 1918) that bridged members of the radical left, USPD and MSPD, as 
well as some liberals.269 The need for this lobby becomes clear when we further inspect the 
figures about women’s participation in the Bavarian councils.
In December 1919, the provisional National Council had 256 members, only eight of 
which were female. Three organisations with a seat in the National Council specifically 
represented women’s interests: the Social Democratic Women’s Association of Munich 
(Sozialdemokratischer Frauenverein München), the Federation of Bavarian Women’s 
Associations (Hauptverband der bayerischen Frauenvereine) and the Association 
for Women’s Suffrage (Verein für Frauenstrimmrecht). Furthermore, two vocational 
organisations for women were represented in the National Council: the Bavarian Women 
Teachers’ Association (Bayerischer Lehrerinnenverein) and the Association for Catholic 
Bavarian Women Teachers (Verein katholische bayerischer Lehrerinnen).270 Furthermore, 
in a telegram from the Worker’s and Soldiers’ Council, dated 21 November 1918, Emma 
Sauber271 is notified that she has been elected as a member of the workers’ council (although 
her name does not surface anywhere else).272 
Women’s mass firings from the factories and assumed political illiteracy were not the 
only reasons that Bavarian women were excluded from politics. A third important reason 
was the categorisation of vocations eligible for election into the workers’ councils, as the 
included vocations were generally masculine in nature. And even though the last category 
on the list was that of ‘domestic servants’, not a single maid was delegated in the council, 
and no one appears to have thought about electing these workers.273 The inclusion of women 
was also hampered by a fourth problem, related to the praxis of the workers’ elections. Even 
in workplaces where women still formed an important part of the workforce (and hence the 
267 Lida Gustava Heymann in Münchener Post, 20 November 1919. 
268 Schaupp, Der Kurze Frühling der Räterepublik. Ein Tagebuch der Bayerischen Revolution, 83.
269 Ibid., 85.
270 Verzeichnis der Mitglieder des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern, nach dem Stande 
vom 21. Dezember 1918, in: Verhandlungen des provisorischen Nationalrates des Volksstaates Bayern im 
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demos), they fell victim to the sociological issue that it was mainly experienced, popular and 
expertly skilled workers who were elected. Compared to their male colleagues, women simply 
had not acquired as much experience over the war years. Moreover, since they had domestic 
duties to take care of after work, they had no time to meet colleagues in pubs or at clubs, so 
they had few chances to become popular.274 But of course the main problem was the fact that 
housewives were explicitly denied the right to vote for the councils. Even though Marxist 
theory had always maintained that domestic work was as essential for the continuous 
reproduction of the capitalist economy as ‘professional’ work, the men in power completely 
ignored the women in Bavaria. Journalist and socialist women’s rights activist Toni Sender 
(1888–1964) from Frankfurt am Main would make exactly this argument at the USPD party 
conference in November 1919.275 Although universal suffrage opened up possibilities for 
women to participate in political life, actually fulfilling this potential remained difficult. 
 
4.7 Electing a new Landtag 
On 20 November 1918, Minister Auer argued that, since the Bavarian constitution held 
that the King had the right to dissolve both chambers of the Landtag (sometimes called 
Diet or Bavarian State Parliament), this right had now transferred to the government of 
the Volksstaat Bayern. The government immediately announced that the Landtag that 
had been elected on 28 September 1918 had now been dissolved.276 On 5 December 1918, 
the Bavarian government announced that elections for its Landtag were to be held on 12 
January 1919. For the first time in Bavaria, every citizen (male and female) over the age 
of 20 was eligible to vote, and any citizen (male and female) over the age of 25 could be 
elected.277 That same 5 December, Berlin witnessed the beginnings of a violent spiral when 
army troops loyal to the social democratic President Friedrich Ebert murdered 16 radical 
leftist protestors at a demonstration. Two weeks later, Ebert ordered his army to fire their 
cannons on a revolting marine division – an event that would eventually lead to the break 
in the government between the USPD and MSPD.278
The tensions between Munich’s radical left and its social democrats began to rise as well. 
Erhard Auer felt threatened by radical left-wing forces and their possible influence on the 
soldiers’ councils, so he decided to establish a Bürgerwehr in addition to the armed forces 
under control of the Soldiers’ Council.279 On notice boards and pillars around Bavaria, 
posters called up the Bürgertum to enlist for the militia. The word Bürger can designate 
274 Ibid., 49.
275 Helga Grebing, Frauen in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Heidelberg: Stiftung Reichspräsident-
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both bourgeois and citizen, but in the context of arming militias against a perceived left-
wing influence on the soldiers’ councils it was generally taken to mean the former. Both 
the soldiers and the Left were infuriated by what they considered a counterrevolutionary 
act aimed at arming the militant right. Auer quickly defended himself by claiming that 
he intended the term Bürger in the republican sense, as citizen, but the radical left, 
represented by Ernst Toller, demanded his resignation, and the soldiers’ council accused 
him of undermining the armed forces.280 
In his condemnation of Auer, Ernst Toller provided an interesting argument regarding 
leadership in the council movement. He stated that it was ‘tragic, that we, who fight for 
socialism, have to fight our socialist leaders’. Furthermore, he claimed, this meant fighting 
‘all spiritual suppression’, since ‘our current leaders have proven to lack the leadership 
qualities’ needed to push the socialist cause forwards: ‘Give us leaders that we trust more, 
and we will accept them gladly.’281 What is interesting about this conception of leadership 
in the council movement is that leadership as such is not denounced, but that it should 
be something that is given, or rather earned by displaying particular capacities. In other 
words, leaders are under the strict democratic control of those they claim to lead. 
Although tensions in Bavaria rose, Auer could remain in his post. Not in the last 
place because Prime Minister Eisner defended him and tried to maintain good relations 
between the parties. Eisner simultaneously aimed to preserve some of the revolution’s 
achievements in a new, provisional Basic Law for the Bavarian Republic that was published 
by the government on 4 January.282 Though the text has some typical Eisner phrases, 
councils are never specifically mentioned: 
The past is dead. The people are struggling to shape their fate in new ways. That this 
people as a whole freely decides on its conditions and lives is the inviolable eternal 
constitutional right of the Bavarian Republic. Its rule should not consist in the 
application of empty external rights, but in the immediate and continuous cooperation 
in affairs of state and in the legally guaranteed power to enforce the will of the people 
at any time. This living democracy is executed and completed through the free 
organizations of the people, as well as in the parliament, and especially through the 
referendum, which has the purpose and effect of ensuring the harmony between the 
will of the people and their representatives in government and parliament.283
280 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 63.
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This Basic Law for a ‘living democracy’ was not discussed with the democratically 
elected councils, nor is there any evidence that suggest that they had any influence on the 
development of this constitution.
Earning less than three percent of the votes, the elections of 12 January were a 
politically devastating loss for Eisner and his USPD. Nevertheless, Eisner managed to 
forge a coalition between the USPD and MSPD socialists, even though he himself would 
not remain in his post as prime minister. This chapter could well have ended around this 
point if Eisner had been allowed to hand over power to this newly elected parliament and 
the legally and democratically legitimated government. I might have been able to write 
another section on the conflicting conceptions of democracy at play in the power struggle 
between the councils and the parliament, but that would have wrapped up the history of 
the Bavarian revolution.284 
4.8 Power vacuum and Council Congress
Eisner would not get the chance to hand over power because of the actions of the right-
wing nationalist and army lieutenant Anton Arco-Valley, which eventually resulted in 
what would become known as ‘the second revolution’. On his way to the first meeting 
of the new Diet, on 21 February, Eisner was shot in his head and back by Arco-Valley 
and dies in the street. The murderer motivated his act in a note: ‘Eisner is a Bolshevik, 
a Jew, he is no German, he does not feel German, he undermines any patriotic thought 
and feeling, he is a traitor.’285 The Thule-Gesellschaft (Thule Society), of which Arco-Valley 
was a member, was a circle of radically anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists that had already 
attempted to kidnap Eisner and attacked other prominent Jews in Bavaria. The Thule 
Society would play an important part in establishing and developing the Nazi movement, 
but the virulent anti-socialist, anti-Semitic rhetoric in many nationalist and bourgeois 
newspapers over the past months also had its effects.
Eisner’s death presented the revolutionaries with practical issues that deserved 
instantaneous attention. Immediately after the news had reached the assembly in the 
Diet, rumours spread that Auer had somehow been involved. Alois Lindner (1887–1943), 
a butcher and member of the workers’ council, took out his gun and shot Minister Auer 
out of his chair, leaving him severely wounded. Lindner killed two bystanders who tried 
to stop him before he fled to Hungary. 
In the chaos after Eisner’s assassination and the attack on Auer, councils from all over 
Bavaria assembled in Munich to avert the threat of counterrevolution. They constituted a 
Zentralrat (Central Council) of the Bavarian Republic that included representatives from 
284 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 273.
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the three left-wing parties and the peasants.286 The Zentralrat realised that the election 
results indicated that there was no parliamentary basis for a left-wing (revolutionary) 
government in Bavaria and that any form of revolutionary, socialist government would have 
to have an extra-parliamentary basis.287 So instead of assembling the newly elected Diet, 
the Central Council assembled representatives of all Bavarian councils for the Congress 
of Bavarian Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Councils (Kongress der bayerischen Abeiter-, 
Bauern- und Soldatenräte) at Munich’s Deutsches Theater. Taking place two months after 
the National (German) Council Congress in Berlin, it was clear that proponents of the 
councils could not expect support from the national government. Still, as we will see, 
delegates here were similarly optimistic as those in Berlin that this was the beginning of 
council rule in Bavaria. Even though the circumstances of this Bavarian congress were 
much less favourable than those in Berlin, delegates debated with vigour and eloquence. 
After some introductory words in commemoration of Eisner by the chair of the Central 
Council, Ernst Niekisch (1889–1967), the Congress immediately sparked a debate about the 
relation between council republic and democracy. Niekisch was MSPD but represented the 
moderate left wing of that party – in contrast to his right-leaning predecessor, Auer. He 
was a young teacher and editor who had been actively involved in the council movement 
as chairperson of the Worker’s and Soldiers’ Council in Augsburg and a strong proponent 
of concerted action by the three leftist parties. After his expulsion from the SPD in 1926, 
Niekisch would become a spokesperson of national bolshevism and admirer of Stalin. World 
War II and his imprisonment by the Nazis cured him of his nationalism, and the suppression 
of workers’ uprisings in 1953 cured him of his bolshevism before his death in 1967.288
Niekisch apparently circulated an agenda that included an item titled ‘Räterepublik oder 
Demokratie’ (council republic or democracy), which implied that a council republic would 
not be democratic. This led to a fierce ‘interruption regarding the standing orders’ (zur 
Geschäftsordnung) by Gustav Landauer. The item was then changed to ‘future constitution 
of the Free People’s State of Bavaria’.289 So even before the assembled delegates got to this 
second item on the agenda, the councils as a political form and force had gotten a great 
deal of attention in the meeting. USPD delegate Carl (sometimes written as Karl) Kröpelin 
(1893–1977), a locksmith and mechanic who was a member of the Revolutionary Workers’ 
Council, positively linked November’s peaceful and bloodless transition in Bavaria and 
the responses to Eisner’s murder to the development of the councils. Instead of ‘party 
286 Käppner, 1918 - Aufstand für die Freiheit. Die Revolution der Besonnenen, 441.
287 Johannes Merz, “Auf dem Weg zur Räterepublik,” Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 66, no. 2 
(2003): 543.
288 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 158.
289 Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- 
und Soldatenräte vom 25. Februar bis 8. März 1919, 1. Sitzung. München, den 25 Februar 
1919, pp.1-2, available via: http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/bsb00009689/images/index.
html?fip=193.174.98.30&seite=1&pdfseitex=.
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comrades’ (Parteigenossen), the delegates should identify as ‘proletarian comrades’ 
(Proletariergenossen). According to Kröpelin, the party was small-minded, whereas 
the proletariat was part of something greater, since it connected the events in Munich 
to processes beyond Bavaria and Germany: ‘Don’t become small-minded, comrades!’290 
The response to Eisner’s murder, according to Kröpelin, showed that the councils would 
be decisive in both contemporary and future society. Communist delegate Fritz Sauber 
(1884–1949)291, a former catering assistant and chair of the Munich Soldiers’ Council and 
Bavarian Soldiers’ Council supported this, stating that the popular response to the murder 
of Eisner proved that the ‘council idea’ (Rätegedanke) permeated the people of Bavaria.292 
This speculative conclusion would be proven false (or at least voted down) at the end of 
the congress, but it serves as proof of the council proponents’ high spirits on this first day. 
This first meeting on Tuesday 25 February 1919 was held amidst enormous tension in the 
city and around the Deutsches Theater that would last the entirety of the next five days of 
meetings. The Congress was disrupted by theatre guards who searched the delegates for 
arms, by gunshots in the distance, by police officers who tried to arrest representatives 
and by demonstrations of workers and soldiers who wanted to speak to the congress. 
Notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, historian Allan Mitchell notes that ‘the 
deliberations of the congress were amazingly coherent’.293 Explicitly aware that the whole 
of Germany, if not the world, was watching them and that the Bavarian people wanted to 
see action and results after these turbulent months, the delegates did not agree on much, 
but they were unanimous in their desire to finally solve the question of the future of 
parliamentary democracy and to deliver a tangible starting point for a post-revolutionary 
social order. 
4.9 Revolutionary right, representation and sovereignty
The debate on Bavaria’s future was started by Gustav Landauer while the standing orders 
were still being discussed. He demanded the Congress declare itself sovereign and annul 
the Diet so that it could form a provisional National (Bavarian) Council that could instate, 
control and recall ministries. This would not mean that Bavaria would necessarily be a 
council republic, but the Congress could not leave its formal relation with other bodies 
unresolved. Landauer claimed that this did not need to be done to decide Bavaria’s future, 
but to create the possibility to govern and to act. In a somewhat denigrating tone, he tells his 
fellow delegates that, as some of them might not have any experiences with revolutionary 
290 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 1. Sitzung. München, den 25 
Februar 1919, p. 4.
291 Roß, Biographisches Handbuch Der Reichsrätekongresse 1918/19, 211.
292 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 1. Sitzung. München, den 25 
Februar 1919, p. 5.
293 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 283.
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rights, claiming such rights works as follows: a body arising from the working masses claims 
sovereignty, meaning full legislative and executive power. It then creates a constitution in 
which it hands over those powers to new institutions. The Congress should thus claim 
those powers in order to be able to decide how it could hand those powers over at a later 
stage.294 His lesson in revolutionary rights was supported by Max Levien (21 May 1885–16 
June 1937), a Russian-German communist who held a doctorate in natural sciences from 
the University of Zürich. Levien volunteered in German military service from 1913 until 
1918 and played an important role in Bavaria’s November revolution. A gifted speaker, he 
soon surfaced as the chair of the Soldiers’ Council and the Spartacists in Munich, and was 
involved in founding the KPD as the Bavarian delegate on 30 December 1918. He acted as 
the chair of the Bavarian KPD and would become one of the leaders (together with Eugen 
Leviné) of the second Bavarian Council Republic (see Section 4.11).
Later in the same meeting, Sauber’s claim that the Bavarian people were generally 
supportive of a council republic (see above) appeared to be confirmed by a large gathering 
outside the Landtag of around 5.000 soldiers and workers who called themselves the 
‘Permanent Assembly of Proletarians’ and had convened in the Wagner hall. Represented by 
revolutionary sailor Rudolf Egelhofer, the Assembly asked the Congress the right to present 
some demands, which was supported by a large majority of the Congress. Their main 
demands were to immediately declare Bavaria a council republic and enter into diplomatic 
relations with revolutionary Russia, permanently dissolve the Diet, ‘cleanse’ councils of 
people who did not act in the general interest, and – by now an evergreen in the German 
revolutionary repertoire – arm the proletariat and disarm the bourgeoisie. These demands 
were not directly put to a vote, but – in truly parliamentarian fashion – an appeals committee 
was installed to deal with extra-congressional requests from angry demonstrators.295 
Interestingly, these requests led to a debate about the transparency and publicness of 
the meetings. Should angry mobs be granted access to the venue, and did they deserve a 
place in the public gallery? The next day, the congress continued their meeting without an 
audience because of severe threats to delegates. Erich Mühsam found this hard to justify 
and proposed searching all visitors for weapons before granting them access to the public 
gallery. Communist delegate Fritz Sauber opposed this using a peculiar argument about 
representation: if representatives were afraid to be murdered by the people they represented, 
they apparently were not very good representatives and had no right to be in the assembly. 
He did not seem to realise the irony of this argument when he continued by saying that he 
was mailed death threats every day. Gustav Landauer aimed his anger at the guards outside 
294 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 1. Sitzung. München, den 25 
Februar 1919, p. 13.
295 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 1. Sitzung. München, den 25 
Februar 1919, p. 16-17; Idem., Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 
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the Landtag building who searched and disarmed the delegates, and had been commissioned 
by the city commander: ‘we are sovereign … , the chair needs to better protect the dignity of 
this house, or does he know nothing about parliamentary traditions?’296 
When it comes to the concept of representation, the role of Lida Gustava Heymann 
(explicitly identified as ‘Frau’ Heymann in the minutes of the meeting) is of special interest. 
Heymann explicitly claimed to speak for the women of Munich, standing for peace and 
kindness instead of arms and bloodshed. She began her speech with the exclamation: 
‘Finally, you allow a woman to speak to you!’ When she was interrupted by excited cheers 
of support, she related the unrest in the Congress to the bloodshed in Berlin, and asked 
that speakers would be allowed to speak calmly and without such shouting: ‘You, who are 
assembled here, are the chosen ones, the world is watching you. You need to remain calm 
in order to rule the people. If we want to meet humanity with more goodness, love and 
humaneness, we should not shout but speak sensibly, listen and act.’297 Heymann not only 
explicitly claimed to represent the grossly underrepresented women of Bavaria, but she 
did so by demanding a different, arguably less masculine style of democratic deliberation. 
One could even argue that her statement about meeting humanity was a conscious move 
towards a more inclusive political language, an alternative to more gendered terms such 
as worker or proletarian.
On 7 March 1919, Anita Augspurg proposed extending the council system to include 
Frauenräten (Women’s Councils). She remarked that the absence of women from the 
current system was problematic, particularly in the Peasants’ Councils, since many 
women worked in agriculture (almost 50% of all working women in Bavaria worked in 
the countryside, while for men this percentage was only 28,4%).298 In order to make up 
for women’s comparative lack of political education and experience, the establishment of 
women’s councils was imperative. She hoped that this would be a temporary solution until 
women would be equally politically educated and interested. The result of such women’s 
councils would be to improve the political representation of women, but also to politicise 
the household: 
I hold it to be urgently necessary that the domestic atmosphere is more politically 
coloured through the participation of women in politics, and that politics will be a 
common good at home.299
296 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
Februar 1919, p. 26.
297 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
Februar 1919, p. 23.
298 Sternsdorf-Hauck, Brotmarken und Rote Fahnen. Frauen in der Bayrischen Revolution und Räterepublik, 
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299 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 7. Sitzung. München, den 7. 
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Augspurg added that after granting equal political rights to women, it was necessary 
to interest them in politics by aligning the domestic arena with general politics. When the 
proposal (signed by Augspurg and Heymann) was put to a vote, it was rejected by a majority 
of the delegates. Ernst Niekisch argued that the proposal lacked practical guidelines and 
was therefore not useful. The leftist radicals around Landauer and Mühsam supported 
the proposal and were furious with the MSPD for rejecting it. On the final day of the 
congress, Mühsam returned to the issue to point out his disappointment with the political 
behaviour of MSPD delegates at the Congress.300 The chair of the meeting apparently felt 
uneasy with the proposal being rejected, because after the vote he declared that he would 
send the proposal to the Executive Council ‘as a stimulus and for advice’.301 As was to be 
expected, nothing happened, and there would never be Women’s Councils in Bavaria. 
4.10 Councils or parliament? – revisited
As mentioned before, the delegates were quite unanimous about the goal of the congress: 
a decision had to be taken on the institutional future of post-revolutionary Bavaria. 
Given the power vacuum that arose after Eisner’s murder and Auer’s absence, Bavaria 
needed legitimate and functioning democratic institutions. The question that had 
occupied the revolutionaries from November onwards took centre stage during the 
congress deliberations: what would be the proper form for democratic rule of Bavaria: a 
parliamentary democracy, a council republic, a proletarian dictatorship or a combination 
of those things?
The MSPD was represented by Walter Löwenfeld (1889–1925), a lawyer from the party’s 
right wing who distinguished a council system from council dictatorship. The Russian 
situation, where the councils had been means to overthrow capitalism but failed to become 
ends in themselves, was an example of the latter. He stated that dictatorship could lead 
to a political revolution, but never to a social revolution. According to Löwenfeld, Marx 
had already predicted that in military dictatorships revolutions would be violent, but in 
functioning democracies with general suffrage the revolution had to be peaceful. The goal 
in Bavaria would be to enact a peaceful social revolution that enabled the participation 
of all parts of society in a combination of organic, bottom-up democracy (councils) and 
majority rule. Löwenfeld differentiated this form of ‘democracy as intended by Marx’ 
from ‘bourgeois-democratic forms’.302 He added a more pragmatic argument against 
dictatorship: as the rest of Bavaria would never accept a dictatorship from Munich, the 
300 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 8. Sitzung. München, den 8. 
März 1919, p. 183.
301 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 7. Sitzung. München, den 7. 
März 1919, p. 181.
302 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
Februar 1919, pp. 34-5.
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revolutionaries could give all manner of great speeches, but they would still starve if there 
was a shortage of food.303
Levien responded to this as spokesperson of the communists: ‘Bürgers of the Republic, 
comrades!’ He argued that they already were a dictatorship of the proletariat, and all 
assembled delegates were dictators. There was no one above them, no one who could 
influence them. He agreed with Löwenfeld that the debate was not between council system 
or democracy, but between council democracy and bourgeois democracy. Parliamentary 
democracy, with its horse trading and haggling, was not what the proletariat wanted. The 
concept of popular sovereignty related to this form of democracy had to be abandoned, as 
it included the exploiters and capitalists who had turned Europe into a bloodbath. What 
was needed, according to Levien, was a concept of sovereignty of the working masses, as 
they should not depend on this congress, the central council or any Volksbeauftragte to 
save them – the working masses needed to act and create their own future with their own 
hands.304 
Drawing explicitly on Marx and Kautsky, Levien demanded that the social democrats 
(as ‘mother of the councils’) took responsibility now that they held power in the councils:
I do not ask that you become communists … but that you hold them [the councils] close 
to your chest and do not let them be torn from your arms … That you protect them like 
your children, they are blood of your blood, flesh of your flesh.305
After this colourful and emotional appeal to the social democrats, Levien’s practical 
recommendations for council rule paled in comparison. It would not suffice to translate 
the Russian constitution. They needed a specifically Bavarian constitution outlining how 
local councils would fall under an umbrella council congress that would convene two to 
four times a year.306 This ‘Gesamträtekongress’ would be elected by District Councils, which 
in turn would be elected by the local councils.307 Interestingly enough, at the basis of his 
proposal were not the Betriebsräte that were based in the workplace, but councils based on 
location – Levien did not explain what this meant in terms of the demos of these councils. The 
government and executive power would be located in the Central Council (Zentralrat), which 
would be accountable to the Gesamträtekongress – there would be no need for a parliament.
303 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 284.
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On the second day of the Congress, all speakers appeared to agree that parliamentarism 
should not return to Bavaria. Erich Mühsam used a martial language familiar from the 
past five years of war: after Eisner’s death, the Diet should have stood up and acted, but 
instead it decided to disband. This made the Diet not a leader but ‘a deserter, and we 
should treat it as such’.308 When the Diet disbanded, all power was transferred to the 
councils, and the Congress should finalise this process by declaring Bavaria a (socialist) 
council republic: all legislative and executive power should be in the hands of the councils 
as representatives of the working people.309 
This limitation of suffrage to the working class led to opposition from the social 
democrats, even from those in favour of the council system. Karl Gareis from Weissenburg, 
a small industrial city south of Nuremberg, expressed his fears that the city of Munich 
would remain dominant over the rest of Bavaria, and that particular groups of Bavarians 
would be excluded from the councils. Bavaria could not withhold the right to vote from 
salespeople and entrepreneurs, as had happened in Russia. What was needed was a council 
system that was upheld not just by a violent minority, but by general suffrage in every 
town, village and city: ‘The only way to socialism is democracy, true democracy’.310 
Based on these speeches, one gets the impression that a clear majority would be in 
favour of some kind of council system. This turned out to be a misperception. More 
debates on the question of the councils were scheduled for the third day, 28 February. 
However, Fritz Sauber (chairperson of the Soldiers’ Council) opened the meeting with 
the worrying message that some former ministers had convened in Nuremberg and were 
planning military action against Munich. This led to an increased sense of urgency among 
the delegates who now felt they needed an effective government without further delays. 
That afternoon, a motion to declare Bavaria a socialist soviet republic was put to a vote 
and defeated by 234 votes against 70. Immediately afterwards, a counter motion calling for 
the Diet’s instantaneous return was accepted by an overwhelming majority, shattering the 
hopes for a Bavarian Council Republic. Similar to the ‘political suicide club’ in Berlin, here 
the council representatives chose to prevent the institutionalisation of their own position 
and instead establish a parliament. 
The next morning, on 1 March, thousands of people assembled on the Theresienwiese 
to protest the Congress’ decisions and Stadtkommandant Dürr, who had signed a pamphlet 
condemning the radical left at the Congress. Soon the Republikanische Schutztruppe arrived 
(Republican Defence Troops, a voluntary militia of about 1.800 men who had elected the 
painter Alfred Seyffertitz (1884–1944) as their commander and declared themselves loyal 
308 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
Februar 1919, p. 45.
309 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
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310 Verhandlungen des Kongresses der Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenräte, 2. Sitzung. München, den 26. 
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to social democracy in the name of peace and order). The Defence Troops were treated 
with anger and in response they shot at the crowd, leaving three dead. The radical left’s 
feeling of treason by the social democrats was fuelled first by the obstruction of the 
council republic in the Congress, and then by the murder of protestors. Gustav Landauer 
was furious, and when the Congress reconvened that morning he screamed: ‘The whole of 
natural history knows no more revolting creature than social democracy.’311 Nevertheless, 
there was a provisional government to be constructed. The congress nominated a coalition 
of the two social democratic parties, with four MSPD ministers and three from the USPD, 
completed by a non-affiliated statesman with valuable governmental experience, Heinrich 
von Frauendorfer.
With the Congress finally having produced something tangible, the delegates dispersed 
and returned to their constituencies. And as much as delegates had endlessly debated 
how to break with the old party-dominated parliamentary politics and start something 
fresh centred around councils, the newly nominated cabinet needed to be approved by 
exactly those old bureaucratic party organisations. Delegates from the MSPD, USPD, 
BBB and DDP organised an unofficial meeting in the city of Nuremberg, where they soon 
reached a consensus on a programme for the new government. However, a few days later, 
the Bavarian MSPD conference rejected the nominated cabinet and its proposal because 
it had not been nominated by an official parliament and was therefore democratically 
illegitimate.312 With this decision, the MSPD made it publicly clear again that they did 
not recognise the councils as legitimate democratic bodies, and they stressed their 
commitment to parliamentary politics. 
After a few more days of negotiations, the parties agreed on a ‘Nuremberg 
Compromise’ that was a remarkably ‘Weimarian’ solution to the question of councils 
or parliament, namely: neither. The Diet would be temporarily reconvened to approve 
the new government and grant it emergency powers, while the councils would be re-
elected but stripped of their executive and legislative powers.313 When the compromise 
was discussed at the reconvened Council Congress on 5 March 1919, the MSDP member 
who presents the compromise, Max Süßheim, was repeatedly interrupted by frustrated 
and disappointed delegates from the left. Within the USPD, opinions on the compromise 
were mixed: on the one hand delegates like journalist Felix Fechenbach, a close ally (and 
secretary) of late Eisner, defended it, while the Jewish radical intellectual, revolutionary 
socialist and pacifist Ernst Toller objected that Fechenbach had no right to speak on behalf 
of the party. What is more, he argued, the assembled delegates should not consider this 
issue as representatives of their respective parties, but as revolutionary delegates: 
311 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 87.
312 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 287.
313 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 88.
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You must not act based on the decisions of any party leadership, but solely on your 
revolutionary consciousness. … Finally break with this principle of authority! This 
principle was one of the roots of the world war; do not allow it to become one of the 
roots of a workers’ war.314
Toller also attempted to argue against the ‘holy principle of majority rule’ seemingly 
inherent to parliamentary democracy. In the wrong kind of bourgeois or absolutist state, 
this majority principle leads to a false parliamentarism that hampers progress. Exactly 
because delegates are geistig (meaning intellectual, spiritual, rational) and able to think for 
themselves, they sometimes have to ignore the majority.315 This involves conceptualising 
the delegates as trustees with a free mandate, as opposed to the party mandate that the 
MSPD seemed to uphold, and the imperative mandate that was common in the council 
tradition.316 
The Council Congress rejected the Nuremberg Compromise, but as the delegates did 
feel the urgency to finally create a functioning government for Bavaria they decided that 
there would be another round of negotiations between the Congress and those involved 
in drafting the Compromise. Within three days, the Compromise was adjusted so that 
councils obtained the right to initiate a referendum against decisions of the Diet.317 
Although this could not persuade the radical left, who were opposed to the compromise 
itself, it did relieve the other delegates’ concerns, so the Congress adjourned shortly after 
– for the last time.318 
Notwithstanding the radical left’s fears and threats of civil war, the Diet reconvened on 
18 March, ceremonially passing an Ermächtigungsgesetz (enabling act) that granted power 
to the new cabinet, headed by left-of-centre MSPDer Johannes Hoffmann. Hoffmann, a 
former primary teacher who served as minister of education under Eisner, immediately 
prorogued the Diet indefinitely and concluded with the words: ‘The political act which 
Prime Minister Eisner wanted to undertake on February 21 is now accomplished.’319 
314 “Dann haben Sie zu handeln, nicht nach Beschlüssen irgendwelcher Parteileitungen, sondern einzig 
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4.11 Creating a council belt from Rhine to Volga
Just when the council hopes had died in Bavaria, developments in other central European 
capitals led to renewed spirits. This time, the council dream not just involved Bavaria, 
or even the German Reich, but stretched halfway around the world. In early March, 
Lenin had founded the Communist International with the aim of advancing the world 
revolution. On 12 March, the constituent assembly of Vienna, like Munich a progressive 
capital in a conservative Catholic country, had declared that Austria would be an integral 
part of the German Reich. This would create a great rurally Catholic but urban left-wing 
counter force in the south of Germany against the dominance of Protestant (and by now 
counter-revolutionary) Prussia in the north. The final push to revive hope for a strong 
power bloc in the East were the events in Budapest on 21 March. Béla Kun, leader of the 
Hungarian communists, overthrew the conservative government of Count Károlyi and 
immediately declared a soviet republic based on council rule. What is more, he urged 
Vienna to introduce the same council system, creating a council belt from Bavaria across 
Austria and Hungary to the Soviet Union.320 
Suddenly, Kurt Eisner’s dream (see his speech of 3 November 1918, Section 4.4) of 
unifying the south-east of Europe under the banner of council federalism seemed within 
reach.321 Erich Mühsam described the atmosphere among the left radicals: 
On March 21, the news about the proclamation of the council republic in Hungary 
struck like a bombshell. The excitement of the proletariat was overwhelming. … The 
speakers at the demonstrations and assemblies found excited approval when they 
encouraged the workers to emulate the Hungarian example. For the bourgeoisie, the 
spook of the council republic had now become a reality.322
Two concrete forces were taking shape that would play important roles in the upcoming 
events. On the one hand, the unemployed had been agitated for a while, but since late March 
they had begun to be more organised, with an elected executive committee and nightly 
meetings in the Kindl brewery. They demanded that Hoffmann lower the prices of public 
utilities or else they ‘would be forced to help themselves’.323 The other force was the radical 
section of the military, as it had been in the November revolution. Over 3.000 soldiers 
met at the Löwenbrau beer hall for a meeting under the telling title ‘The Soldier in the 
Revolution’ and demanded the formation of a Red Army and a re-election (or a ‘thorough 
320 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 297-99.
321 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie, 378.
322 Erich Mühsam, “From Eisner to Leviné. The Emergence of the Bavarian Council Republic,” in All 
Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919, ed. Gabriel Kuhn 
(Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 235.
323 “Forderungen der Erwerbslosen”, Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 4 April 1919.
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cleansing’, in their parlance) of the soldiers’ councils.324 This combustible synthesis of ‘the 
unemployed with the unreconciled’325 would soon cause Bavaria to experience its long-
anticipated (or feared) second revolution.
On 4 April, a number of events further increased tensions in the country. Prime 
Minister Hoffman announced that – contrary to his promise to the Council Congress 
– the Landtag would reconvene on 8 April. Simultaneously, about 70 kilometres to 
the northwest, an assembly of workers’ and soldiers’ councils took place in the city of 
Augsburg to discuss ‘The Second Revolution’. At this assembly, some delegates demanded 
the proclamation of the Bavarian Council Republic and suddenly found a large majority in 
favour of this resolution. Moreover, the resolution asked for an alliance with Hungary and 
Russia, and the full socialisation of the economy. In order to put force behind this demand, 
the workers decided to organise a general strike until the proclamation was made.326 A 
delegation of workers, including prominent MSPD leader Ernst Niekisch, was sent to 
Munich to inform Hoffmann of their demands. The delegation and the Bavarian Central 
Council convened with the cabinet, and eventually agreed that the Landtag would not 
be recalled. No decision was taken on the proclamation of a Bavarian Council Republic, 
leaving Munich once more in a state of confusion, uncertainty – and opportunity.
On the night of 4 April 1919, a varied group of ministers, communists, anarchists, 
police officers, farmers and people from the Central Council, the two socialist parties and 
the Revolutionary Workers’ Council gathered in the office of the minister for military 
affairs to discuss the future of Bavaria. The minister himself, Schneppenhorst, acted as the 
spokesperson for the MSPD. He surprisingly proposed establishing a council republic in 
Bavaria, apparently emboldened by an extraordinary MSPD conference in Upper Bavaria 
where the members had voted in favour of a council republic by 240 votes against 13.327 Even 
more surprising, and confusing to those present, was that his proposal was rejected by Eugen 
Leviné, the spokesperson for the communists. In a complete reversal of roles, it was now the 
MSPD demanding council rule, while the communists who had demanded it for the past 
five months rejected the proposal. The reason for this rejection was that Leviné did not want 
to share power with the social democrats and preferred a communist-dominated council 
system. One could argue that his conception of the council took on a Leninist twist where the 
council is not a goal in and of itself but mainly serves as an instrument (or the instrument) 
to enhance the power of the communist party.328 To confuse matters even more, the next 
day an emergency meeting of MSPD delegates in Nuremberg rejected Schneppenhorst’s 
proposal and retracted the MSPD’s support for any such council republic.329
324 Schaupp, Der Kurze Frühling der Räterepublik. Ein Tagebuch der Bayerischen Revolution, 153.
325 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 300.
326 Schaupp, Der Kurze Frühling der Räterepublik. Ein Tagebuch der Bayerischen Revolution, 153.
327 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie, 379.
328 See the argument of Walther Löwenfeld earlier in this chapter. For this Leninist council concept, see Ask 
Popp-Madsen and Kets, “Three Conceptions of Council Democracy”.
329 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 95.
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But when the group of men met again on the night of 6 April, it became clear to all 
involved that the Bavarian Council Republic lacked support from both the right (MSPD) 
and the left (KPD). The radicals in the centre (anarchists, USPD, dissenters from the 
other parties), however, did not want to waste the opportunity, and the next morning 
the Bavarian Council Republic was declared.330 The declaration explicitly denounced 
partisanship and instead claimed that the council republic was a dictatorship of the 
proletariat that strived for the participation of all working people in public life and a 
socialist-communist economy. The Landtag was abolished, the cabinet retreated, and 
relations with Russia and Hungary would soon be established. A Red Army would be 
erected and plans for expropriations were made. On a more symbolic level, 7 April was 
declared a national holiday in order to celebrate the ‘joyful hope for a happy future for all 
mankind’.331 
In the days following the declaration in Munich, all major cities in Bavaria (except 
Nuremberg) joined the republic, and south of the Danube many smaller cities declared 
their support. 332 Gustav Landauer wrote to a friend that he had become: 
the people’s delegate for propaganda, education, science, arts, and a few other things. 
If I’ll have a few weeks, I hope I can achieve something; however, it is very likely that it 
will only be a few days, and then all this will have been but a dream.333
As in the other Council Republics, education was one of the most successful policy areas. 
In the few days that the council republic in Bavaria was functional, Landauer proposed a 
complete reform of the educational system, from primary schools to universities. Just like 
in Bremen, schools were democratised by granting the teachers far-reaching forms of self-
government. Moreover, all ranks at the now-nationalised universities were abolished, and 
fees were annulled.334 
In most other policy fields, however, nothing tangible was produced and, as Landauer 
had feared, after the first few days the ‘pseudo-council republic’, as the communists called 
it, began to take its first blows. Hoffmann, who had fled to Bamberg with his government, 
was pressured by Friedrich Ebert to restore order in Bavaria. Munich was cut off from the 
rest of the Reich by an economic boycott, but this was not enough for the government in 
Berlin. On 12 April, Ebert threatened that if order was not restored very soon, a military 
solution would be the only option. Hoffmann, fully aware of the bloodshed that had 
330 Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, 309-10.
331 “Proklamation der Räterepublik in München am 6./7. April 1919, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv - Signatur: 
Plakatsammlung 1913, available via: https://bavarikon.de/object/bav:GDA-OBJ-0000000000000079. 
332 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie, 379-80.
333 Gustav Landauer, “To Fritz Mauthner,Munich, April 7, 1919,” in All Power to the Councils! A Documentary 
History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919, ed. Gabriel Kuhn (Oakland: PM Press, 2012).
334 Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, 101.
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accompanied this ‘solution’ in other cities (for example in Hamburg and Bremen), tried to 
find another way and instructed the Republican Defence Troops in Munich that were still 
loyal to him to bring down the council republic. 
In the early morning of Palm Sunday, April 13, Hoffmann’s forces executed their 
orders and attempted to take Munich from within. They occupied the main train station 
and the Wittelsbach palace, and arrested leading figures of the Council Republic like 
Erich Mühsam, the anarchist theorist and poet who was part of the council government. 
However, the Red Army that was still being assembled proved to be much stronger than 
expected, and at the end of the day, after hours of fierce fighting throughout the city, 
it had defended the Council Republic and chased the putschists out of the city. Twenty 
fighters were dead, hundreds wounded. Though the Council Republic had survived this 
first onslaught, its position was clearly precarious. Internally, there was the economic 
boycott and the fight against Bamberg and Berlin. Externally, Hungary was invaded by 
counterrevolutionaries, and Russia was in the midst of a fierce civil war. The radicals in 
Munich could not expect any outside help.335
While the fights against Hoffmann’s troops were still ongoing, an assembly of workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils declared a general strike and the establishment of a ‘real council 
republic’ (as opposed to the previous Scheinräterepublik (pseudo-council republic) of 
the ‘anarchists’.336 An executive committee was formed, headed by communist leader 
Eugen Leviné and supported by important figures from the ‘first’ council republic, such 
as Ernst Toller and Gustav Landauer. This communist Council Republic lasted until the 
end of April. Hoffmann, now out of options, turned to Ebert and Noske for help. A force 
of over 35.000 troops, mostly Freikorps, began their march to strike down the Council 
Republic of Bavaria. Over 600 people were shot, including many innocent bystanders, and 
28 government troops died. Gustav Landauer was captured and brutally beaten to death 
like his comrades Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Berlin earlier that year. Eugen 
Leviné was shot after being sentenced to death for high treason.337
4.12 Conclusions
The bloody ending of the council experiments in Munich was part of a pattern that arose 
throughout the German Reich. Eventually the council republics were ended through 
armed intervention by (right-wing paramilitary) Freikorps cooperating with the national 
army.338 
335 Ibid., 116.
336 Niess, Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie, 380-81.
337 Ibid., 382-3.
338 Mark Jones, Am Anfang War Gewalt. Die Deutsche Revolution 1918/19 und der Beginn der Weimarer 
Republik, trans. Karl Heinz Siber (Berlin: Propyläen, 2017).
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The death of Kurt Eisner on 21 February 1919 marked a turning point in the 
revolutionary events in Bavaria. Aside from the political consequences discussed in this 
chapter, Eisner’s death and funeral also provided a platform to reflect on the development 
of the revolution. One of the results was an awareness of the peaceful and relatively 
orderly fashion in which the November Revolution had taken place in Bavaria and the 
overall smooth transfer to new forms and conceptions of politics. Although much of this 
involved Hineininterpretierung and a hagiographic account of ‘Prophet’ Eisner, it also led 
to some interesting insights into the relation between political upheaval and ideological 
developments. Take for example Heinrich Mann (1871–1950), writer and brother of 
Thomas Mann, who acted as chairperson for the ‘Political Council of Intellectual Workers’ 
(politische Rat geistiger Arbeiter, not to be confused with the liberal-conservative Central 
Council of Intellectual Workers). In a speech commemorating Eisner, Heinrich Mann 
reflected on how the revolution had catalysed the development of ideas: ‘The 100 days of 
Eisner’s government have produced more ideas, more joy in reasoning, greater animation 
of minds than all 50 years before … His belief in thoughts’ power to actualize in reality 
embraced even non-believers. Mind is truth!’339 This reflection on the experience of the 
revolution as a catalyst of ideational innovation and development ties in with the work of 
Koselleck and Freeden discussed in Chapter 2. Koselleck argued that in times of upheaval 
concepts become Kampfsbegriffe: concepts people struggle with and over.340 So during 
revolutions, political and social concepts change meaning much more rapidly than in 
quieter times. Therefore, as Mann signalled, revolutions like Bavaria’s are pressure cookers 
of experiences and expectations that rapidly expedite conceptual changes. Looking back 
on the experiences of council rule in Munich, specifically on the relations between party 
and union leaders and the workers, soldiers and peasants in the councils, and on the 
conceptions of council democracy that these groups developed, we can distinguish several 
of these contestations with and over concepts.
Firstly, the revolutionary events in Munich and Bavaria show that, even though some 
small groups had explicitly aimed for a revolution, there was no revolutionary script to 
follow. The Theresienwiese protest on 7 November immediately showed the different 
positions of the two main groups: the MSPD and the USPD. While the former remained 
on the field to continue their impressive but non-revolutionary protest, Eisner invited the 
more radical USPD to march through the city to get soldiers on board of the revolution. 
In this process, councils were first formed by soldiers to organise their collective actions, 
and soon workers would follow. The election of such councils was organised hastily, and 
the representatives lacked formal democratic legitimation. Eisner incorporated these 
councils in a concept of ‘lively democracy’, and hence gave some coherence and meaning 
339 Heinrich Mann, cited in Weidermann, Träumer. Als die Dichter die Macht Übernahmen, 131. [translation 
is mine].
340 Bödeker, “Concept - Meaning - Discourse. Begriffsgeschichte Reconsidered.”
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to the assembly of councils in Munich. Although the councils did provide democratic 
legitimation to Eisner’s position as prime minister, those councils were in reality granted 
very little power. At least partially, this was due to the influence of the MSPD, which from 
the beginning aimed to install a Bavarian national assembly instead of a council system. 
Eisner was willing to make serious concessions in the hopes of avoiding factionalism 
among the workers’ parties. 
Secondly, councils were established throughout Bavaria in many different forms and 
shapes, without a central organisation behind it. This once again points to the intuitive, 
spontaneous character of this political form. Soon after their establishment, many of these 
councils wrote to ‘Munich’ for directions. These councils wanted to be part of a broader 
network and often asked for assistance in organising their relations with other local 
authorities. Within two weeks after the revolution, the central government in Munich 
tried to bring clarity with central guidelines for existing councils and the directive to 
establish councils in places where these did not yet exist. In this interesting turn of events, 
the decentralised and intuitively formed local councils rather quickly searched and found 
guidance and embeddedness in a centralised greater whole.
Thirdly, the formation of these guidelines was one of the main battlegrounds for the 
struggle over and with various council concepts. The MSPD, represented by Auer, conceived 
of the council as an advisory body without executive power that had a subsidiary role to 
a National Bavarian Parliament. The USPD, represented by Eisner, conceived of councils 
as the very opposite of parliaments, functioning as the foundation of the new republic’s 
‘lively democracy’. This also involved democratising the workplace and the army. A third 
council concept was provided by the Revolutionary Workers’ Council, which focussed on 
the councils as a ‘revolutionary power’ that would have no executive power but instead 
control all the government’s actions and meetings. The final guidelines for councils in 
Bavaria would be a compromise between the two socialist parties that leaned heavily 
on the MSPD’s conception of the council. The Bavarian councils would be more like an 
ombudsmen or consumers’ organisations than democratic instruments of self-rule at 
work and in the barracks. 
A fourth conclusion to be drawn is that the debate that has often (historically and 
contemporarily) been depicted as a struggle between council and parliament in reality was 
much more nuanced. Sure, there were those on the radical left who demanded an absolute 
or ‘pure’ council system (which did not exist in Bavaria) and those on the right-wing of the 
MSPD who saw no role for the councils in a representative democratic republic, but most 
delegates appeared to hold a position that searched for some reconciliation of councils and 
parliament. This provides two important insights: first of all, the later council communist 
concept of council politics as fundamentally at odds with ‘bourgeois’ political forms such 
as parliaments, parties and unions cannot be based in the experiences with councils in 
Bavaria. The communists’ rejection of the proposal to form a council republic in early April 
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made it clear that even the staunchest supporters of ‘pure councilism’ eventually appeared 
to conceive of councils as an instrument for communist party politics. This conception is 
fundamentally different from the council communist conception that involves no party 
and that considers the councils as a goal in and of themselves. The other insight is that 
the debates about council politics in Bavaria suggest that, contrary to contemporary 
popular belief, councils cannot be considered as a form of direct democracy versus 
parliamentarism’s mediated or representative democracy. The delegates were aware of their 
role as delegates and hence conscious of their representative function. All major debates 
about inclusion and exclusion in the councils were debates about who is represented and 
who is not. Hence, the conceptual struggle between councils and parliamentary politics 
is not a struggle over direct versus indirect democracy, but over different conceptions of 
representation and its institutionalisation.
My fifth and final conclusion is that the debates in and about councils in Bavaria 
were inherently related to the political constitution of a demos. This was visible from the 
very first stages of the revolution, when councils were named ‘people’s council’, ‘workers’ 
council’ or ‘peasants’ council’, designating who was to be represented and hence also who 
was excluded from the demos. In the political debates that took place in Munich, this 
would resurface when questions arose about elections and who would have the right to 
vote. Whereas the concept of universal suffrage was generally agreed on when it came to 
the inclusion of both men and women in the political community, it was not so clear when 
it came to the question of class. Including non-working class (‘bourgeois’) professions to 
the National Council was contested, as was including the unemployed. Moreover, women 
demanded more inclusive processes and institutions, because universal suffrage had 
not resulted in anything close to equality between the sexes. Just like in other examples 
described in this thesis, although the women’s arguments were well-received, this did 
not lead to a better position in Bavarian politics. Even though the revolution and council 
experiences resulted in a considerable increase in formal rights for women in the political 
and social realm, the revolutionaries’ ample opportunities to improve the position of 
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The previous chapter showed how one of Kurt Eisner’s first acts after the revolution in 
Munich was to declare Bavaria a Free State. 342 ‘Free’ related to the state’s relative autonomy 
vis à vis the central German Reich (or, later, the Weimar Republic). The next two cases, 
Bremen and Hamburg, already had such a status as free city states. As important trade 
centres, the two Hanseatic cities had preserved the right to govern their affairs as 
independent states within the German Confederation. In both cities this was organised 
through a city parliament (Bürgerschaft  which literally means citizenry) and an executive 
body called the Senat (senate). As we will see, this status aparte would have considerable 
effects on the development of the revolution here. 
This chapter will zoom in on the northwest German city of Bremen. What makes 
Bremen an extraordinary case in the German Revolution, is the dominance of the radical 
left wing within the local Social Democratic Party (SPD) before and during the war. 
The support for the radical left was particularly sizable among primary school teachers 
(Volksschullehrer) and dock workers. The radicalisation of the working class in this city 
is often partially credited to radical party theorists such as Anton Pannekoek and Karl 
Radek.343 This chapter aims to investigate the relation between the ideas of these theorists 
and Bremen’s working class. Although radical theorists definitely played an important role 
in the development of council communist ideas, this chapter shows how the theorization 
of radical working-class politics must also be attributed to the workers and soldiers in the 
councils.
Another reason to shift our gaze to this city state is that Bremen’s institutional context 
brought out crucial debates about the relation between the revolutionary councils and 
existing institutions such as the Bürgerschaft and the Senat. As we will see, many of the 
conceptual clashes over the meaning and constitution of democracy that took place in 
Bremen prefigure the debates in Berlin. In that regard, the revolutionaries in Bremen (and 
Hamburg, as I will show in the next chapter) can be said to have done the conceptual and 
institutional groundwork for discussions and events in the capital. This means that, in order 
to understand the German revolution and its ideas, we must take Bremen into account.
341 Earlier versions of this chapter have been published as: Gaard Kets, Radikale Theorie und politische 
Praxis in der Bremer Räterepublik. In  Novemberrevolution und Räterepublik 1918/19 Bremen und 
Nordwestdeutschland zwischen Kriegsende und Neuanfang (Bremen: Bremische Bürgerschaft und 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2019), 116-125; and Gaard Kets, Working-Class Politics in the Bremen Council 
Republic. In The German Revolution and Political Theory, edited by Gaard Kets and James Muldoon 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 91-111.
342 My dear colleague dr. Thomas R. Eimer, who passed away before this dissertation was printed, deserves 
praise for his extensive and useful feedback on this chapter. Moreover, the people at the Staatsarchiv 
Bremen were very generous with their assistance during my research at their institute. 
343 Peter Kuckuk and Ulrich Schröder, Bremen in Der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919. Revolution, 
Räterepublik, Restauration (Bremen: Edition Falkenberg, 2017), 43.
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After a brief historical introduction explaining the context of the revolution in Bremen, 
the chapter delves into three questions that were formative for Bremen’s revolutionary 
events and for the development of council communist thought. The first question is one 
of inclusion and exclusion: who constitute the demos of council democracy? Second, 
how should the councils relate to other political institutions? The third question then 
shifts to the envisioned post-revolutionary society: what were the councils’ possible 
institutionalisations? I will seek to answer these questions by exploring newspapers, ego 
documents, and the minutes of the meetings of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in 
Bremen.
5.2 Historical context
Bremen is an old Hanseatic city consisting of three separate parts: the city, Bremerhaven 
and Vegesack, the latter two both being harbour cities. Bremen was allowed one 
representative in the Reichstag of the German Empire, and its Senate appointed someone 
to the Bundesrat. The Bürgerschaft was the elected parliament of the city, and suffrage 
was limited to citizens who held a minimum amount of funds (16,5 Mark). Among those 
with enough funds to be allowed to vote, however, there was no political equality: the 
electorate was divided into eight electoral classes based on education and location. The 
Bürgerschaft was more of a board of dignitaries than a parliament based on popular 
representation in the modern sense. The city’s executive power was in the hands of the 
Senat. The Bürgerschaft did not have any right to dismiss the Senat, and senators were 
appointed for life. The Senat consisted of 16 members, of which at least 10 had to have law 
degrees and three traders. Based on these prerequisites, it is not surprising that the Senat 
remained a very homogeneous institution until the revolution.344
In the wake of (and inspired by) 1905’s revolution in Russia, the local branch of the 
national SPD, the Social Democratic Association Bremen (Sozialdemokratischen Verein 
Bremen, SDVB), was established in order to organise an education centre for workers – 
comparable to the role of the SPD’s Parteischule in Berlin. It was established and run by 
radical left-wing members of the party, such as Alfred Henke, Wilhelm Pieck and Johannes 
Knief. A cigar maker by trade, Henke (1868–1946) had had a career in socialist politics as 
well. He was editor of the Bremer Bürger-Zeitung, member of the Bürgerschaft since 1906 
and one of the founders of the USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany). 
Wilhelm Pieck (1876–1960) was a furniture maker and member of the Bremer Bürgerschaft 
for the SPD from 1905 to 1910. He participated in the SPD party school, where he was 
heavily influenced by his teacher Rosa Luxemburg, and he became a critical member of 
344 Peter Kuckuk, “Bremen vor der Revolution,” in Peter Kuckuk ed., Die Revolution 1918/1919 in Bremen. 
Aufsätze und Dokumente (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2010), 48.
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the SPD’s left wing. He left Bremen during the war and would not return, becoming well-
known as leader of the SED and the first president of the DDR (Deutsche Democratische 
Republik, German Democratic Republic). Johannes (Johann) Knief (1880–1919) was a 
Volksschule teacher, editor and politician who played a formative part in Bremen’s radical 
left. He founded the radical journal Arbeiterpolitik and was the editor of Der Kommunist, 
the daily newspaper of the International Communists of Germany (IKD). Although he 
was very influential in the radical left before the revolution, he did not play an important 
role in the revolution itself. He was arrested in Munich in January 1918 and remained 
incarcerated until that November. Soon after he came back to Bremen in late November 
1918, he fell ill. Although he was nonetheless elected to the Rat der Volksbeauftragten, his 
illness prevented him from playing an active role. He died of appendicitis in April 1919. 
From 1910 onwards, Bremen’s Social Democratic Association managed to attract 
radical theorists from around Europe to teach at their school, of which Pannekoek and 
Radek were the most illustrious ones. Eventually, this resulted in the radical left gaining 
a dominant position within the local SPD and fierce conflicts with its national leadership, 
ultimately leading to the exclusion of the Bremen branch from the national organisation.345 
During the final years of the war, the Bremen Left (Bremer Linke) had mobilised the 
masses, including many women, for demonstrations, strikes and public meetings.346 The 
authors and editors of the radicals’ weekly Arbeiterpolitik (Workers’ Politics) increasingly 
questioned the role of party and union leadership, and explicitly challenged the workers to 
take matters into their own hands.347 The newspapers in Bremen brought the news about 
the mutiny in Kiel on 5 November. The day after, a group of sailors arrived from Kiel 
to liberate comrades who had been arrested in the suburb of Oslebshausen, northwest 
of Bremen. With support of workers from the AG Weser docks, the sailors managed 
to release their comrades and continue on to Bremen. The Aktien-Gesellschaft ‘Weser’ 
(generally called AG Weser) was a large shipbuilding facility (the largest company in 
Bremen and surroundings, with 11.000 workers) of crucial importance to producing of 
materiel (cruisers, submarines) for Germany’s Imperial Navy. The Weser docks were also 
a hotbed of worker radicalisation, one of the Bremen Left’s strongholds. 
When the sailors and dockworkers reached the city of Bremen on 6 November 1918, 
the leadership of the radical left was not present – some resided in Berlin, some were at 
345 Kuckuk and Schröder, Bremen in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919. Revolution, Räterepublik, 
Restauration.
346 Wilhelm Eildermann, “Im Kampf für ein Sozialistisches Vaterland,” in Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen, ed. 
Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1960), 139-161.
347 Philippe Bourrinet, The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900-68): ‘Neither Lenin nor Trotsky nor 
Stalin!’ - ‘All Workers Must Think for Themselves!’ (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2016), 56.
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the front and others were imprisoned.348 Nevertheless, apparently inspired by the Bremen 
Left’s radical teachings, dockworkers took matters into their own hands and established 
workers’ councils at AG Weser, joining forces with sailors, soldiers and other workers in 
the city centre, where they spontaneously started a soldiers’ council.349 That same day, the 
Soldiers’ Council ruled the city.
5.3 The council and other institutions
With the military takeover on 6 November 1918, Bremen’s revolution had begun. 
Thousands of soldiers, sailors and workers came together on the marketplace, where the 
USPD chairman, Adam Frasunkiewicz, declared that a workers’ and soldiers’ council 
would be established. Frasunkiewicz (1873–1923), was a cobbler who had had a career 
within the SPD and the party school, before switching to the USPD in March 1917. He was 
imprisoned from August 1917 to October 1918, making him one of the few leftist leaders 
in Bremen during the revolution.350
The workers assembling on the marketplace decided to elect 180 delegates from 
workplaces for their workers’ council. Combined with the 30 delegates of the soldiers’ 
council, made for a Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of 210 delegates. The workers’ part of the 
Council established an Action Committee (Aktionsausschuss) of 15 delegates, subdivided 
in six Subcommittees (Unterausschüsse) that functioned as the Council’s executive.351
While the Council could count on its strong military support to hold de facto power 
over the city, the Bürgerschaft and Senat more or less continued working like before, with 
a strong power base in the city bureaucracy. This effectively created a period of dual power 
between 6 and 14 November.352 The physical revolutionary victory had not yet resulted in 
a constitutional, political revolution. In the week that these two political powers existed 
in parallel, the revolutionaries managed to gradually obtain a stronger position. On 
9 November, the radical part of the Soldiers’ Council took a first step in this process, 
voting to dismiss all officers (there were at least four353) from the Soldiers’ Council.354 
On 14 November, the chairman of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, Alfred Henke, 
348 Karl Jannack, “Wir Kämpften in Bremen für die Räterepublik,” in Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen, 163-187; 
Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik, Die Bremer Linksradikalen. Aus der Geschichte der Bremer Arbeiterbewegung bis 
1920 (Zweite, Erweiterte Auflage) (Bremen: Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik, 1979), 34; Kolb, Die Arbeiterräte in 
der Deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918-1919, 79.
349 Kuckuk and Schröder, Bremen in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919, 61.
350 Ulrich Schröder, “Adam Fransukiewicz – Schuhmacher, Kriegsgegner, Häftling, Revolutionär, 
Parteisekretär, Lagerhalter: Eine Politische Biografie,” ed. Historische Gesellschaft Bremen (Bremen: 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2017), 102-143.
351 Eberhard Kolb, “Rätewirklichkeit und Räte-Ideologie in der Deutschen Revolution von 1918/19,” in Vom 
Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik, ed. Eberhard Kolb (Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972), 94.
352 Kuckuk and Schröder, Bremen in Der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919, 78.
353 Ibid., 64
354 Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik, Die Bremer Linksradikalen. 
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dismissed both Bürgerschaft and Senat, and claimed full sovereignty for the council.355 This 
declaration was an exact copy of the one used in Hamburg two day before (see Chapter 6), 
and was accepted in the council unanimously and without any debate. 
Early the next day, the official transition of power was staged as a truly political event. 
Over 1.000 people gathered in front of the town hall, where they were entertained by the 
garrison band. Delegates of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council appeared on the balcony, 
where Henke declared the Council ‘the representative of the entire people’ and called on 
the old government not to obstruct the new powers. The event’s climax was the hoisting 
of a red flag, accompanied by loud cheers from the crowd and the tunes from the band. 
After discharging the old powers, the political revolution was mostly complete. However, 
the declaration also made it clear that the rest of society remained relatively unchallenged, 
assuring Bremen’s citizens that private property remained protected and that plunderers 
would be tried summarily.356 Even though leftist radicals had demanded workers’ control 
over food, the nationalisation of banks and big industries, and peasants’ control over 
the estates where they worked, none of these issues were part of the discourse during 
the actual takeover of power in Bremen. This also implies that, at this early stage of the 
revolution in Bremen, the councils functioned as political organs of representation, not as 
instruments for economic democracy in the way that they would later be conceptualised 
in council communist ideology. 
Officially dismissing the old institutions did not mean they ceased to exist. Since the 
Senate had directed the city’s administration for decades, the whole government of the 
city was structured to serve this small elite. The revolutionaries understood that their 
takeover of sovereignty would not immediately transform these structures, so cooperating 
with the old elite would still be necessary. This explains Henke’s hopeful expectation that 
the Senate would cooperate with the new council government now that ‘democracy had 
been victorious’. This new arrangement could of course, he said, ‘all in all be nothing 
but provisional’ – implying that the Senate would be relieved of its tasks as soon as the 
Council could take control over the vast state bureaucracy.357
The old elite was indeed willing to cooperate. The mayor, who was also chairman of 
the erstwhile Senate, met with former senators and a delegation of the Council to form 
a mixed committee (of 12 members, hence the popular name Zwölfer-Ausschuss) that 
would organise the transfer of city governance to the ‘new situation’. The exact power 
relations between the former Senate and the Council were figured out in the following 
days. Although the Council was the sovereign political power, the Senate would still 
organise the daily administration in most areas. The Council would supervise the Senate 
355 Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat, “Protokolle und Berichten zu den Sitzungen des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrats,” 
Sitzung 14. November 1918.
356 Bremer Bürger-Zeitung, 15 November 1918.
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and important decisions had to be discussed in the Council. Moreover, Council delegates 
would obtain a presence in the administrative bodies (Deputationen).358 Notwithstanding 
the Senate’s formally subordinate position, practically the Deputationen were able to 
function as before without much interference from the Council. The most important 
reason for this was the lack of people willing and able to lead these complex bureaucratic 
bodies, which were to an important extent impenetrable to laymen workers and soldiers, 
particularly in the financial sphere. The Council was aware of this, and this explains why 
they left daily proceedings in the hands of the old senators, if under democratic control of 
the Council. Henke explained this during a Council meeting on 19 November 1918, when 
he stressed that it would take time to establish their own administrative structures, and 
that until then, their function would be mainly one of control.359
In the council communist theory that would develop in the years after the German 
Revolution, the councils’ functioning is often based on Karl Marx’ concept of the workers’ 
council (for which an idealised depiction of the Paris Commune had been his main point 
of reference) which functioned as a ‘working body’ combining executive and legislative 
power.360 In Bremen, this concept was never part of the political debates about the relation 
between the new Council and the old representative bodies. Bremen’s revolutionaries 
organised their work and proceedings on political structures they were more familiar 
with. In the Council meeting of 19 November 1918, all delegates seemed to agree that, after 
the dismissal of the Bürgerschaft, the Council operated as the new legislative body. Even 
though sharing executive power with old administrators was recognized as a potential 
threat to the revolution, none of the delegates referred to the concept of the ‘working body’ 
that would become so important in council communist ideology.
The relation between the Council and other institutions was questioned again when 
the Bremen’s Council met on 28 November 1918 to discuss its position on the national 
assembly. They were interrupted by a delegation of workers who requested that their 
claims were heard, which led to a debate about the desired relation between the Council 
and the working class. The workers delegation was headed by the leftist radical Johann 
Knief, who played an important role in the distribution and development of council 
ideas in Bremen. Soldiers’ delegate Meyer, an MSPD-leaning Sanitätssoldat (medic) and 
chair of the executive of the Soldiers’ Council, responded that he did not have time to 
listen to anyone who just walked into a Council meetings. The interests of workers and 
soldiers were represented through the delegation system, and this kind of interruption was 
disruptive. Wilhelm Breitmeyer, a carpenter and workers’ delegate for the IKD, and Julius 
358 Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ausschusses von Senat und Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat 1918-1919. Signature 
3/3 Senatsprotokolle und Senatsvorlagen (seit 1875), file 3/3 - 151. Staatsarchiv Bremen, Germany. 
359 “Protokolle und Berichten zu den Sitzungen des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrats”, 2. Sitzung Dienstag, den 19. 
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360 Marx, “The Civil War in France”, retreived from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/
civil-war-france/ (accessed on 21 April 2021).
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Reimann, revolutionary soldiers’ delegate, had a more direct conception of democracy 
and responded that the Council should provide a listening ear when the people call on 
them. USPD-leaning soldiers’ delegate Lambert Willems even called this a duty of the 
Council’s. The majority of the Council agreed, and they decided to invite the workers to 
their meeting the next morning. 
The next day, the delegation marched into the building (again headed by Johann Knief) 
and warned the delegates that the masses would not accept anything but the rejection of 
the national assembly. The revolution in Germany had created the councils as the proper 
political form of the working class, and they needed to be protected. Parliament was the 
political form of the bourgeoisie, and establishing such an institution would mean the 
bourgeoisie’s victory over the revolution. In his speech, Knief referred to the council 
system as a dictatorship of the proletariat, which for him and his supporters outside was a 
concept with a clearly positive connotation. 
Communist delegate Alfred Stockhinger stated that, as the workers of Bremen 
recognized the Council as the institution directly executing the people’s will, the Council 
had to do what the workers demanded – should the Council fail to do this, it would lose its 
right to call itself a workers’ council. Workers’ delegate Adolf Dannat, a pupil and friend of 
Anton Pannekoek, conceptualised democracy by distinguishing between parliamentary 
or bourgeois democracy and true, full democracy, which was impossible if the economy 
was still based on capitalist structures. A dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary to 
achieve the transformation towards a communist society. Only after that could society be 
ruled without dictatorship. 
We can now sketch the concepts communists used in their theorizing of the relation 
between national assembly and council system. According to the communists, the council 
was the proper organisational form of both the revolution and post-revolutionary society. 
It was directly accountable to the working class and ruled solely in that class’ interest – 
hence, council rule was a dictatorship of the proletariat.
5.4 Constituting the Demos
In a Workers’ Council meeting on 29 November 1918, the workers decided to organise new 
elections for the Workers’ Council and appointed a committee of five members that would 
prepare the Wahlreglement (election regulations). According to historian Peter Kuckuk, the 
debate about voting procedures shows how arguments about the elections were informed 
by the council’s self-perception and self-understanding, by its perceived aims and political 
function, but also by the power positions of the parties involved.361 The Wahlreglement was 
first presented to the Council on 4 December. The inevitable democratic question of the 
361 Kuckuk and Schröder, Bremen in Der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919, 143.
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self-demarcation of the demos, the in- and exclusion of potential voters, was one of the 
primary issues in the debate. 
How the question of membership was interwoven with the self-perception of the Council 
becomes clear in the proposal’s by committee member Conrad Brauckmüller (USPD, leader of 
Bremen’s socialist youth organisation), who declared that the regulations were not permanent 
but should be considered ‘emergency legislation’. Because of the Council’s provisional character 
as a democratic body, and because of its role in preserving the achievements of the revolution, 
he considered it justified to exclude counter-revolutionary (bourgeois) elements from the 
Council. This position was supported by other USPD members and left-wing radicals. Yet 
USPD member Frasunkiewicz considered the Council to be more than a temporary body and 
seemed to perceive it as the foundation of a workers’ state. He argued that the governing body 
of a workers’ state could only be elected by workers, not their parasitic bosses. He stressed 
that the elections were a fundamental issue: it meant empowering workers, so that their self-
elected workers’ state could flourish. The MSPD, on the other hand, wanted to broaden the 
demos to include the middle class, such as the relatively large and heterogeneous group of 
civil servants who were not members of any of the three workers’ parties (MSPD, USPD and 
IKD). A related question in this respect was on what basis people should vote: workplace or 
residence? The IKD argued that the industrial proletariat should vote on the basis of their 
workplace. This would secure a direct and close relation between Council members and their 
base in the factories. The USPD largely supported that position. As the MSPD wanted to 
include other groups as well, they proposed to base suffrage on whether people were included 
in the files of the health insurance, but the Council rejected this proposal. 
Another element of the voting regulations that was debated was the paragraph claiming 
that only those organised in either one of the three parties or a socialist trade union were 
eligible to vote. The MSPD argued that workers who were members of Christian and 
liberal trade unions or were politically non-organised should also obtain the right to vote. 
He received unexpected support from communist (and chair of the Hansa-Lloyd works’ 
workers’ council) Max Opfermann, who argued: ‘Any pressure to become a member of 
any party or union in order to be allowed to vote, must disappear’: all workers should be 
able to vote – irrespective of party or union affiliation.362 This argument appears to have 
been based on the struggles of radical workers, theoretically supported by the writings of 
Pannekoek and Radek, against the iron discipline of party and union.363
At the next meeting, when an improved version of the voting regulations was 
discussed, communist Hans Brodmerkel, a self-employed butcher who had been involved 
in founding the radical journal Arbeiterpolitik in 1916, expressed his wonder that there 
seemed to be fellow communists who supported the proposal to limit suffrage to those 
362 Ibid., 147-48.
363 Cf. for example the exchange of ideas between Pannekoek and Kautsky in the mass strike debates of 1912: 
Anton Pannekoek, “Massenaktion und Revolution,” Die Neue Zeit 30, no. 41 (1912).
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who were organised in parties. He felt that the MSPD should serve as a clear reminder 
of the effect that traditional parties and unions have had on the working class, as a result 
of which many workers had consciously resigned from these political organisations. He 
referred to the lessons of Anton Pannekoek and articles of Karl Radek to argue that the 
unorganised masses were the liberating force of the working class. It would be unfair for 
the Council to deny exactly these workers the vote, and it would go against the ideas 
of Pannekoek and the Bolsheviks’ experiences in Russia.364 Communist Wilhelm Seitz 
admitted that the current suffrage was exclusive, but this was justifiable because Bremen 
was in an exceptional situation: the voting regulations had to be seen as provisional, with 
the sole function of preserving the provisional socialist republic of Bremen – so it was 
justified to restrict suffrage to those that supported that republic.365
This debate shows that the parties disagreed substantially on the question of who 
should be included in council politics, and that only the MSPD had a theoretically coherent 
answer to this question (universal suffrage). The radical left was struggling to preserve the 
revolution on the one hand, and the council’s democratic legitimation on the other. Most 
speakers opted for security at the expense of democratic inclusiveness. More interestingly, 
however, the debate shows diverging tendencies within the communist group. One part 
focussed on a strong and disciplined organisation of radical workers in the communist 
party, whereas the other focussed on the workers’ spontaneous self-organisation 
outside traditional party and union structures. Bremen’s case is one of the first visible 
manifestations of this council communist tendency that would only become observable in 
the broader German communist movement in the following years.366 Moreover, it shows 
how workers absorbed concepts of pre-revolutionary radical theory and adjusted these to 
their political context. In doing so, they developed rudimentary forms of concepts that 
would become part of council communist theory.
5.5 Visions of post-revolutionary society
Just before Christmas 1918, the political situation in Bremen changed significantly. As 
Bremen’s communists had obtained significant influence on the USPD, these groups grew 
closer in their outlooks on the political situation in Bremen and Germany. Mid-December, 
this led USPD leader Alfred Henke to proclaim that the revolution was endangered from 
‘the right, whereas we have no enemies on the left’,367 signalling an important break 
between Communists and USPD on the one side, and the MSPD on the other. Crucial 
364 “Protokolle und Berichten zu den Sitzungen des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrats”, 10. Vollsitzung des Bremer 
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in this development was the radicalisation of the Soldiers’ Council, strongly influenced 
by its chairman Bernard Ecks – a wounded veteran in his mid-thirties who had joined 
the communists after his return from the Eastern Front.368 Two Council decisions, (co-) 
executed by the Soldiers’ Council, stood at the core of the radicalisation of Bremen politics: 
taking over the Bremer Bürger-Zeitung on 21 December 1918 and arming the proletariat. 
The Council had decided to organise the new Workers’ Council elections on 6 January 
1919. The MSPD manipulated election procedures, for example by allowing large groups 
of workers and civil servants to easily become members of the MSPD and hence eligible 
to vote for the Council. Although these tricks did not provide the MSPD with a majority 
(104 of the 263 mandates), it infuriated the other parties and increased the already high 
tensions between them. The USPD and Communists cooperated to find a way to remove 
the MSPD from the new Workers’ Council. 
These events coincided with a series of protests and uprisings in Berlin, where 
Spartacist-led revolutionaries rejected the choice of the Reichsrätekonferenz to establish 
a national assembly and started a fierce protest against the MSPD government. The KPD 
in Bremen (previously the IKD, who had merged with the Spartacists to form the KPD 
on 29 December 1918) wanted to support the communists fighting in Berlin and secretly 
prepared the proclamation of a Council Republic in Bremen. Late on 9 January, the USPD 
was informed that mass actions were scheduled to pursue this path the next day. On 10 
January, while a band was playing on the marketplace and workers were demonstrating in 
large masses, the KPD and USPD proclaimed the Council Republic. All of this happened 
without any violent clashes.369 
The proclamation of the republic necessitated a new institutional design for Bremen. 
The first meeting of the newly elected Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council was used to discuss 
the new governmental structures. The Senat and Bürgerschaft had already been formally 
dismissed, but now any cooperation with the former Senat was over, and it would no 
longer play any role. The first task therefore was to divide the governmental offices and 
departments, and to transfer them into nine so-called Volkskommissariate (People’s 
Commissioners). The Council also elected a Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Council of People’s 
Delegates) that had similar competences to the former senate and remained answerable 
to the Council at all times. The Council also established a body to control this Council 
of People’s Delegates, the Vollzugsrat, which consisted of the 15 delegates who had been 
assigned a Volkskommissariat. It is not hard to understand how this rather miraculous 
institutional design, in which the controllers of the council were themselves ultimately 
controlled by the council, was not very functional. 
368 Sitzungen und Protokolle des Soldatenrates in Bremen, Sitzung 20. Dezember 1918.
369 Kuckuk and Schröder, Bremen in Der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919, 70-71.
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The main challenge was to find sufficient people to occupy the government’s new 
positions. With the MSPD excluded, there was not much governmental experience to rely 
on. In practice, this meant that revolutionaries took over the top positions, but that the 
rest of the organisation, including its procedures, hierarchies and managers, remained 
intact. In the new political bodies that should control the state of Bremen, the USPD had 
a numerical majority, although their left-wing leaders generally voted with the KPD, 
so the influence of both groups was more or less equal.370 In the short period that the 
Council Republic of Bremen existed (it was crushed on 4 February 1919), virtually all 
political questions were about the protection of the young and fragile republic against 
enemy forces, both in- (banks, the MSPD, the old elites, army officers) and outside Bremen 
(the military force of the central government in Berlin, financial lock-out by the Entente). 
These increasing tensions resulted in even stronger distrust and enmity between the two 
governing parties. Considering all this, it is not surprising that the concrete results and 
revolutionary policies of the Council Republic were very limited. In this section, I will 
highlight two debates that characterised various visions of a post-revolutionary society 
and therefore were important to the development of council communism. One was about 
the acceptance of, and participation in, the Nationalversammlung (national assembly) 
elections that were scheduled for 19 January 1919. The other was about support for the 
unemployed, which also touched on the relation between equality, gender and work. 
The Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council discussed the national assembly elections on 13 
January 1919. Adam Frasunkiewicz, leader of the left-wing section of the USPD, noted 
that Bremen, because of the fundamental opposition between the national assembly and 
the Bremen Council Republic’s council system, should not help organise these elections. 
Bremen should not promote an institution that would dig the grave of the council movement. 
The communist Karl Jörn, an activist who had fled his home city of Nienburg because of 
his activities in the local workers’ council, added that accepting parliamentarism instead 
of terrorism and the dictatorship of the proletariat was the main mistake made in Berlin. 
Centrist USPD member Alwin Kerrl defended the elections, explaining how socialists had 
tried to make optimal use of their limited democratic rights for 50 years to distribute 
their ideas to the masses, and these upcoming elections would be a great medium for this 
ideological struggle.371 
The communist metalworker Franz Manthey, chair of the workers’ council at the Atlas 
works, responded that proletarian ideas should not be disseminated in parliaments, but 
on the streets. By boycotting the elections, Bremen would serve as a radical example for 
the proletariat in other cities. Frasunkiewicz endorsed that and referred to the faltering 
revolution in Germany. The renewal of the revolution had to start somewhere, and 
370 Ibid., 193.
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boycotting the national assembly elections in Bremen would be a most suitable moment.372 
By the end of the day, a small majority of soldiers’ councils and USPD delegates voted to 
allow the national assembly elections.
This short debate highlights an important question that would come to demarcate 
a differentiation between two labour-movement strands in later years: on the one hand 
were socialists and communists who considered parliamentary work an important (if 
insufficient) weapon in the struggle towards a more emancipated society, and on the 
other hand a small group of council communists who rejected all parliamentary work 
as tempering revolutionary potential and endangering the development of a working 
class that would be able to think and act for itself. Though still underdeveloped and 
immature, this can be considered as part of a concept of geistliche self-development and 
self-empowerment. 
From the very start of the revolution in Bremen, support for unemployed workers had 
been an important issue. In the months following November 1918, the problem increased 
dramatically because many returning soldiers found their former jobs occupied by others, 
mostly the women and children who had kept Bremen’s (war) industry running. Moreover, 
because of the high inflation, existing unemployment benefits no longer sufficed to support 
the unemployed and their families. Until the proclamation of the Council Republic, the 
Senate had obstructed any new policy for unemployment compensation. With the Senate 
out of the way, the council government saw an opportunity to finally solve this problem. 
The most interesting question in the discussion that unfolded was that of unemployment 
benefits for women and girls. The council government foresaw that women would only 
receive a third of the compensation for men, emulating the differences between male 
and female council members, the latter receiving only two thirds of the men’s fee.373 
Communist Karl Ertinger defended this by claiming that women and girls could generally 
live with their parents. His fellow communist Käthe Ahrens, one of only three female 
Council members, vehemently objected. Pained and shocked that workers would make 
such proposals, she argued that the concept of solidarity in a workers’ state demanded the 
equal treatment of men and women.374 
Centrist USPD leader Alfred Henke defended the inequality by first pulling the 
‘realist’ card, and then the ‘pragmatist’ one. After paternalistically stating that he was 
convinced of Ahrens’ good intentions and claiming that he was also a supporter of equal 
treatment in principle, he argued that the compensation compensated for wages, and 
that women’s current wages were considerably lower than those of men. Moreover, if 
372 Idem.
373 Inge Marßolek, “Novemberrevolution in Bremen,” in Niedersächsische Geschichte, ed. Bernd Ulrich 
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women’s compensation would get higher than their wages (in Bremen and in Germany 
at large), Bremen would see a massive influx of women applying for unemployment 
benefits. Another female Council member, Minna Otto, stressed that the principle of 
equal payment should eclipse practical objections, and sharply inquired why, if Henke was 
such a supporter of equality, the wages for female Council members were still lower than 
that of men. Communists Karl Plättner and Hugo Wahl stated that Ahrens’ request was 
a demand for justice, and that an emerging socialist state should not recreate bourgeois 
class laws. This differentiation based on gender was unacceptable, a re-enactment of the 
failings of the previous, capitalist society. This wave of critique forced Ertinger to admit 
that he had not thought enough about the position of working women, and he promised to 
have another look at the proposal – which in the end did not lead to any improvements.375 
Elsewhere, the council republic was also less attentive to gender inequality. Already at 
the second meeting of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, on 19 November 1918, Henke 
had stated that his opinion on universal suffrage had changed. Whereas he had previously 
demanded full equality in the polling booth, he now considered that a potential danger 
to the revolution.376 A few days later, Henke referred to the concept of Unmündigkeit 
(immaturity) of women and youth, and stressed the need to politically enlighten these 
groups.377 Henke did not explain whether this Unmündigkeit was selbstverschuldet (self-
incurred)378 or not, but these arguments illustrate the deeply rooted sexism that was 
part and parcel of the democratic discourse – even among the most devoted defenders 
of council democracy. Historian Jörn Brinkhus has rightly stated that the radical left’s 
complaints about MSPD members who departed from their radical political programmes 
as soon as they got power could have easily been turned on themselves when it came to 
gender equality: as soon as radicals ruled the city, they forgot their calls for universal 
equality if it might risk their position.379 
The debate shows the difficulties that even the most radical emancipatory 
revolutionaries had with internalising and executing the concept of gender equality. 
A number of gender-related issues coincided in this debate. First of all, there was the 
tension caused by returning soldiers expecting that the women who had been working in 
factories for the past four or five years would just return to their domestic work. This pre-
375 “Protokolle und Berichten zu den Sitzungen des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrats”, 17. Vollsitzung des Bremer 
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revolutionary social division of tasks was barely challenged or questioned.380 Secondly and 
relatedly, there was the issue that the workers’ council elections were based on the male-
dominated workplace. This left women largely under-, not to say un-, represented. Thirdly, 
the male-dominated government (only Minna Otto held a place in the Vollzugsrat; no 
other women were involved in executive organs)381 clearly felt no urgent need to challenge 
or problematize the existing, pre-revolutionary gender inequality in any serious way. They 
only started thinking about the issue after Ahrens and Otto’s criticism. This surely ties into 
recent studies on the almost exclusively masculine revolutionary subject in Germany.382 
The relation between the revolutionary men and women in Bremen can be described 
by the visionary words of Immanuel Kant, whose ideas played an important part in the 
development of social democratic thought in Germany: 
The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will 
soon see to it that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire fair sex) 
should consider the step forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly 
dangerous.383
The Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Bremen met for the 21st and final time on 3 February 
1919. In the days before, most of the sparse meeting time had been used to discuss whether 
anything could be done to avoid the seemingly inevitable clash between the armed workers 
from Bremen’s factories and docks who were ready to protect their Council Republic and the 
marching divisions that the central government had sent to ‘liberate Bremen from the terrorist 
dictatorship of the Bolsheviks’. Disgruntled officers had repeatedly requested the central 
government to intervene. After the Spartacists in Berlin had been crushed by government 
troops, Minister Gustav Noske decided that an army division could be sent to Bremen.
The council government’s attempts to negotiate with Berlin were useless. On 3 
February, Noske ordered the Gerstenberg Division and the Caspari Freikorps to start 
their attack on Bremen. The Freikorps was led by Walter Caspari (1877–1962), who had 
been an officer in Bremen’s infantry regiment but was dismissed by the Council Republic. 
He began to assemble volunteers for a paramilitary unit among his old comrades, and 
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as soon as the negotiations between the Ebert government and the Council Republic 
had failed, he presented his Freikorps of 600 men to the Gerstenberg Division.384 This 
division was created by combining two heavily armed fighting units of almost 5.000 
men in total, along with artillery and two tanks under the command of Oberst Bernhard 
Wilhelm Gerstenberg (1863–1945). Gerstenberg’s Division and the Freikorps marched on 
Bremen, and after a long day of bloody gunfights between the government troops and the 
armed but untrained workers, the Bremen Council Republic fell. Twenty-eight (mostly 
young) workers died defending the city, and on the side of the government and Freikorps 
24 (para-)militaries died. The governance of the city was taken over by MSPD members, 
who formed a ‘provisional government’ and declared almost all the policies that had been 
instituted by the Council Republic in its 25 days of existence invalid.385
5.6 Conclusions
The women, workers and soldiers in Bremen contributed to a revolutionary wave of 
radical democratic politics that swept through the German Empire in November 1918. 
The experiences and ideas that resulted from a couple of months of experimental self-
rule were generally diffuse, incoherent and heterogeneous. This chapter aimed to analyse 
and weigh the contribution of these working-class ideas and experiences to the emerging 
conceptualisations of the council. 
The two main conceptual questions that the workers and soldiers had to answer were 
(1) how their council should function, particularly vis à vis other (existing and emerging) 
political institutions, and (2) how a legitimate demos could be justly formed for this new 
form of kratos. 
Section 5.3 showed that the revolutionaries did not fundamentally contrast the 
concept of the council against other political forms. The emerging councils were 
generally considered the supreme, but not only, form of political representation in the 
city. Cooperating with the old governmental institutions was considered temporarily 
necessary, and the structures and hierarchies that shaped day-to-day governance strongly 
resembled the old structures: separation between executive and legislative power, and 
the use of committees and subcommittees (Ausschüsse and Unterausschüsse) to rule the 
departments of the city’s vast bureaucracy. 
The communists used the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat to signify a society 
democratically ruled by the working class via a council system. This also meant a principled 
384 Jörn Brinkhus, “Das Freikorps Caspari, Die Eroberung Bremens am 4. Februari 1919 und das Städtische 
Bürgertum,” in Novemberrevolution und Räterepublik 1918/19, 126-139.
385 Karl-Ludwig Sommer, “Die Bremer Räterepublik, ihre Gewaltsame Liquidierung und die 
Wiederherstellung “Geordneter Verhältnisse” in der Freien Hansestadt Bremen,” ed. Historische 
Kommission für Niedersachsen und Bremen (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2005), 1-30.
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rejection of establishing a national assembly. The USPD was internally divided over the 
relation between council rule and the role of a parliament, but generally saw the councils 
at least as transitional institutions that would be able to organise the socialisation of the 
economy. The MSPD generally considered the council undemocratic because of their 
exclusive membership and suffrage, and wished to substitute them for a parliamentary 
democracy based on universal, free and equal elections. For them, the councils were 
revolutionary instruments, unfit for post-revolutionary organisation of society. 
The conceptualisation of the relation between the council and the people differed 
too. Whereas the soldiers and many communists felt that the council should merely 
execute the will of the people in a very direct sense (which would later be incorporated in 
council theory with the concept of the imperative mandate), USPD and MSPD delegates 
conceptualised representation via the councils in a more indirect sense, giving delegates 
room to make decisions independently as well. 
When discussing the constitution of a proper demos, left-wing radicals restricted 
suffrage to the working class, whereas the MSPD and some USPD members considered 
a broader democratic legitimation of the Council necessary and thus aimed to extend 
suffrage. Most of the revolutionaries were convinced that the workplace was the proper 
basis for this new political form, and that elections should take place at the workplace. 
An important principal discussion was about whether the electorate should be politically 
(in parties) and economically (in unions) organised. This question for the first time 
demarcated two different groups in the communist movement: one that defended the 
party as the leading organisational form, and another that considered the party and union 
problematic hierarchical structures and therefore believed that unorganised workers 
should also (or particularly) be allowed to vote. This emerging theoretical divergence 
would later develop into a dividing line between ‘Leninist’ and council communists. 
In these debates, the Bremen revolutionaries referred to the teachings of theorists like 
Pannekoek and Radek to support their arguments. 
The analysis of the council debates during the Bremen Council Republic’s 25 days 
has shown how the upcoming elections for the national assembly provoked ideas about 
the proper place and function of proletarian politics. Whereas many in the communist 
party and the USPD considered a parliament one potential place to distribute their ideas 
and reach the working class, a small group of communists considered it a poisonous and 
treacherous arena that would be incapable of empowering workers to act and think for 
themselves. According to this minority, the street and workplace would be the proper sites 
for discussing communist ideas with workers. In this we find the beginning of a concept of 
council politics that would become an important element of council communism. 
The Council government’s new policy on unemployment benefits sparked the only 
serious challenge to council politics’ dominant masculinity. These debates show the 
problematic sexism in socialist and communist praxis, even though their theories and 
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programmes had always demanded radical emancipation irrespective of gender. The direct 
consequence of this in Bremen was that bourgeois forces managed to appropriate the 
groups of women struggling for recognition.386 Women, who had to a great extent created 
the window of opportunity for the creation of councils and the German revolution, were 
alienated from the revolution and its councils, and found themselves on the side of the 
bourgeois parties demanding parliamentary politics instead of council rule. The fact that 
the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council decided to push women back into the household, thus 
also denying them a position of influence in the new council democracy is troublesome 
to say the least. The tension between a council democracy based on the workplace and 
the role of unpaid labour (mostly by women) at home had and has never been seriously 
problematized by council communists. 
This is one of the main challenges for any reappraisal of council democracy and the 
council experiences in Bremen and Germany. A fresh look at the roots of council democratic 
thought should not only incorporate the theoretical accounts of council politics that were 
developed after the German Revolution, but also shift its gaze to the historical experiences 
of the workers and soldiers themselves, taking their political conceptualisations seriously.
In relating these insights to the production of political ideas and concepts, Bremen’s 
case has proven exceptionally useful. The minutes from the Bremen councils have shown 
that existing concepts of working-class representation and organisation, for example those 
of the centrist MSPD or of left-wing intellectuals such as Anton Pannekoek, provided the 
basis for many debates about council politics. On the one hand, council delegates used 
ideas of these professional thinkers in their conceptual contestations – this shows the 
importance of the local party school, where Pannekoek had influenced radical sections 
of the Bremen working class. On the other hand, we have seen how basic ideas about, for 
example, democratic inclusion and legitimacy, were then further developed by common 
revolutionaries to shape concrete politics in the council. Here, organic intellectuals, 
generally without much formal education but fostered in the party school, were able to 
develop and discuss their own concepts of council politics. Moreover, figures such as 
Johann Knieff demonstrated the importance of intermediaries in the transfer of ideas 
between the common revolutionaries, professional theorists, and those not represented in 
the councils at all. In Bremen, then, we do not so much witness a relation between ‘leaders’ 
and ‘followers’ in the development of council ideas, but a process that we can genuinely 
label a co-production of political thought by these various groups of agents. 
386 Stuckmann, “Die Neue Frau. Wandel Der Geschlechterrollen Im Bremen Der Weimarer Republik.”
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In many respects, Bremen and Hamburg present similar cases. Both were free city states 
in north-western Germany with similar governance structures and histories of relative 
political independence from the rest of the country. But their revolutionary history was 
rather different, and this chapter will show how that influenced the debates in the local 
council. Whereas a large portion of the working class in Bremen had been radicalised in 
opposition to the central workers’ parties prior to the revolution, Hamburg was a bulwark 
of the SPD’s traditional, reformist wing. This chapter investigates how this affected the 
development of council theory by reconstructing political debates in Hamburg’s council 
meetings during the early stages of the German Revolution of 1918–1919. We examine the 
minutes of 76 meetings of the city’s Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council from 6 November 1918 
to 24 March 1919 in order to offer a rich portrait of a key moment in the development of 
council theory.388 I will focus on the period of the councils’ greatest power and influence: 
from the early days of November until the First National Congress of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Councils on 16 December 1918, at which point the councils voted for national 
assembly elections to take place on 19 January 1919 (a vote that council delegate Ernst 
Däumig called a ‘suicide club’ for the councils). 
Delegates in the councils faced the daunting task of pushing through a transformative 
programme in the interest of ordinary workers whilst maintaining the basic administrative 
functions of a failing government and crippled economy. Placing their debates in political 
context presents an opportunity to study these ideas in action, which helps dispel the 
myth of council ideology as a set of abstract and dogmatic principles. Council theory is 
perhaps best known through Anton Pannekoek’s Workers Councils, which has a more 
speculative and utopian bent than other writings in the tradition. Council delegates within 
Hamburg’s Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council were concerned with immediate problems and 
debated how to enact their principles in the face of the realities of a complex environment. 
In the course of my analysis, I will show that council delegates held a variety of positions 
on the issues and demonstrate how theoretical principles often succumbed to the necessity 
of pragmatic solutions.
Because of the relative lack of council ideology’s theoretical elaboration before the 
emergence of workers’ councils in the Russian and German revolutions, studying council 
debates also offers an important perspective on the origins of council thought. As 
workers’ councils spontaneously arose in mass strikes across Europe with little planning 
387 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Gaard Kets and James Muldoon, “Rediscovering 
the Hamburg Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils” in: James Muldoon (ed.), Council Democracy: Towards a 
Democratic Socialist Politics (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 51-70. 
388 We were able to benefit from the recent publication of the source book edited by Volker Stalmann, Der 
Hamburger Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat 1918/19 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag 2013).
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or knowledge of how they should be developed, the councils’ initial meetings contain 
important political contestations and crucial debates concerning different interpretations 
of political challenges. Examining these records provides insight into the mindset of 
participants, rather than of council theorists often writing well after the events took place. 
While there are excellent monographs on some of the major theorists of council theory, 
such as Anton Pannekoek, Richard Müller and Rosa Luxemburg, there is less on the local 
council delegates and the actual practices of political movements during the revolution.389 
I aim to contribute to filling this gap with a detailed examination of a short chapter in the 
history of the council movements. This also highlights a contrast between Bremen and 
Hamburg: whereas in Bremen the influence of local professional thinkers was evident, 
this is much less the case in Hamburg. What we observe from the debates is that there is 
no single official position on council communism, but rather a set of shared underlying 
concerns and a number of ways these ideas were put to work in different political contexts.
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I introduce the political context of the 
formation of the Hamburg councils. Section 6.3 examines the first debates of the Hamburg 
Council on the relationship between councils and the institutions of the previous political 
order. This issue would play a pivotal role in the formation of council communist ideology. 
Hamburg is a particularly interesting case because the Council had to relate to not only the 
national assembly in Berlin, but also the two representative institutions that had governed 
this relatively autonomous city-state during the previous decades: the Senat and the 
Bürgerschaft. Third, I will analyse debates on the relationship between councils, political 
parties and trade unions. Fourth, I analyse the issue of membership and democratic 
inclusion. The councils faced questions of who should be included in their political 
organisation, particularly concerning women, peasants, intellectual labourers and the 
unemployed. Fifth, I examine how soldiers’ delegates successfully proposed ideas about 
the democratisation of the army, and how these ideas then transferred to the national 
level at the National Council Congress in Berlin, where they would become known as the 
Hamburg Points. I conclude by reflecting on what these instances of bottom-up political 
thought mean for the development of the council idea. 
6.2 The Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Hamburg
Hamburg had been an important city for centuries, a main trade hub between the middle-
European hinterland and the Atlantic world. As one of the leading cities in the Hanseatic 
league, it obtained a special status as a Free City upon joining the German Bund in 1815, 
389 John Gerber, Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism of Workers’ Self-Emancipation 1873-1960 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); Ralf Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution: 
Richard Müller, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Origins of the Council Movement (Leiden: Brill 
Publishers, 2014); Paul Frölich, Rosa Luxemburg: Ideas in Action (London: Pluto Press, 1994).
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stressing its importance by calling itself Freie und Hansestadt (Free and Hanseatic City) 
from 1819 onwards. In the 19th century, the city on the shores of the river Elbe developed 
further into a true metropolis: the city housed 180.000 people in 1800, but by the start of 
World War I this number had increased to one million, 900.000 of whom lived within 
city limits – which made it the Empire’s second largest city after Berlin (which had two 
million inhabitants at the beginning of the 20th century). Even compared to the average 
German population growth of 52% between 1875 and 1910, Hamburg’s impressive growth 
was 252%.390 Around two thirds of this was due to migration, the rest to increased births. 
The migration increase was strongly related to the increased industrial importance of the 
harbour city, where in the years before the war 4,5% of global trade took place, and over 
36% of German trade. This resulted in not only large numbers of workers in industry, 
trade and the docks, but also the Empire’s largest share of millionaires just before the 
war. The contrast between this millionaire class and the working class in Hamburg was 
enormous: many lived in slums, damp cellars and dangerous shambles, with standards of 
hygiene horrible ‘beyond description’. 391
Because of this large concentration of workers, August Bebel considered Hamburg ‘the 
capital of German Socialism’. Already in 1874, the social democratic party in Hamburg 
obtained over 40% of the city’s Reichstag votes, and from 1898 onwards this increased to over 
60%. The local branch of the SPD had 32.929 members in 1907, increasing to 49.422 in 1914, 
making it the largest local branch of the German Empire. Only 4% of those members was a 
Beamte (office worker) or self-employed, so (compared to other cities) it was a real workers’ 
party, with strongholds in metallurgy, wood production, transport and construction.392 
As a result of the working class’ high degree of organisation in Hamburg, and the 
interwovenness of the unions, the party, and employers’ organisation, the city’s social 
democracy had developed in a strong reformist direction, with a tendency to solve 
potential conflicts through peaceful deliberation. The main actor in this was the first social 
democrat to be elected to the local Bürgerschaft in 1901, Johannes Ernst Otto Stolten (1853–
1928), who maintained good relations between his party and the progressive members of 
parliament. After the revolution, he would become an influential national politician in the 
Reichstag and return to Hamburg as senator and deputy mayor. In the years before the 
war, he edited the Hamburger Echo, a local social democratic daily that, in contrast to the 
Bremische Bürgerzeitung in the other northwest-German free state, maintained a centrist, 
mainstream party voice.393 
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While in many cities, most notably in Bremen, the SPD was increasingly split into right 
and left wings, this was not the case in Hamburg. There was no left wing, and the only open 
opposition to the leadership of the workers’ organisations came from economist Heinrich 
Lauffenberg (1872–1937), who had studied economy and philosophy at the University of 
Rostock and held a PhD in history. A former member of the Centre Party who converted 
to Marxism after reading the work of Joseph Dietzgen (who had also been a big influence 
on Anton Pannekoek), Lauffenberg joined the SPD in 1904. He edited the Düsseldorfer 
Volkszeitung before moving to Hamburg in 1907, where he became a historian of the 
workers’ movement. In 1912, the same year he became the leader of the party school, he 
was already expelled from all SPD positions because of his increasingly radical insights. 
Strongly opposed to the war, he became increasingly interested in the ideas of Dutch 
theorists Anton Pannekoek and Herman Gorter, finding a comrade and intellectual ally 
in Fritz Wolffheim. From 1916 onwards, Lauffenberg also maintained close relations with 
Johann Knief in Bremen. 
The start of the war had a strong impact on Hamburg. The naval blockade brought 
all harbour-related industries to a standstill, and the number of people employed in the 
harbour was decimated, going from roughly 20.000 in 1915 to 3.000 in 1918.394 With a large 
portion of the men drafted for service in those years, the percentage of female industrial 
workers rose from 20 to over 33 percent in 1918. Those same years, the costs of living 
increased as much as 150%, while wages dropped about 20%, while workdays of 12 hours 
and weeks of 60 hours were normal.395 These numbers show the deteriorating situation of 
Hamburg’s working class that fuelled the anti-war protests during the war years. 
During the first years of the war, the protests against scarcity and hunger were generally 
carried out by women and young people. From the spring of 1917 onwards, after the 
revolution in Russia, the demographics and the subjects of Hamburg’s protests evolved. In 
April 1917, the local police notes that ‘the events in Russia have had a strong effects on the 
masses’, who began to envision radical changes in society as a solution for the declining 
conditions.396 Calls for bread began to be supplemented with calls for peace, leading to 
a large demonstration of 10,000 men and women on Hamburg’s Heiligengeist field on 1 
August 1917. In January 1918, the strike wave that swept the entire empire did not skip 
Hamburg either. On 28 January 1918, office worker Hedwig Brosterhues wrote to a friend 
at the front: ‘Then a huge long line of workers passed through the Mönckebergstrasse, 
apparently to the union building ... I can tell you when I saw this, this train of serious 






jubilant through and through.’397 Those last days of January, over 30,000 workers from 
Hamburg’s docks and metal works joined the strikes. Two elements of this strike would 
be important to the events unfolding in November that year. The first is that workers 
elected delegates to a political body they called the Workers’ Council. The second is that, 
for the first time, economic demands were supplemented by explicit political demands: 
peace without annexations, workers’ representatives to join the negotiations with Russia, 
the release of political prisoners and the democratisation of the state through general 
suffrage.398 
The war years demarcated a cleavage in Germany’s workers’ movement. The SPD 
leadership’s support for the war led to the establishment of an opposition within the party. 
This process was catalysed by the revolutions in Russia, after which anti-war activists 
within the party established the USPD. Although this new party had a Hamburg branch 
from 1917 onwards, it never really gained a foothold. The MSPD held a firm grip on the 
social democratic daily, maintaining their information monopoly, and the police already 
arrested the leadership of the new party in August 1917, effectively decapitating the party 
early on. Just before the revolution, in October 1918, the USPD in Hamburg had only 500 
members.399 
The left radicals around Laufenberg and Wolffheim had not been able to convince 
masses of workers of their ideas, but they had been successful in the party’s youth 
movement, which had opposed the war from the beginning. Rudolf Lindau (1888–1977) 
worked for the Hamburger Echo from 1911 onwards and had assisted Laufenberg in 
writing the history of the workers’ movement in Hamburg. One of the founders of the 
SPD’s Youth Association, he was elected its chair in 1915. The year before his election, the 
local party leadership had agreed to subordinate the youth association to the Jugendwehr 
(youth service) as part of the ‘pre-military education’ of the workers’ youth. The youth 
association had massively and successfully opposed this plan, transforming into an anti-
war opposition hub to the local party leadership, with Lindau as its leader. As part of their 
suppression strategy of intra-party opposition, the leadership disbanded the association 
in March 1916. The 1,500 members continued their club under the new name of Freie 
Jugendorganisation (Free Youth Organisation) and established their own journal called 
Proletarier-Jugend (Proletarian Youth).400
Neither the radicalised youth nor the small group around Laufenberg and Wolffheim 
got a chance to organise serious opposition within the workers’ movement during the war. 
The Freie Arbeiterorganisation was one of the organisers of food and peace protests in 1916 
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and 1917, and its leadership was arrested or drafted to the front. The left radicals were also 
mostly arrested, drafted or put under house arrest, which limited their influence on the 
workers’ movement during the war. It would take a revolution to bring these groups back 
to the stage. 
6.3 The revolution in Hamburg
On 5 November 1918, the USPD organised a massive gathering in the Gewerkschaftshaus 
(trade union building), where sailors from Kiel were greeted enthusiastically, leading 
to a solidarity strike. Wilhelm Düwell (1866–1936), editor of social democratic journal 
Vorwärts, proposed a mass demonstration the very next day and called for the establishment 
of a workers’ and soldiers’ council.401 This call was answered by over 40,000 people at 
Hamburg’s Heiligengeist field. Many of the participants were armed sailors, soldiers and 
workers who proceeded to march to strategic positions across the city, capturing the army 
headquarters, various military barracks and the social democratic newspaper, Hamburger 
Echo.
By that evening, the workers’ and soldiers’ provisional council was acknowledged 
(even by representatives of the local senate and parliament) as Hamburg’s highest political 
and military authority. Aside from maintaining order and protecting the revolution, 
the council’s main priority was to organise elections for more permanent workers’ and 
soldiers’ councils. On 8 November 1918, the factories and workshops hosted elections for 
the Großen Arbeiterrat (Grand Workers’ Council) of approximately 600 delegates. These 
gathered the next day to choose 18 delegates for the Workers’ Council. The remaining 12 
seats in the 30-seat Workers’ Council were occupied by delegates from the trade unions 
and the three workers’ parties (USPD, MSPD and the Linksradikalen – radical left). The 
USPD and the radicals initially dominated the Council, as demonstrated by the fact that 
USPDer Heinrich Laufenberg was elected first chairman. 
Soldiers elected delegates to the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Hamburg through 
their own council structures. From ships and barracks across the city, soldiers elected 
delegates to the ‘General Assembly of Soldiers’ Councils of Hamburg-Altona and 
surroundings,’ which consisted of 350 members. From this group, 100 members were 
delegated to the Delegates’ Assembly, which was in turn led by a small executive committee 
of 15 (later 30) members called the Soldiers’ Council. Together, the Workers’ Council and 
the Soldiers’ Council formed the 60-member Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Hamburg, 
as shown in Figure 1 below. This council existed a few months, having its final meeting 
on 24 March 1919, a day after the elections for the city parliament which made it obsolete. 




had flown over town hall on 11 November 1918 was finally removed, and the Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council was dissolved.
Figure 1. The Structure of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of Hamburg
6.4 The councils and the old institutional order
In some of the best-known texts of council communism (written in the years after the 
revolution) – by Pannekoek, Rühle and Korsch, for example – councils were envisaged 
as alternatives to bourgeois state institutions.402 Many council theorists considered 
workers’ councils to be proletarian organs that were distinct from bourgeois institutions 
due to their directly recallable delegates, their system of voting from within the working 
class and the workers’ control over production. Many radical council delegates also saw 
the council system as a complete break with the past. In a speech to the First National 
402 See for example Anton Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2003).
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Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils in Berlin, December 1918, Ernst Däumig 
declared: ‘We have to abandon the entire old administrative machinery, on the federal, 
regional, and municipal level. The German people have to get used to self-management 
instead of governance.’403 However, in most German cities outside of Berlin, councils 
exercised little more than a supervisory function over existing government apparatuses. 
As the latter offered no resistance to the councils, the administrative structure tended to 
remain in place.404 Many of the older industrialists, state authorities and other bourgeois 
elements were suspicious of the councils but dared not risk directly attacking them.405 The 
revolutionaries perhaps naively underestimated the resilience of the old institutions and 
failed to foresee the difficulties of undertaking basic administrative duties without them. 
Ernst Däumig argued that the ‘state apparatus had new men at its head but remained 
essentially unchanged’.406 Similarly, Karl Korsch recorded that: ‘Councils were in many 
if not most cases content with a very ineffective “control”, when in reality they should 
have demanded full powers in the legislative, executive and judicial fields.’407 Only the 
Executive Committee of the Berlin Council, headed by Richard Müller, demanded that 
full legislative and executive power should reside in the councils. However, even that 
Executive Committee conceded the necessity of maintaining certain existing government 
apparatuses, stating in a communiqué on 11 November 1918: ‘All the communal 
authorities of the various Länder, of the entire Reich, and of the army are to continue in 
their activities.’408 
The precise relationship between the new councils and the older institutions was 
subject to heated debate within the councils. Hamburg provides an illustrative case study 
of the practical problems many of the local councils arising across Germany faced. In 
this instance, the old institutions were abolished by decree for only a few short days 
before revolutionaries were forced to acknowledge how dependent they were on them 
for administrative support, which led to a desire for compromise and cooperation. The 
arguments between Hamburg’s delegates are also instructive because they prefigure 
the main debate at the First National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils in 
Berlin: the choice between a parliamentary or a proletarian democracy, between ‘national 
elections or the council system.’ Three main factors came into play in negotiations over the 
place of state administrative institutions alongside the councils. First, political parties had 
403 Ernst Däumig, “The National Assembly Means the Councils’ Death,” in Gabriel Kuhn (ed.), All Power to 
the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919 (London: PM Press, 2012) 
48.
404 Walter Tormin, Zwischen Rätediktatur und Sozialer Demokratie: Die Geschichte der Rätebewegung in der 
deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1954) 89–90.
405 Ernst Däumig, “The Council Idea and Its Realization,” in Kuhn (ed.), All Power to the Councils!, 53.
406 Ibid., 57.
407 Karl Korsch, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany,” available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1921/councils.htm.
408 Quoted in Korsch, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany”.
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ideological differences when it came to the councils’ role. While radical council delegates 
from the USPD and the Radical Left believed that councils should form the basis of new 
state institutions, the MSPD was reluctant to view the councils as a genuine alternative to 
a parliamentary system, so MSPD delegates used their position in the councils to retain 
or reform existing state structures. Second, without a consistent understanding of how 
a council system worked, the workers had ideological hesitations about creating a full 
council republic. Due to the propaganda efforts of the MSPD, liberals and conservatives, 
the rallying cry for national unity around parliamentary elections was very strong, and 
workers were not convinced that a council system presented a desirable alternative. Third, 
pragmatic concerns also prevented the swift abolishment of state apparatuses, because 
that would have made it impossible to fulfil the basic administrative duties so desperately 
needed to keep the country functioning. Thus, even when radical elements dominated the 
councils, they hesitated to completely remove key institutions of the bourgeois state.
Hamburg was governed by a Senat (senate) in which a mayor, deputy mayor and 
24 senators were (from 1860 onwards) elected by a Bürgerschaft (citizens’ council) and 
appointed for life. The Bürgerschaft was not open to all citizens, only to an elite based 
on wealth and social class. And even after obtaining de facto power over the city, the 
provisional workers’ and soldiers’ councils that arose on 6 November 1918 did not 
immediately alter the official position of these old institutions. That evening, delegates 
from the provisional workers’ council marched on the town hall to meet with the senators, 
declaring that ‘the workers and soldiers have taken political power into their hands, they 
will show that they are ready to use this power the right way’.409 Yet the Senate was not 
abolished, only commanded to secure the supply of paper for the declarations of the 
Council. One newspaper even reported that, although the councils had taken authority 
over police and military matters, the Senate and the Bürgerschaft would be able to function 
as usual.410 In its first public announcement, the Council declared that it had conquered 
‘most of the political power’, leaving its precise relation to the old institutions unclear.411 
On 12 November 1918, the Presidium of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of 
Hamburg issued a unanimous proclamation: 
The Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council has taken over the execution of political power 
in the state territories of Hamburg. The Senate and Bürgerschaft no longer exist. The 
Hamburg state territories will soon be part of the German People’s Republic. … Public 
servants remain at their positions. Their wages will be paid. … The Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council will from now on meet in the town hall.412
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The Presidium’s desire to put an end to the old institutions is further emphasised by the fact 
that the Council would now meet in the traditional home of the Senate and Bürgerschaft.
The meeting of Hamburg’s Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council directly followed that of the 
Presidium. The atmosphere of the meeting was gewitterschwül (ominous), with the door and 
room guarded by armed sailors. Nobody was allowed to leave before the end of the meeting, 
and some members felt trapped.413 Laufenberg started the debate by reading the Presidium’s 
proclamation, but soon a political difference emerged between the radical delegates and 
those of the MSPD. Louis Gruenwaldt (1856–1931), council delegate and chairman of the 
MSPD faction in the Bürgerschaft (of which he had been a member since 1904), argued that 
authorities need not be removed by violence and that, rather than replace the Bürgerschaft 
and Senate, their voter base should be expanded to a universal suffrage. He was supported 
by Heinrich Schönberg (1870–1919), a butcher and chair of the cartel committee since 1902, 
who argued that social reform would be in the best interests of workers, not revolution.414 
In his opinion, dismissing the Senate would lead to economic turmoil, which would anger 
the masses and turn them against socialism. The radical delegates rejected these arguments 
as too conservative for the current revolutionary situation and said that there was no time 
or capacity to hold municipal elections for a new Bürgerschaft. The Council voted in favour 
of the Presidium’s proclamation with six dissenting votes (presumably MSPD). Gruenwaldt 
concluded that the radicals had decided on a ‘very unpleasant undertaking.’415 However, this 
vote would not be the last word on the old institutions.
Following the council meeting, Laufenberg visited the Senate, accompanied by armed 
sailors, and explained that their institution no longer existed. He stated that ‘the past 
has been definitely disposed’, and that there were no ‘bridges between the past and the 
present left’.416 Nevertheless, he explained, the Council would still request the expertise 
and co-operation of individual former senators for the governance of the city. A Council 
meeting on 13 November 1918 decided that former senators could exercise their former 
offices under political control of the Council.417 After some ambiguity about whether the 
senators could continue their work as senators, it was decided that the most prominent 
senators could sit in a committee alongside Council delegates that would operate under 
the Council’s political control.418 
On 15 November 1918, the Council discussed its plans for the old Bürgerschaft and the 
institutions that would replace it. The issue was that they still needed the Bürgerschaft to 
pass finance bills that would allow government spending. The councils did not want to 









such as police wages, benefits for the unemployed and veterans, housing for the poor, 
food distribution, and so on. Delegates discussed the possibility of establishing a new 
communal parliament with universal suffrage. The MSPD’s Louis Gruenwaldt argued 
that holding elections was impossible at this point, so there was no other option but to 
use existing institutions. Berthold Grosse (1863–1927), carpenter by trade but union and 
party official for the MSPD for the previous decades, agreed, adding that there would be 
democratic benefits to maintaining the Bürgerschaft and expanding its voting population 
to include all classes. The Council decided that, despite their previous proclamation, the 
Bürgerschaft would still function, now with universal suffrage, as would the Senate. This 
marked reversal of the Council’s initial intentions can be viewed as a concession in its 
grappling with the difficult political realities of governing a city still in turmoil. 
To explain this new constellation of political powers to both the public and the 
old institutions, Grosse proposed that Laufenberg hold a thundery speech before the 
Bürgerschaft’s first meeting and directly explain its new role and how it related to the 
Council’s sovereignty.419 The next day, Laufenberg and four other delegates met with five 
Senate representatives to explain the new power relations between the Council and the 
old institutions.420 Six main issues were raised:421 first, to ensure political sovereignty 
remained firmly in the hands of the Council, it was granted veto power over all decisions, 
and the old institutions should only deal with non-political issues. Second, the Council 
was to appoint four delegates with full participation rights to the Senate. Third, one of 
those delegates would act as the Senate third chairman, on equal footing with the first 
and second chair. Fourth, a new Bürgerschaft would be elected by popular vote based on 
universal suffrage as soon as possible. Fifth, the Council would participate in the Senate’s 
financial committee. The sixth and final issue related to changing the names of the Senat 
and Bürgerschaft, as they were so closely associated with the old political order. Various 
proposals were submitted (Rat or Magistrat for the Senate, Stadtverordnetenversammlung 
for the Bürgerschaft), but none of them were agreed upon. The main reason for this was 
based on a fear that foreign allies and investors would withdraw their capital from Hamburg 
if its main institutions were renamed. It was argued that the chaos that would result could 
be catastrophic for Hamburg’s financial situation. Hence, in order to secure continuity 
and the state’s capacity to deliver basic services, the traditional names were maintained.422 
Although the idea of a more direct democracy nested in factories and barracks animated 
radical delegates, practical administration demands cut short any possible experiment 
with a ‘pure’ council system.
419 Ibid., 199–207.
420 Ibid., 215–222, 217.
421 For the debates of these issues, see the meetings’ minutes in: Stalmann (ed.), 199–237.
422 Ibid., 208–214, 222–228, 223.
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6.5 Political parties and trade unions
Council communists are perhaps best known for their vehement rejection of participating 
in political parties and trade unions. Their steadfast advocacy of the masses over leaders 
and their critique of the role of the Communist Party led Lenin to accuse them of ‘denying 
the necessity of the party and of party discipline’ and ‘completely disarming the proletariat 
in the interests of the bourgeoisie’.423 This anti-party position is most clearly presented in 
Otto Rühle’s 1920 pamphlet, The Revolution is not a Party Affair,424 which criticised the 
commanding role that leaders played in political parties and the depoliticising effect this 
had on the masses by decreasing their initiative and denying them effective agency. He 
also argued that the larger and more powerful a political party became, the more it would 
defend its power within the system at the expense of advocating for structural change and 
revolutionary activity. Rühle believed the separation between political parties and trade 
unions needed to be overcome by an organisation with a unified framework which would 
be ‘neither a political party with parliamentary chatter and paid hacks, nor a trade union’. 
He argued for a revolutionary organisation that was organised factory by factory, such as 
the General Workers’ Union (Allgemeine Arbeiter-Union, AAU), which was formed after 
the German Revolution in opposition to the traditional trade unions.
At the time, most council delegates, however, did not hold a radical anti-party position. 
This slowly changed after their disillusionment with traditional political parties following 
the Russian and German revolutions and the Bolsheviks and the MSPD’s perceived betrayal 
of the working class. In 1918, at the height of the German council movement’s power, there 
was only a limited anti-party discourse amongst council delegates – although there was 
dissatisfaction with the SPD for their granting of war credits, and talk of the need for an ‘a 
new kind of organisation’. As late as 1920, Pannekoek still believed in the necessity of a well-
disciplined revolutionary party in organising working-class consciousness.425 Later, he grew 
more sceptical of traditional political parties and called for new ‘parties or groups based 
on opinions’ that would act as ‘organs of the self-enlightenment of the working class’.426 
Functioning mainly for propaganda purposes, such educational groups would be where:
persons with the same fundamental conceptions unite for the discussion of practical 
steps and seek clarification through discussions and propagandize their conclusions, 
such groups might be called parties, but they would be parties in an entirely different 
sense from those of today.427
423 V. I. Lenin, “‘Left’ Communism: an Infantile Disorder”, italics in original.
424 Otto Rühle, The Revolution is not a Party Affair, available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/ruhle/1920/
ruhle02.htm.
425 Pannekoek, “World Revolution and Communist Tactics,” available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/
pannekoe/tactics/
426 Pannekoek, “General Remarks on the Question of Organisation,” available at https://www.marxists.org/
archive/pannekoe/1938/general-remarks.htm.
427 Pannekoek, “Party and Class,” available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/1936/party-class.htm.
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The idea that all political parties were bourgeois and that a revolutionary party was a 
contradiction in terms only developed after 1918.428
Let us examine how events unfolded on the ground in Hamburg in relation to this issue. 
The initial formation of councils by sailors in Kiel and Hamburg’s solidarity strikes and 
councils were not organised through existing political parties. The emergence of soldiers’ 
and workers’ councils across Germany began as spontaneous actions that originated in 
strike committees and industrial councils rather than traditional institutions of worker 
representation such as trade unions and the SPD. However, as soon as the councils arose, 
political parties such as the MSPD and USPD organised to take action within the councils, 
dominating their initial meetings and discussions. In Hamburg, the USPD initially held 
an advantage over the MSPD due to its closer ideological and organisational connections 
to the councils. Following the Heiligengeist protest on 5 November 1918, the first 
provisional workers’ and soldiers’ council consisted only of USPD members. At a meeting 
of Vertrauensmänner (trustees) of the Hamburg workplaces organised by the MSPD and 
trade unions, Hugo Haase (1863–1919, radical intellectual, former SPD co-chair, SPD 
faction leader in the Reichstag, co-founder of the USPD, and co-chair of the Revolution’s 
Rat der Volksbeauftragten) proposed banning trade union members from the councils, 
since ‘these people cannot represent the interests of the revolutionary proletariat’.429 His 
proposal was met with enormous resistance. During an USPD meeting on the same day, 
however, Wilhelm Düwell, the editor of party newspapers in Essen, Dortmund and Berlin, 
made a similar suggestion. His proposal to exclude party and union representatives from 
the Council had more success, earning ‘warm applause’.430 When the MSPD leadership 
and trade union cartel met early on 7 November 1918, they were aware that they were 
about to miss the revolutionary boat, and they decided they should do everything in their 
power to regain their influence on the working masses.431 
Although the USPD initially attempted to organise in the councils without trade 
unions and the MSPD, the latter’s organisational power and their threat to sabotage the 
councils by organising their own delegate assemblies led the USPD to compromise.432 On 
the evening of 8 November 1918, representatives of the MSPD, USPD, trade unions and 
the Radical Left gathered to discuss the composition of the Council. The radical parties 
demanded that the Council would be the new sovereign body leading the revolution. While 
sceptical of the councils’ organisational form, the MSPD and trade unions were willing 
to co-operate within the council structure on the condition of Gleichberechtigung (equal 
rights). This led to the Executive of the Workers’ Council, consisting of three delegates 
428 Pannekoek, “Party and Class”.
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from both the MSPD and USPD.433 Thus, while initial aspirations were for the councils 
to transcend party divisions, pragmatic concerns for unity and organisational power led 
to a balance of power between the parties within the councils. Council delegates were 
not opposed to parties per se. Although many of the radical delegates were critical of the 
MSPD’s direction, they still belonged to a political party and saw a pivotal role for it in 
leading revolutionary activity. The idea of dissolving all parties within the councils was 
only appealing to those delegates who believed they could already exercise control over 
the direction of events.
Writing afterwards, council theorists who experienced these events were critical of the 
role of political parties. Both Ernst Däumig and Karl Korsch argued that the infighting 
between parties had a distorting effect on the development of working-class consciousness 
and organisation within the councils.434 Däumig claimed that in ‘many cases, the 
members of the workers’ councils were simply appointed by the leadership of the two 
social democratic parties without even consulting the rank and file’.435 This increased the 
top-down nature of the councils and prevented the rank and file from exercising adequate 
control over deputies. Furthermore, factional strife between parties within the councils 
created a ‘conflict between “party discipline” and “proletarian duty”’, whereby a delegate 
could be torn between remaining faithful to their party and voting in the interests of the 
working class.436 Delegates could thus be prevented from acting as local representatives for 
their factories and workplaces, particularly if they belonged to the MSPD, which did not 
have much faith in the councils.
Yet it is hard to imagine a political system without parties, or how they, without the 
oppressive apparatuses of a one-party state, could be prevented from arising in a council 
system. The idea of a strict opposition between parties and councils ignores the extent 
to which organised political parties were able to exert their influence on the emergent 
political actors and institutions. It is impossible to demarcate two separate ‘systems,’ since 
most actors within the councils were also party members, and the dynamics of party 
politics played out within the councils. The council movement may have emerged without 
the organisational initiative of the main political parties, but it was soon dominated by 
party factions. Later, council communists developed their position through a growing 
scepticism towards the role of political parties, but even at their most extreme, theorists 
could not completely detach themselves from the necessity of an organisation that would 
co-ordinate and lead revolutionary activity.
433 Ibid., 153–157.
434 Korsch, “Evolution of the Problem of the Political Workers Councils in Germany”.
435 Däumig, “The Council Idea and its Realization,” in Kuhn (ed.), All Power to the Councils!, 55.
436 Ibid., 55-56. 
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6.6 Membership and democratic inclusion
The (self-)determination of any political community is defined though relations of in- 
and exclusion. Forming a community requires a moment of closure, when a boundary 
is drawn defining who has membership and can participate in government. This closure 
and the community’s resulting boundaries can be contested and change over time. The 
revolutionary moment in Germany provided an opportunity to radically alter the power 
relations between classes and redefine a new democratic collective. The Empire under 
Bismarck had been a conservative, hierarchical and closed society which had largely 
resisted liberals’ and socialists’ progressive pushes for reform. With the abdication of the 
Kaiser and the councils’ assumption of power in November 1918, the council movements 
faced a theoretical dilemma of reconciling their desire for the rule of the working class with 
their aspiration for an inclusive political community in a post-capitalist society. While 
their political programme was based on class struggle against a ruling elite, socialism’s 
final aim was to eliminate class-based oppression and include all individuals as free and 
equal members of a self-determining society. 
This tension was not always easily resolved and produced different accounts of socialist 
political organisation and its objectives. For example, Pannekoek understood council 
democracy to mean ‘workers’ power to the exclusion of the other classes’. He was critical 
of discourses of abstract universality insofar as they would empower ‘the war profiteers, 
black market speculators, landowners, moneylenders, rentiers, all those who live off the 
labour of others without doing any work themselves’.437 In a clash between the desire for 
democracy and workers’ control over production, Pannekoek tended to come down on the 
side of the latter. In contrast, Rosa Luxemburg argued that: ‘Social Democracy has always 
contended that it represents not only the class interests of the proletariat but also the 
progressive aspirations of the whole of contemporary society. It represents the interests of 
all who are oppressed by bourgeois domination.’438 Although no less aware of the dangers 
of counter-revolution, Luxemburg felt the importance of achieving socialism through 
democracy and reaching out to other marginalised groups. These positions represent 
different attempts at negotiating the often-conflicting demands of the need to organise for 
power and protect the revolution against counter-revolutionary tendencies while fulfilling 
the underlying socialist goal of an egalitarian and inclusive society.
During the revolution, grappling with this theoretical problem entailed answering 
the practical question of who could be a member of the councils. This issue took on 
particular significance once councils assumed political power and membership involved 
437 Anton Pannekoek, “Social Democracy and Communism,” available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/
pannekoe/1927/sdc.htm.
438 Rosa Luxemburg, “Marxism or Leninism?” in Reform or Revolution and Other Writings (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2006), 94.
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the opportunity to actively participate in self-government. The debates in the Hamburg 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council provide an opportunity to analyse how council delegates 
faced challenges from three different partially excluded groups: women, peasants and 
the unemployed. My analysis reveals that in the early days of the revolution, council 
delegates were relatively inattentive to the way not only the bourgeoisie but many of the 
lower classes were effectively excluded from participation in the councils. They confronted 
issues of democratic exclusion only when they were thrust upon them, and even then 
often haphazardly and inadequately. These debates reveal many of the era’s ideological 
limitations and the failure to properly grapple with internal power hierarchies and other 
forms of exclusion outside of the capital/labour relation.
Before addressing these three groups, there was one group over which there was little 
disagreement: most socialists agreed about the need to remove the bourgeoisie from 
positions of structural power. The councils were recognised as class-specific institutions 
intended to counteract the bourgeoisie’s economic and political dominance. As Müller 
addressed the National Congress:
The people who produce must be in the councils, whether they are manual or 
intellectual workers – but not every parasite exploiting the labour of others! Comrades, 
be aware! We already have ‘landlords’ councils.’ What’s next? ‘Millionaires’ councils’? 
Such councils we don’t need.439
The council system would not allow members of the bourgeoisie to form their own centres 
of power in the form of councils because these would be aimed at oppressing workers 
and reinforcing class rule. As a result, Pannekoek concluded that ‘the ruling class must 
be excluded from exercising any political influence whatsoever’.440 If a member of the 
bourgeoisie wished to give up his private ownership of capital and participate in the new 
society alongside workers, then he could ‘make his voice heard in the factory assemblies’ 
and ‘have the same decision-making power as any other worker’.441 This exclusion was not 
a permanent ban on all bourgeois individuals, but rather on the particular political power 
designed to expropriate surplus labour.
The councils’ exclusion of marginalised groups was partly due to their organisation 
in workplaces. The council movement sought to eliminate the distinction between the 
political and the economic, in other words to remove the need for a separate political 
sphere by having workers directly administer the production process for the benefit of 
the community. This would place self-government processes directly in workplaces as 
primary sites of production and socialisation. However, with people’s political membership 
439 Müller, “Democracy or Dictatorship,” in Kuhn (ed.), All Power to the Councils, 64.




organised through workplaces rather than artificial electoral boundaries, participation in 
a political community became dependent on, and conditioned by, the size and type of 
their workplace. Pannekoek recognised that ‘whoever does not work as a member of a 
production group is automatically barred from the possibility of being part of the decision-
making’.442 Yet for those outside of the organised industrial labour in the cities (which was 
the majority of the population), this entailed a reduced participation in government.
The first group excluded from political participation is women, even though they had 
played a pivotal role in the organisation and maintenance of society during the war, working 
in the factories and providing the front and their families with resources. Moreover, these 
women had organised demonstrations and strikes (such as the one that toppled the Tsar in 
1917) and were at the centre of the political struggle for universal suffrage. In spite of all this, 
women were severely underrepresented within the councils, both as delegates and as a class 
who were more likely to have undertaken unpaid reproductive labour outside of a workplace 
environment and therefore were excluded from participation in workplace-based councils.443
In the Hamburg Grand Workers’ Council, only three of the 600 members were women. 
In the smaller and more influential Hamburg Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, this figure 
was reduced to just one, Erna Halbe (1892–1983). A kindergarten teacher and member of 
the (radical left) Jugendbund, Halbe had been expelled from the SPD during the war for 
opposing the war, and would be one of the founding members of the KPD in December 
1918. These figures reflected national trends, with only two female council delegates among 
the 489 attending the National Congress.444 Compared to their significant numbers within 
rank-and-file workers, there were also barely any women acting as officials within the 
council movement.445 Efforts by women’s rights advocates to redress this vast inequality 
were never taken seriously. At a preparatory meeting of the Vertrauensmänner of the 
Hamburg workplaces on 9 November 1918, the membership and composition of the 
workers’ council was discussed. While they agreed that there would be representation 
from different labour categories (i.e. metal, wood, coal, etc.), a proposal from two members 
to elect women to the council’s executive was neither discussed nor put to a vote, and soon 
fell of the agenda.446 On 19 November 1918, the issue was discussed once more, because the 
Council had received a letter from the Hamburg-Altona Organisation for Women’s Rights 
concerning the establishment of a Women’s Council that would form part of the Hamburg 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in order to defend women’s interests. Their request was 
442 Ibid.
443 The role of gender in the German Revolution is yet to be thoroughly studied. Although recent decades 
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denied, but as a consolation the women’s organisation was allowed to elect a delegate to 
the Council’s socio-political committee.447 An invitation to this meeting never arrived, 
however, and repeated efforts to rectify the matter fell on deaf ears.
It was clear that most council delegates believed that all workers, not simply factory 
workers, should be allowed to form councils and be part of the federal council system. Ernst 
Däumig argued that ‘the council system is not only relevant for the manual worker but also 
for the intellectual worker’, as it should ‘build the necessary bridges uniting all proletarians’.448 
At the 13 November 1918 meeting of the Hamburg Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, the 
announcement that public servants (teachers, policemen, fire fighters, etc.) were establishing 
their own councils was greeted with enthusiasm, as it provided an opportunity for bureaucratic 
personnel sympathetic to the revolution to play a greater role in the city’s governance. 
On the question of peasants, the council movement was generally more hesitant. 
On the one hand, ‘Zusammenarbeit von Stadt und Land ’ (cooperation between city and 
countryside) was an important ideal for council delegates, yet they also expressed concerns 
over the conservatism of rural organisations.449 When the topic of food shortages arose, it 
was immediately suggested that the best public speakers be sent to the surrounding villages 
to secure the farmers’ delivery of food to Hamburg. These speakers were to convince the 
farmers to elect farmers’ councils that would co-operate with the city’s Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council.450 Delegates noted that even the existing liberal farmers’ clubs could 
play a role, although there were fears that empowering these peasant organisations could 
result in counterrevolutionary activities. Ultimately, the immediate need to avoid food 
shortages overrode any ideological concerns, and they agreed that delegates would be sent.
The representation of the unemployed is a third example of inclusion issues in the 
Hamburg Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council. Since council delegates were elected in the 
workplace, the unemployed had no direct influence on council politics. Nevertheless, as the 
city’s governing body, the Council had many decisions to make regarding to unemployment, 
lay-offs (especially in relation to the military) and unemployment benefits. In the first weeks, 
the councils did not discuss the fact that decisions concerning the unemployed were being 
taken without their knowledge or input. It was only at the end of 1918, when a large number 
of unemployed workers gathered in front of the town hall and demolished a delegate’s car, 
that they were considered. They were represented by Alfred Lippmann, a cabinet maker, who 
read out a list of demands which included higher benefits, more forms of assistance, as well 
as more jobs, though not the right to be systemically represented in the council. Although 
unemployed men and women did not demand membership of the council, the Council’s legal 
advisor, Carl Herz (1877–1951), eventually proposed that representatives of the unemployed 
447 Ibid., 248–252.
448 Däumig, “The Council Idea and its Realization,” in Kuhn (ed.), All Power to the Councils!, 58.




should be in permanent contact with the council through a new committee.451 Even though 
the unemployed were sceptical about this proposal, the council agreed to it, and Heinrich 
Laufenberg was sent to the balcony to communicate this decision to the unemployed 
protesting outside the Rathaus. He promises the protestors he would be in close (‘daily, even 
hourly’) contact with their representatives.452 
As a sociological reality, the working class did not include all lower and oppressed 
classes. Radical labour leaders were generally sceptical of the capacity of peasants, petite 
bourgeoisie and other declassed individuals to exercise power in a manner that furthered 
the aims of the revolution. They had good reason to doubt whether other groups would 
follow their political programme, but their exclusion raises serious questions about the 
councils’ democratic credentials. There was also a theoretical lacuna concerning members 
of society who were connected to the working class but not engaged in paid productive 
labour for whatever reason. Certain council theorists adhered to a troubling connection 
between productive activity and political rights. Furthermore, while council delegates 
aimed to extend forms of council organisation to all productive workers, the reality was 
that only the major centres were included. In Berlin, for example, initial plans for workers’ 
councils were drawn up without any consideration for the huge industrial and working-
class neighbourhoods outside of Berlin’s city limits.453 The three examples of exclusion 
examined above reveal a common theme: questions of membership were only discussed 
in response to problems raised by marginalised groups themselves, not out of any desire 
to clarify the proper demos of these new democratic institutions and establish adequate 
democratic principles of inclusion. Yet the councils’ democratic character the meant that 
marginalised groups could voice their concerns and demand inclusion, even if these 
demands were handled arbitrarily and imperfectly.
6.7 Democratisation of the army
In the night of 8 December 1918, a mixed group of former revolutionaries and supporters 
of Hamburg’s old ruling classes attempted a putsch in order to end council rule and call for 
Bürgerschaft elections as soon as possible. The amateurish attempt failed, and eight of its 
leaders were imprisoned. Though unsuccessful, the attempt alerted the supporters of the 
revolution that a counter-revolution was a realistic possibility. As such, the attempt would 
inspire their decisions on the democratisation of the army that would become known as 
the Hamburger Punkte (Hamburg Points). These regulations regarding the organisation of 
the defence forces would become one of the radical left’s most important achievements at 
the National Congress of Councils in Berlin later that month.
451 Ibid., 431–438.
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453 Hoffrogge, Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution, 76.
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Immediately after the coup attempt, on 9 December, the council assembled, and Walther 
Lamp’l proposed guidelines to secure the army in the hands of the revolutionaries. The 
first point was to establish a revolutionary guard as an immediate counter to conservative 
forces. This point was unanimously accepted. The second point was to use the Hamburger 
Echo as the Council’s formal daily, which was accepted (with two nay votes). The third 
point stated that munition and weapons depots would be controlled by revolutionary 
soldiers from now on, which did not lead to any discussion in the council. The fourth 
point was a true power-grab by the revolutionary soldiers: the command over all forces 
stationed in Hamburg would now be in the hands of the Siebener-Ausschuß, the executive 
committee of the Soldiers’ Council, which could only consist of ‘revolutionary elements’. 
This power shift was given a strong symbolic element by the abolition of any insignia and 
officers’ uniforms. Moreover, officers would be disarmed and could no longer be member 
of the soldiers’ councils, except by explicit approval of a majority of the regiment. This 
point was added to the list by Franz Schädlich (born in 1872), a loyal MSPD delegate 
from the Soldiers’ Council who was also a high-ranked union official. The reliability of 
the troops would now be the responsibility of the soldiers’ councils instead of the officers. 
These last points were all unanimously accepted without debate.454 
It might seem surprising that the radical demands to democratise the strictly 
hierarchical Prussian military system were proposed by the moderate MSPD delegates 
and that they were accepted without serious debate. Partly, this might be explained by 
the coup attempt: the crisis situation made it clear that the revolutionary achievements 
were open to counterattacks from the ruling classes, and that the councils’ position was 
vulnerable and in need of protection. Still, the argument for a democratically controlled 
and largely egalitarian revolutionary militia to defend the socialist state had been part of 
the social democratic tradition since the Erfurt Programme of 1891.455 The combination of 
crisis management and the Volkswehr as a traditional democratic-revolutionary concept 
from the workers’ movement explains why the Hamburg Council took this radical step 
without much debate. 
A few weeks later, at the National Council Congress in Berlin, the Hamburg Points 
would become national policy after Walther Lamp’l introduced them as a response to 
demands by dissatisfied soldiers in Berlin. After deliberations with the Berlin Soldiers’ 
Council, the points would alter slightly,456 but the democratisation of the army was also 
adopted without much opposition by the council delegates in Berlin. The democratisation 
of the army initiated by the delegates in Hamburg went directly against the wishes and 
interests of the national MSPD leadership, which had struck a secret deal with the army’s 
454 Stalmann, 356-362.
455 Hoffrogge, “Reich, Räte Und Republik - Die Stenografischen Berichte Des Ersten Reichsrätekongresses 
1918,” 16-17.
456 For the Hamburg Points in Berlin, see chapter 3.
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high command in the early days of the revolution to ensure mutual support between the 
officers and the MSPD leadership. 
To conclude, one of the most radical policy proposals in Hamburg’s Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council was not initiated by the most radical revolutionaries, but rather by centrist 
MSPD soldier delegates who articulated a concept from the traditional social democratic 
repertoire against the wishes of their own party leadership. While the Hamburg Points 
were considered a victory for radical revolutionaries in both Hamburg and Berlin, they 
would not be effectuated. The Rat der Volksbeauftragten stalled their implementation, and 
after the January fights in Berlin, the officers’ position was formally restored. 
6.8 Conclusions
The German revolutionaries wanted to depart from existing repertoires of politics but 
struggled to create new ones. Though the collapse of the old order’s legitimacy and 
authority created the possibility of radical transformation, it proved tricky to organise 
councils into a force capable of taking de facto power. Attempts to create a new society 
were impeded both by ideological hesitation and the practical realities of attempting to 
govern a divided society where basic administrative functions collapsed. Existing political 
parties certainly did not instigate the revolution, but they were quick to seize opportunities 
to advance their programmes. The unfamiliar radical council ideas eventually gave way to 
a better-known programme of social democratic reforms that the MSPD managed to find 
support for among a broad variety of (also moderate and conservative) forces. 
There were no clear blueprints for the political challenges that revolutionaries faced. 
The Russian Revolution, by and large, was seen as a cautionary tale. While some of the 
radical delegates believed that important lessons could be learnt from this experience, 
even Laufenberg sought to distance Germany from the Russian example. As a result, 
the actions of council delegates reflected both a number of pragmatic compromises and 
the council delegates’ competing interpretations of the councils’ proper structure and 
role. Nevertheless, the experience of participating in workers’ councils would inspire a 
generation of leftist intellectuals and activists, some of whom would continue to theorise 
workers’ councils as a third path between the bureaucracy of state socialism and the 
inequalities and exploitation of capitalist democracy. 
The absence of most party leaders during the revolution was a striking feature of the 
events in Hamburg. Even more than in the other cases I studied above, Hamburg’s parties 
and unions lacked influence on the initial councils, which emerged without any roles for 
these traditional organisations. Moreover, the lack of leadership allowed room for local 
intermediaries to play a role in the initial formation of councils. Nevertheless, the parties 
and unions managed to regain their influence and soon the decision was taken to organise 
the council system along the traditional lines of parties and unions. Once this shift took 
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place, we saw that almost all council delegates had strong party affiliations and a fair 
amount of party-political or union-representative experience. The councils in Hamburg 
were more councils of workers’ representatives than of workers. To relate this to the 
categories this thesis employs, they were councils of intermediaries rather than common 
revolutionaries. 
Zooming in on the role of the radical left, we noticed that they found it hard to gain 
traction among Hamburg’s workers. They could only spread ideas about radical politics 
through their influence on the youth movements – and, considering Erna Halbe’s 
contributions to the debates, not without some success. Arguably the most radical proposal 
that was developed in Hamburg, the democratisation of the army, was put forward by the 
moderate delegates of the MSPD. Here we saw that, in the situation of crisis, the existing 
social democratic notion of a People’s Army was one of the concepts the revolutionaries 
from different parties shared. 
Reflecting on the development of ideas in the Hamburg council, it is clear that most 
debates were strongly shaped by problems of the day. This also affected the development 
of ideas about organisation. Although there were some ideas about radical democracy, 
these were soon overshadowed by pragmatism and the need to cooperate with existing 
institutions. A similar development can be detected when we look at ideas about the proper 
demos for council politics. There was simply no well-considered concept of inclusion and 
exclusion that could guide the council advocates in their decisions. Certainly the new 
council system emboldened disadvantaged groups to speak up and raise their concerns, 
and to that extent you could argue that the councils had a democratizing effect on 
Hamburg society. Nevertheless, it was only in response to these protests and contestations 
that the delegates discussed who would be included in council politics and who would not. 









The four cases studied in this thesis were selected to shed light on the development of 
political ideas in the councils of Germany’s revolution in November 1918. By analysing the 
debates in and about these councils in Berlin, Munich, Bremen and Hamburg, I have tried 
to reconstruct who the main actors were, what their roles were and how they contributed 
to the development of ideas about democracy. In this concluding chapter, I will connect the 
results of these four case studies to the research questions explained in the Introduction. 
The next section will cover the initial councils and the people able to conceptualise or 
contest their development. Section 7.3 then dives into the council debates and reconstructs 
how conceptions of council politics were discussed in relation to other political institutions, 
such as local governing structures or the national assembly. The fourth section considers 
the fundamental debates about democratic inclusion and exclusion that accompanied 
the development of democratic ideas in the councils. Finally, Section 7.5 will provide an 
answer to the main research question about common revolutionaries, intermediaries and 
professional thinkers and their contributions to the development of political thought in 
the councils.
7.2 Establishing councils, actors and ideas
The first research question that this thesis aimed to answer was how councils were 
established during the German revolution and which actors were able to influence this 
process. The four cases studies have shown the importance of the January 1918 strikes for 
the formation of the council idea in Germany. In these strikes by workers in the metal 
and arms industry, demands to end the war were joined by the demand for the Kaiser to 
abdicate. In all four cities I studied, the experiences in that wave of strikes were part of 
the development of a common understanding of the council as a political form to organise 
protesting masses and to govern workplace and city. In Berlin, the network of Revolutionäre 
Obleute was of crucial importance and largely operated outside of existing party or union 
structures. In sharp contrast to the Sparticists, the Obleute had no clear leaders and no 
pre-existing intellectual cadre. Instead, it was a horizontal, heterogeneous network of 
local trustees on the factory floors. This structure was very organically connected to the 
workers’ councils that originated in the early days of the revolution. When the revolution 
arrived in Berlin, the rapid radicalisation of the demonstrators’ demands was beyond the 
leadership of the traditional social democratic institutions. Soldiers and sailors took the 
initiative and were joined by the Obleute and other workers. The initial workers’ council 
elections took place in the factories and barracks and were not organised along party lines. 




Volksbeauftragten and Vollzugsrat that were dominated by party representatives. This can 
be considered the first step of the workers’ councils in making themselves obsolete.
In Bavaria, the establishment of councils was equally decentralised. The correspondence 
between the central council in Munich and various workers’, peoples’ and peasants’ 
councils throughout Bavaria showed that the councils only contacted the capital for 
guidance after they had been established. The soldiers’ councils in Bavaria acted more 
assertively and pro-actively, taking measures to democratise the army and solidify their 
own position as councils in a new governance structure for the army divisions. In response 
to the demands for guidance from local councils, the central revolutionary government in 
Munich, led by Auer and Eisner, drew up guidelines for councils. Though the MSPD and 
USPD had fundamentally different conceptions of the role of councils in state politics, this 
was never part of a broader democratic debate. The government took decisions without 
any input from existing councils. When the Revolutionary Workers Council presented its 
own proposal for council institutionalisation based on the work floor, the party ministers 
completely ignored it. 
While Kurt Eisner used his popular speeches and stage plays to express a conception of 
councils aimed at fundamentally democratising society on all levels by involving people in 
the governance of their daily lives, his actual politics did the opposite. Though the national 
council assembly was used to formally legitimise Eisner’s government, it was not involved in 
any actual policymaking and had no control over the government. Radical workers objected 
to this in various council institutions, but they were not heard. It was only after Eisner’s 
murder that Bavaria began to experiment with councils in the two council republics that were 
established. Although radical intellectuals such as Ernst Toller and Erich Mühsam thought 
that the council idea was very popular in Bavaria, this appeared to be overly optimistic. In 
general, Munich’s revolutionary politics was characterised by a group of intellectuals with 
wide-ranging plans who appeared to lack a substantial relationship with the local workers. 
This might explain why ideas about the democratisation of culture and education were 
taken more seriously than the democratisation of the economy: the intellectuals involved in 
the Eisner government and the council republic were more experienced in these fields and 
therefore able to develop concrete policy ideas.
In Bremen and Hamburg, the councils originated in the docks and barracks, and 
outside the grasp of local parties. The radical left was dominant in Bremen, while it was 
not very influential in Hamburg. In Bremen, theorists like Anton Pannekoek had been 
able to influence many young dockworkers and teachers, and these radical ideas had been 
disseminated through local journals and editors. This had made many workers in Bremen 
weary of the role of parties and unions in organising of and protests. In the docks and 
barracks, they formed councils outside of the control of local parties. The local leader of 
the USPD soon saw the potential and joined the efforts of workers and soldiers to establish 
a workers’ and soldiers’ council for the city. 
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In Hamburg, the situation was quite different. Although the city had a large working 
class, it was not radicalised like in Bremen. The local branch of the social democratic 
party had a strong presence in the wood and metal industry and in construction, and the 
working class was well-organised in the traditional unions. The party had successfully 
held a reformist course aimed at deliberation and the peaceful representation of working-
class interests in the city government. The few radical-left ideas came from a group around 
the intellectual Heinrich Lauffenberg, who was interested in the ideas of Dutch theorists 
Pannekoek and Gorter, and who was in close contact with Johann Knief from Bremen. 
Revolutionary politics in the city was soon aimed at reconciling the new councils with the 
old institutions of the Senat and the Bürgerschaft. 
At the Reichsrätekongress in Berlin, council delegates from all over Germany gathered 
to discuss the future of the councils. Its composition was very diverse: work-floor 
representatives with no prior formal political experience sat side by side with famous 
former Reichstag members. Most delegates lacked formal education, but since almost all 
of them had been part of the social and cultural Bildung of the social democratic party, 
they shared a basic repertoire of political concepts or outlooks. This became particularly 
clear in the debates about the democratisation of the army, where soldiers argued and 
voted against the wishes of the MSPD. These soldiers drew on their shared involvement 
in structures of domination, discipline and hierarchy in the German army, and on pre-
revolutionary social democratic ideas about an egalitarian Volkswehr. In Munich, the 
soldiers established a very similar position. That case in particular shows how politically 
uneducated soldiers were able to develop their own political concepts of democracy in 
opposition to their party leaders based on their common identity and experiences, and 
embedded in their collective notion of an egalitarian people’s army.
In general, then, we have seen that in all four cases the councils’ establishment 
and development was beyond the grasp of existing parties. Informal networks of local 
revolutionaries such as the Obleute or the Linksradikalen played an essential role in this 
initial phase. Moreover, the councils were established in a decentralised process. After 
various councils had been established in local factories or barracks, there were efforts to 
unify them in something of a council system. This process happened in all four cases, with 
Bavaria the clearest example: after local councils had been established in towns all over 
the province, they wrote to Munich for directions as to how to function and what their 
competences would be. 
An interesting contrast appears when we reflecting on which actors were involved. 
The initiators of the revolution and the councils were mostly common revolutionaries, 
soldiers, sailors and workers. These men and women established the first councils and 
discussed organisational questions during the revolutions’ early days. But when they 
elected representatives for higher-level councils, such as the central city councils, these 




well-known leaders and thinkers from the labour movement. This mechanism was most 
visible when representatives were delegated to the National Council Congress in Berlin 
in December 1918: here, the number of professional thinkers and intermediaries such as 
editors and union representatives was much higher than in the local councils. 
In this mechanism, we can discern Robert Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Although 
Michel’s thesis described the development of political parties, it can be extended to cover 
all kinds of organisations: ‘It is organisation that gives birth to the domination of the 
elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the 
delegators. Who says organisation, says oligarchy.’457 Even when the original formation 
and development of an organisational form is spontaneous and bottom-up, as was the case 
for most councils, the logic of its development will lead to bureaucratisation and eventually 
oligarchisation. For Michel, when an organisation becomes stronger, it simultaneously 
becomes less democratic. This indicates that Michel understands democracy in Rousseau’s 
tradition: for him, democracy means direct democracy, so any form of representation is – 
and must be – a deviation from this.458 
It is worth noting that, even though such a development towards bureaucracy was 
certainly apparent in the councils, the case studies also found that many disadvantaged 
groups were emboldened by the existence of the councils to contest this oligarchic 
tendency. In all cases, we encountered groups of women, unemployed, Beambten and 
others who challenged the delegates and demanded to be heard. It is in this sense that the 
council system’s direct-democratic, spontaneous aspirations worked at least partially as a 
brake on oligarchisation. 
7.3 Conceptualisation and contestation of the councils
The second research question in this thesis asked how various groups conceptualised and 
contested councils, particularly in relation to existing political institutions and structures. 
The main debate about this during the revolution was that on councils versus parliament. 
The cases showed that few revolutionaries in fact considered them to be mutually exclusive. 
While there were radicals who rejected any form of parliamentary politics, as well as 
moderates who wanted to get rid of the councils altogether, most delegates in the analysed 
cases aimed to find a new political structure that could accommodate both councils and 
parliament. 
When the councils emerged during the first days of the revolution, there was no script 
to guide the workers and soldiers in their political experiment. Hence, it is not surprising 
457 Robert Michel, Political parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy. 
(New York: The Free Press, 1962), 365.




to see that many councils took over parliamentary language, processes and structures. 
For example, debates were often prepared in Ausschüße (committees) and organised very 
similarly to local parliaments. The Reichsrätekongress in Berlin was also organised as a 
parliament. In Munich, Eisner developed the concept of a Nebenparlament that would 
accommodate councils from all of civil society. As the name implies, this parliament 
would exist alongside a general parliament elected by the general population. As stated 
before, this conception of a lebendige Demokratie that Eisner developed in no way reflected 
his actual politics in revolutionary Munich. 
Because of their status as free cities in the German Reich, Hamburg and Bremen 
had a long tradition of self-rule. Both cities had a similar political system, with a 
Bürgerschaft representing the upper classes and a Senat forming the local government. 
When the revolutionaries took over, they declared their councils to be the sovereign 
ruling institutions. Nevertheless, the old institutions were not immediately abolished. In 
Hamburg, the council declared that it held ‘most of the political power’, which left their 
exact relation to the other institutions absolutely unclear. In practice, both in Hamburg 
and in Bremen, the cities’ former elites could continue much of their work while the 
councils tried to figure out the relationships between the old and the new. This led to 
tensions in both cities. On 12 November, Hamburg’s revolutionaries decided to abolish the 
Bürgerschaft and Senat, and two days later Bremen’s did the same. Nevertheless, a city’s 
daily administration demands some form of continuity, and eventually most delegates 
realised they needed the bureaucracy and administration to keep functioning. In Bremen, 
Hamburg and Munich, delegates independently developed systems of council control over 
the old governing bodies. In Bremen, it would only be after the declaration of the Council 
Republic that the old institutions were dissolved to make room for new governing bodies 
such the Rat der Volksbeauftragten. 
Calls for more direct forms of democratic politics via councils often came from delegates 
with a close connection to the work floors, as the chapter on Hamburg showed. In Bremen, 
a delegation of radical workers headed by Johann Knief rejected the Reichsrätekongress’ 
decision to elect a national assembly, because they considered parliaments bourgeois 
political institutions. Local workers like Franz Manthey argued that the dissemination of 
ideas should not occur in parliaments but on the streets and at work. 
One of the main conceptual struggles over the role of councils featured the concept of 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Many supporters of the councils used it to argue in favour 
of council rule, and particularly to justify excluding non-workers from the councils. The 
councils were considered temporary instruments that could secure the revolution and 
organise the transitory phase towards a socialist society. Many MSPD delegates rejected 
this conception of council politics as dictatorial and stressed the importance of universal 
suffrage in the socialist tradition. Only a parliament based on universal suffrage could 




councils. Although there could be a place in a future German political system for these 
collected particular wills, it could only be in addition to a representative parliament. 
Some delegates from the radical left, particularly in Bremen, responded that any form of 
representation obstructed the workers from thinking and acting for themselves. 
In this debate about various conceptions of democracy and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, we can recognise Rousseau’s ideas about direct democracy as opposed to forms 
of democratic representation. Whereas MSPD delegates used the concept of the volonté 
générale to argue for a representative parliament, the dictatorship of the proletariat is 
probably closer to Rousseau’s notion of direct democracy in service of a general will. The 
notion of dictatorship of the proletariat is based on the assumption that there is an objective 
and knowable general working-class interest that must be at the core of (democratic) 
politics. As Marx argued, in the transition towards a classless society, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat must protect that general interest against the counterrevolution.459 This 
means that behind the debates about democratic in- and exclusion of people lurks another 
debate about the in- and exclusion of interests and ideas. From the perspective of the 
proponents of the proletarian dictatorship, ideas that did not fit the general working-class 
interest should be excluded from the council.
In her reflections on the Russian Revolution, Rosa Luxemburg challenged the 
dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship on these grounds. For her, dictatorship 
of the proletariat would mean including the majority of the people (the working class) in 
democratic politics. In doing so, she contested the Leninist notion of the dictatorship as 
party rule, but also the social democratic concept of parliamentary politics. For her, it 
meant:
a dictatorship of the class, not of a party or of a clique – dictatorship of the class, 
that means in the broadest possible form on the basis of the most active, unlimited 
participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited democracy.460
Here, as we saw in Marx and in the concept of dictatorship as used in the council debates, 
Luxemburg relates the rule of a small group (either the liberal elite or a party) through a 
representative government (what she, following Marx, called ‘formal democracy’) to the 
negative notion of dictatorship, while she defends a positive notion of dictatorship that she 
believes would be compatible with the direct political participation of the many. 
Even if this theoretical defence of a democratic dictatorship might seem unconvincing 
from our perspective, we should take into account the actual context in which these concepts 
459 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York 
and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 525-541.




were used, developed and contested. As we have seen, the threat of counterrevolution was 
ubiquitous and real – many council experiments were drenched in blood by an alliance 
of conservatives and social democrats. The decision to consolidate the revolutionary 
democratic achievements at the (temporary?) expense of more democratic aspirations is 
comprehensible (even if we disagree with it). 
7.4 Democratic in- and exclusion: speaking subalterns
In the debates about who could be part of decision-making in council politics, three 
main groups were discussed: non-workers, the unemployed and women. The exclusion 
of non-workers was already discussed above in light of the concept of dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Generally, delegates from the work floor and the radical left parties vehemently 
opposed including social groups outside the working class in the council structure. In 
Bremen, some leftists even argued that bourgeois instruments like parties and unions 
should be excluded, and that councils should accommodate non-organised workers. These 
arguments can be traced back to the influence of the Dutch theorist Anton Pannekoek, 
who taught at the local party school before the war and argued for spontaneous politics 
instead of the overly disciplined and bureaucratic social democratic party. We can also 
relate this line of argument to the above-mentioned concept of direct democratic politics 
in service of an objective general interest: in the name of true democracy, some groups and 
ideas can be excluded from democratic procedures.
The council structure’s embeddedness in the workplace meant that the unemployed 
lacked any political influence, even though this group constituted one of the most 
disadvantaged parts of the working class. Towards the end of 1918, unemployment 
increased rapidly when more and more men came back from the front while the economy 
was still shattered. In various cities, the unemployed organised and demanded a place 
in the council structure. Although their demands for better treatment were generally 
received with compassion, there were no unemployed councils established in the four 
cities I studied. In Hamburg, the unemployed were promised they would be in close 
contact with the committee for social affairs, but they were not given any formal political 
body to influence policy.
A third group structurally excluded from council politics was women. Although the 
introduction of universal suffrage meant that women obtained formal political equality 
for parliamentary elections, there were at least five obstructions that kept women from 
power in council politics. Firstly, there were barely any women in the elected councils. 
As women had been dismissed from the factories where they worked during the war, 
they were ineligible for the workers’ councils. Secondly, women were considered to be 
politically immature. Thirdly, traditionally female vocations were generally not part of 




were less often elected because they had less experience at work and less time to socialize 
after work. Fifthly, housework and social reproduction were not politically represented. 
The women who were in a council demanded better representation and criticized the 
masculine character of many of the debates. Moreover, women like Anita Augspurg 
and Lida Gustava Heymann argued for the politicization of the domestic sphere and the 
establishment of women’s councils. In Bremen, Käthe Ahrens and Minna Otto demanded 
that their Marxist comrades lived up to the concept of true equality, but their efforts were 
fruitless. 
For all these three groups (non-workers, unemployed and women), their exclusion can 
be traced back to a central deficit in the conception of council democracy. The councils’ 
advocates defended it as inherently linked to the workplace and explicitly separate from 
the public realm of traditional politics. Hence, the legitimation of its proper demos could 
not account for people who were not directly part of the productive labour process. As the 
case studies have shown, the advocates of council democracy were unable to repair this 
theoretical lacuna, which has surely contributed to a decrease of support for this novel 
political form. 
From the debates over the constitution of the demos, we can conclude that many of 
the common revolutionaries supported the exclusion of non-workers. Similarly, many 
ordinary soldiers supported the exclusion of officers from their organs. We saw two lines 
of defence for excluding non-workers – one theoretical and the other pragmatic. The 
theoretical argument involves class rule to serve the general interest: as only the working 
class can know and foster the volonté générale, it is democratically allowed to supress 
individuals and ideas that endanger it. The pragmatic argument was related to the danger 
of counterrevolution and the need for efficient and centralised class rule. Giving power 
back to potential counter-revolutionaries was considered to endanger the democratic and 
social achievements of the November Revolution. Arguments in favour of including non-
working-class groups came from intermediaries, professional intellectuals and politicians 
who were related to the MSPD.
The exclusion of the unemployed was less explicit. In the cases where the unemployed 
contested their exclusion, we saw their interests represented by common revolutionaries. 
Nevertheless, even though these subaltern people were allowed to express their opposition, 
this did not result in improved conditions. Although their ideas about more inclusive 
councils were generally heard with sympathy, they did not obtain formal representation 
in any of the cases I studied. 
At the Council Congress in Berlin, when delegates discussed the role of the councils 
and elections for a national assembly, the speakers were predominantly intermediaries 
(union representatives, journal editors, party officials) and professional intellectuals. In 
Munich, the women representing women’s interests in the council structures were public 
intellectuals such as Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann. On the national level, 
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women like Toni Sender would make the case for inclusive council politics. Considering 
the context discussed above, it is unsurprising that the few women who did manage to get 
a podium in council politics were those who had prior experience as public intellectuals 
and speakers.
7.5 Follow the leader?
In Chapter 2, I argued that there is a lacuna in existing research on the German 
Revolution. Although the role of agency has gained an important place in the literature on 
revolutions, the ideas of these agents (particularly of common revolutionaries) are much 
less studied. For this thesis, I combined insights from both Begriffsgeschichte and network 
theory in order to trace the production, development and contestations of concepts by 
various groups participating in the German Revolution. The aim of this project was to 
answer the question: What is the role of, and mutual relationship between, intellectuals, 
intermediaries and common revolutionaries in developing ideas about democracy in the 
German Revolution of 1918–19? 
The initial establishment of councils and corresponding conceptions of council 
democracy were predominantly the work of common revolutionaries, local organisers and 
networks of radical soldiers and workers, who managed to construct the first elemental 
councils outside the grasp of existing party cadres and union organisations. We have seen 
that the council in these instances was often conceived concretely and pragmatically, 
dealing with everyday organisational questions. At later stages, when central councils 
became governing bodies in the cities, we saw that many of the elected delegates were trained 
party officials and professional thinkers. Though there were common revolutionaries in 
all local councils, most speakers in the debates I analysed were intermediaries. 
In the debates about the novel political form of the council and its relation to existing 
institutions, we saw a conceptual struggle over the meaning of democratic politics. In these 
debates, the development of ideas was also dominated by intermediaries and professionals. 
The most influential common revolutionaries were those who were part of local networks 
such as the Obleute in Berlin or the Linksradikalen in Bremen. These groups had actively 
participating delegates who tried to develop ideas about council democracy but had no 
role in existing parties. In Munich, it was mostly radical soldiers and communists who 
contested exiting political institutions and tried to develop their own conceptions of the 
council – in debates with local intellectual anarchists. But these instances were relatively 
rare.
In fact, common revolutionaries were most visible in the council debates when they 
held demonstrations, protests or strikes to present their demands to the councils. We 
encountered events in all four cases that surfaced the tension between representatives 




sometimes radical sailors or disappointed communists. These events hint at the fact that, 
although the councils originated with unorganised, relatively autonomous revolutionaries, 
they soon became instruments where intermediaries and professionals dominated.
This should not necessarily be considered as negative. The revolutionaries had no 
theories of council politics to guide their decisions, and many conceptions of the councils 
were developed and discussed on the spot. As we have seen, the defence of council politics 
against tried and tested forms of parliamentary democracy was generally unsuccessful. 
Simultaneously, the initial development of the councils and the fact that untrained young 
citizens could take matters in their own hands for the first time made for a formative 
emancipatory experience for many of the revolutionaries. Although the council debates 
were dominated by intermediaries and professionals who talked about the common 
workers instead of with them, these workers did constantly hold these representatives 
accountable. This democratic control – and the continuous stream of demands, objections, 
protest that came from workers in the forms of demonstrations, flyers, posters, letters 
et cetera – was surely one of the most important gains of the revolution. Leaders and 
party officials would still dominate the political debates, even in the councils, but their 
power would not be unchecked. The Weimar Republic was much more democratic than 
the Kaiserreich had ever been, and the democratic awakening of its citizenry can be traced 









Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO)

















· SgY 10/ V / 1/ 1
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 1/ 2
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 1/ 4
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 3/ 17
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 3/ 18
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 3/ 42 Ü
· SgY 10/ V 236/ 8/ 37
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 1
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 2
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 3
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 4
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 5
· SgY 17/ V 253/ 6













· 2 – E 19 a
· 3 3 – 151
· 4,2 – 230
· 4,89 1 – 55
· 6,15 – 2
· 7,123 – 60
· 9,F – 493
· 9,F – 659








· 377-6_I a 6
· 741-4 L 18

























Anweiler, Oskar. The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 1905–
1921. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
Baker, Keith Michael and Dan Edelstein, eds. Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach 
to the Comparative Study of Revolutions. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Bauer, Franz J. Die Regierung Eisner 1918/19. Ministerratsprotokolle und Dokumente. 
Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der Politischen Parteien. 
Düsseldorf: Droste, 1987.
Bernstein, Eduard. Die Deutsche Revolution von 1918/19. Geschichte der Entstehung und 
Ersten Arbeitsperiode der Deutschen Republik. Berlin: Verlag für Gesellschaft und 
Erziehung, 1921.
Beutin, Heidi, and Wolfgang Beutin. Fanfaren einer Neuen Freiheit. Deutsche Intellektuelle 
und die Novemberrevolution. Darmstadt: Wbg Academic, 2018.
Bieber, Hans-Joachim. Bürgertum in der Revolution: Bürgerräte und Bürgerstreiks in 
Deutschland 1918-1920. Hamburg: Christians, 1992.
Bödeker, Hans Erich. “Concept - Meaning - Discourse. Begriffsgeschichte Reconsidered” 
in Ian Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank Van Vree, eds. History of Concepts: 
Comparative Perspectives, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998, 51-64.
Bourrinet, Philippe. The Dutch and German Communist Left (1900-68): ‘Neither Lenin nor 
Trotsky nor Stalin!’ - ‘All Workers Must Think for Themselves!’. Leiden: Brill Publishers, 
2016.
Braeg, Dieter, and Ralf Hoffrogge, eds. Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte 
Deutschlands. 16.-20. Dezember 1918 Berlin. Stenografische Berichte. Neuausgabe zum 
100. Geburtstag. Berlin: Die Buchmacherei, 2019.
Brinkhus, Jörn. «Das Freikorps Caspari, die Eroberung Bremens am 4. Februari 1919 
und das Städtische Bürgertum.” In Staatsarchiv Bremen and Bremische Bürgerschaft, 
eds. Novemberrevolution Und Räterepublik 1918/19. Bremen und Nordwestdeutschland 
zwischen Kriegsende und Neuanfang, Bremen: Bremische Bürgerschaft, 2019, 126-39.
———. “Novemberrevolution - Räterepublik - »Stacheldrahtostern«. Die Revolution 
1918/19 in Bremen.” In Hans-Jörg Czech, Olaf Matthes and Ortwin Pelc, eds. 
Revolution! Revolution? Hamburg 1918/19. Kiel/Hamburg: Wachholtz Murmann 
Publishers, 2018, 57-69.
Broué, Pierre. The German Revolution 1917-1923. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006.
Camp, Matje van de, and Antal van den Bosch. “A Link to the Past: Constructing Historical 
Social Networks” In Proceedings of the ACL-HLT Workshop on Computational 
Approaches to Subjectivity and Sentiment Analysis 2011, 61 - 69.
Canning, Kathleen. “Gender and the Imaginary of Revolution.” In Klaus Weinhauer, 
Anthony McElligott and Kirsten Heinsohn, eds. In Search of Revolution: Germany and 
Its European Context, 1916-1923. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015, 103-26.
Carsten, F.L. Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919. Wildwood House, 1972.
188
Literature and Sources
Diani, Mario. “Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions, and Social 
Networks: ‘From Metaphor to Substance’?”. In Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds. 
Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, 1-18.
Drochon, Hugo. “Robert Michels, the Iron Law of Oligarchy and Dynamic Democracy”. 
Constellations 27, no. 2 (2020): 185-98.
Dülmen, Moritz von, and Bjoern Weigel, eds. Es Lebe das Neue! Berlin in der Revolution 
1918/19. Berlin: Kulturprojekte Berlin, 2019.
Düring, Marten, and Florian Kerschbaumer. “Quantifizierung Und Visualisierung. 
Anknüpfungspunkte in Den Geschichtswissenschaften”. In Marten Düring, Ulrich 
Eumann, Martin Stark and Linda von Keyserlingk, eds. Handbuch Historische 
Netzwerkforschung. Berlin, Wien, Münster: Lit, 2016, 31-43.
Düring, Marten, and Linda Keyserlingk. “Netzwerkanalyse in Den 
Geschichtswissenschaften”. In Rainer Schützeichel and Stefan Jordan, eds. Prozesse. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014 .
Edwards, Jason. “The Ideological Interpellation of Individuals as Combatants: An 
Encounter between Reinhart Koselleck and Michel Foucault.” Journal of Political 
Ideologies 12 (2007): 49-66.
Eildermann, Wilhelm. ““Im Kampf für ein Sozialistisches Vaterland”. In Institut für 
Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, ed. Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen, Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1960, 139-61.
Engel, Gerhard. “The International Communists of Germany, 1916-1919.” In Ralf 
Hoffrogge and Norman LaPorte, eds. Weimar Communism as Mass Movement 1918-
1932. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2017, 25-44.
Erickson, Bonnie H. “Social Networks and History: A Review Essay.” Historical Methods: 
A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History 30, no. 3 (1997): 149-57.
Evans, Richard J. The Feminist Movement in Germany 1894-1933. London and Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.
Föllmer, Moritz. “The Unscripted Revolution: Male Subjectivities in Germany, 1918-1919.” 
Past & Present 240, no. 1 (2018): 161-92.
Foucault, Michel. L’archéologie du Savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1986.
Freeden, Michael. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996.
———. “Ideology and Political Theory.” Journal of Political Ideologies 11, no. 1 (2006): 
3-22.
———. The Political Theory of Political Thinking : The Anatomy of a Practice. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Führer, Karl Christian, Jürgen Mittag, Axel Schildt, and Klaus Tenfelde, eds. Revolution 
und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland 1918-1920. Essen: Klartext, 2013.
Gallus, Alexander. “Die Vergessene Revolution Von 1918/19 - Erinnerung Und Deutung Im 
Wandel.” In Alexander Gallus, ed. Die Vergessene Revolution von 1918/19. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010, 14-38.
189
Literature and Sources
Gerwarth, Robert. Die Grösste Aller Revolutionen. November 1918 Und Der Aufbruch in 
Eine Neue Zeit. Mïnchen: Pantheon, 2019.
Gluckstein, Donny. Western Soviets. Workers’ Councils Versus Parliament 1915-1920. 
London: Bookmarks, 1985.
Goldstone, Jack A. “From Structure to Agency to Process: The Evolution of Charles 
Tilly’s Theories of Social Action as Reflected in His Analyses of Contentious Politics.” 
American Sociologist 41 (2010): 358-67.
———. “Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation.” World Politics 32, no. 3 (1980): 
425-53.
———. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revlutionary Theory.” Annual Review of Political 
Science, no. 4 (2001): 139-87.
Gose, Leah E., and Theda Skocpol. “Resist, Persist, and Transform: The Emergence 
and Impact of Grassroots Resistance Groups Opposing the Trump Presidency.” 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2019): 293-317.
Gramsci, Antonio. Alle Mensen zijn Intellectuelen. Notities uit de Gevangenis. Translated 
by Arthur Westeijn. Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2019.
———. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International 
Publishers, 1971.
Grebing, Helga. Frauen in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/19. Heidelberg: Stiftung 
Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte, 1994.
Grunberger, Richard. Red Rising in Bavaria. London: Arthur Barker Ltd, 1973.
Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik. Die Bremer Linksradikalen. Aus der Geschichte der Bremer 
Arbeiterbewegung bis 1920 (Zweite, Erweiterte Auflage). Bremen: Gruppe 
Arbeiterpolitik, 1979.
Gurganus, Albert Earle. Kurt Eisner. A Modern Life. Rochester, New York: Camden House, 
2018.
Gutmann, Franz. Das Rätesystem: Seine Verfechter und Seine Probleme. Munich: Drei 
Masken Verlag, 1922.
Harman, Chris. The Lost Revolution. Germany 1918 to 1923. London: Bookmarks, 1985.
Hendrikx, Bas. Scenes from a Movement. An Actor-Network Analysis of the Global Rise of 
the Homeless Street Paper. Dissertation: Radboud University, 2014.
Hengel, Guido van. De Zieners. Toekomstvisioenen uit een Verloren Europa. Amsterdam: 
Ambo Anthos, 2018.
Hoffrogge, Ralf. “Reich, Räte und Republik - Die Stenografischen Berichte des Ersten 
Reichsrätekongresses 1918.” In Dieter Braeg and Ralf Hoffrogge, eds. Allgemeiner 
Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte Deutschlands. 16.-20. Dezember 1918 Berlin. 
Stenografische Berichte. Neuausgabe zum 100. Geburtstag. Berlin: Die Buchmacherei, 
2019, 7-27.
———. Working-Class Politics in the German Revolution - Richard Müller, the Revolutionary 




Jannack, Karl. “Wir Kämpften in Bremen für die Räterepublik.” In Institut für Marxismus-
Leninismus beim ZK der SED, ed. Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1960, 163-187.
Jones, Mark. Am Anfang war Gewalt. Die Deutsche Revolution 1918/19 und der Beginn der 
Weimarer Republik. Translated by Karl Heinz Siber. Berlin: Propyläen, 2017.
———. Founding Weimar. Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Kant, Immanuel. An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’. London and New 
York: Penguin Books, 2009.
Käppner, Joachim. 1918 - Aufstand für die Freiheit. Die Revolution der Besonnenen. 
München: Piper Verlag, 2017.
Kautsky, Karl. “National Assembly and Council Assembly.” In John Riddell, ed. The 
German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power. New York: Anchor Foundation, 
1986, 94-107.
Keil, Lars-Broder, and Sven Felix Kellerhoff. Lob der Revolution. Die Geburt der Deutschen 
Demokratie. Darmstadt: wbg Theiss, 2018.
Kets, Gaard, and Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen. “Three Conceptions of Council Democracy: 
Revolutionary Organs, Economic Institutions and Radical Democracy.” Polity 53, 1, 
(2021). https://doi.org/10.1086/711750.
Kets, Gaard, and James Muldoon, eds. The German Revolution and Political Theory. Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Kienitz, Sabine, and Inka Le-Huu. “Frauen in Der Revolutionszeit.” In Hans-Jörg Czech, 
Olaf Matthes and Ortwin Pelc, eds. Revolution! Revolution? Hamburg 1918/19, Kiel/
Hamburg: Wachholtz Murmann Publishers, 2018, 157-71.
Klemperer, Victor. Zo Zag de Waarheid er op Donderdag uit. Dagboek van een Revolutie. 
1919. Translated by W. Hansen. Amsterdam: Atlas Contact, 2015.
Kluge, Ulrich. Soldatenräte und Revolution. Studien zur Militärpolitik in Deutschland 
1918/19. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975.
Köglmeier, Georg. Die Zentralen Rätegremien in Bayern 1918/19. Legitimation - Orgnisation 
- Funktion. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001.
Kolb, Eberhard. Die Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918-1919. Düsseldorf: 
Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 1962.
———. “Rätewirklichkeit und Räte-Ideologie in der Deutschen Revolution von 1918/19.” In 
Eberhard Kolb, ed. Vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik. Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer 
& Witsch, 1972, 165-84.
———. The Weimar Republic. London: Routledge, 1988.
Koselleck, Reinhart. “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History.” In Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, 75-92.
———. “Richtlinien für das Lexikon Politisch-Sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit.” Archiv für 
Begriffsgeschichte 11 (1967): 81-99.
Kuckuk, Peter, ed. Die Revolution 1918/1919 in Bremen. Aufsätze und Dokumente. Bremen: 
Edition Temmen, 2010. 
191
Literature and Sources
Kuckuk, Peter, and Ulrich Schröder. Bremen in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/1919. 
Revolution, Räterepublik, Restauration. Bremen: Edition Falkenberg, 2017.
Kuhn, Gabriel, ed. All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German 
Revolution of 1918-1919. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012.
Landauer, Gustav. “To Fritz Mauthner, Munich, April 7, 1919.” In Gabriel Kuhn, ed. All 
Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919. 
Oakland: PM Press, 2012, 194.
Lawson, George. “Within and Beyond the ‘Fourth Generation’ of Revolutionary Theory.” 
Sociological Theory 34, no. 2 (2016): 106-27.
Lindow, Carl. “Revolution Verpflichtet!” Vorwärts, 22 December 1918, 1.
Luxemburg, Rosa. The Russian Revolution. New York: Workers Age Publishers, 1918.
———. “What Does the Spartacus League Want?” In Rote Fahne, 14 December 1918. 
Available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/12/14.htm.
Maguire, Jennifer Smith, and Julian Matthews. The Cultural Intermediaries Reader.  Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2014.
Marßolek, Inge. “Novemberrevolution in Bremen.” In Bernd Ulrich Hucker, ed. 
Niedersächsische Geschichte. Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 1997, 511-27.
Marx, Karl. “The Civil War in France.” In  Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader. New 
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 618-52.
———. “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader. 
New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 525-41.
Matthias, Erich. “Die Rückwirkung der Russischen Oktoberrevolution auf die Deutsche 
Arbeiterbewegung.” In Helmut Neubauer, ed. Deutschland und die Russische 
Revolution. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968, 69-93.
Merz, Johannes. “Auf dem Weg zur Räterepublik.” Zeitschrift für bayerische 
Landesgeschichte 66, no. 2 (2003): 399-794.
Mitchell, Allan. Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet 
Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Möckl, Karl. “Gesellschaft und Politik Während der Ära des Prinzregenten Luitpold.” In 
Karl Bosl, ed. Bayern Im Umbruch: Die Revolution Von 1918, Ihre Voraussetzungen, Ihr 
Verlauf Und Ihre Folgen. Berlin, Boston: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1969, 5-36.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. “Die Deutsche Revolution 1918/19.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4, 
no. 3 (1978): 362-91.
Mühsam, Erich. “From Eisner to Leviné. The Emergence of the Bavarian Council 
Republic.” In Gabriel Kuhn, ed. All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of 
the German Revolution of 1918-1919. Oakland: PM Press, 2012, 205-263.
Müller, Richard. “Report by the Executive Council of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council of 
Great Berlin.” In Gabriel Kuhn, ed. All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History 
of the German Revolution of 1918-1919. Oakland: PM Press, 2012, 31-39. 
———. “Revolutionary Gymnastics.” In Gabriel Kuhn, ed. All Power to the Councils! A 




———. Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik. Vienna: Malik Verlag, 1924.
Neubauer, Helmut, ed. Deutschland und die Russische Revolution. Stuttgart etc.: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1968.
Niess, Wolfgang. Die Revolution Von 1918/19 in der Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. 
Deutungen von der Weimarer Republik bis ins 21. Jahrhundert. Berlin, Boston: Gruyter, 
2013.
———. Die Revolution von 1918/19. Der Wahre Beginn Unserer Demokratie. Berlin: Europa 
Verlag, 2017.
Oertzen, Peter von. Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. Eine Politikwissenschaftliche 
Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der Betrieblichen und Wirtschaftlichen 
Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/19. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1963.
Pannekoek, Anton. “Massenaktion Und Revolution.” Die Neue Zeit 30, no. 41 (1912): 541-
50.
Pelz, William A. A People’s History of the German Revolution 1918-1919. London: Pluto 
Press, 2018.
Reichardt, Rolf. “Zur Geschichte Politisch-Sozialer Begriffe in Frankreich Zwischen 
Absolutismus und Restauration.” Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 
12, no. 47 (1982), 49-74.
Rosenberg, Arthur. A History of the German Republic. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1936.
Roß, Sabine. Biographisches Handbuch der Reichsrätekongresse 1918/19. Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 2000.
Rürup, Reinhard. Probleme der Revolution in Deutschland 1918/19. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 
1968.
Schaupp, Simon. Der Kurze Frühling der Räterepublik. Ein Tagebuch der Bayerischen 
Revolution. Münster: Unrast, 2017.
Schröder, Ulrich. “Adam Fransukiewicz – Schuhmacher, Kriegsgegner, Häftling, 
Revolutionär, Parteisekretär, Lagerhalter: Eine Politische Biografie.” In Historische 
Gesellschaft Bremen, ed. Bremisches Jahrbuch. Band 96. Bremen: Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
2017, 102-143.
Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, ed. Vorwärts und Nicht Vergessen. 
Erlebnisberichte Aktiver Teilnehmer der Novemberrevolution 1918/1919. Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1960.
Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and 
theory 8 (1969): 3-53.
Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, 
and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Sommer, Karl-Ludwig. “Die Bremer Räterepublik, ihre Gewaltsame Liquidierung und 
die Wiederherstellung ‘Geordneter Verhältnisse’ in der Freien Hansestadt Bremen.” 
In  Historische Kommission für Niedersachsen und Bremen, ed. Niedersächsisches 




Stalmann, Volker. Der Hamburger Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat 1918/19. Düsseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 2013.
———. “Die Wiederentdeckung der Revolution von 1918/19: Forschungsstand und 
Forschungsperspektiven.” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 64, no. 6 (2016): 521-
41.
Sternsdorf-Hauck, Christiane. Brotmarken und Rote Fahnen. Frauen in der Bayrischen 
Revolution und Räterepublik. Köln: ISP, 2008.
Stuckmann, Dagmar. “Die Neue Frau. Wandel der Geschlechterrollen im Bremen der 
Weimarer Republik.” In Jan Werquet, ed. Experiment Moderne: Bremen nach 1918. 
Bremen: Focke Museum, 2018, 86-99.
Tilly, Charles. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
———. Trust and Rule. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Tormin, Walter. Zwischen Rätediktatur und Sozialer Demokratie: Die Geschichte der 
Rätebewegung in der Deutschen Revolution 1918/19. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1954.
Van der Linden, Marcel. “On Council Communism.” Historical Materialism 12, no. 4 
(2004): 27-50.
Vrousalis, Nicholas. “Revolutionary Principles and Strategy in the November Revolution: 
The Case of the USPD.” In Gaard Kets and James Muldoon, eds. The German Revolution 
and Political Theory. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 113-34.
Weidermann, Volker. Träumer. Als die Dichter die Macht Übernahmen. Köln: Kiepenheuer 
& Witsch, 2017.
Weinhauer, Klaus, Anthony McElligott, and Kirsten Heinsohn, eds. Germany 1916-23: A 
Revolution in Context. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015.
Winkler, Heinrich August. Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und 
Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimar Republik 1918 bis 1924. Berlin and Bonn: Dietz, 1984.
Wolff, Theodor. “Der Erfolg der Revolution.” Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, 10 
November 1918, 1.








This dissertation examines the German Revolution of 1918-19. Towards the end of World 
War I, a wave of protests and strikes demanded peace, food and the abdication of Emperor 
Wilhelm II. When, in this flammable context, the naval leadership decided at the end 
of October 1918 to send the German fleet out to sea one final time to attack the superior 
English fleet, this was seen by the sailors as a Todesfahrt, a suicide mission. They refused to 
sail, and the mutiny on the ships in the port of Kiel led to a series of mutinies and uprisings 
in several Northwest German port cities. The uprising spread across Germany and in the 
first weeks of November almost all major cities were in the hands of revolutionary workers 
and soldiers. These groups organized themselves in workers’ and soldiers’ councils, where 
the direction and aims of the revolution were debated, and where the most important 
decisions about post-revolutionary society should be taken. The Emperor fled to the 
Netherlands and the future of the German state was open.
Thus, the transition from a highly hierarchical empire to a democratic republic was to a 
large extent shaped by the ideas and actions of “ordinary citizens” involved in the councils 
in which they experimented with self-government. This dissertation investigates these 
councils, and in particular the development of political thought that took place them. 
What makes the councils particularly interesting from a political theoretical point of view 
is that this new political form of the council had hardly been theorized in that period. 
That is to say, the councils were not only practical, but also conceptually innovative. The 
participants in this democratic experiment could not rely on existing ideas about council 
democracy and thus had to invent all the political and conceptual groundwork themselves. 
The - mainly Marxist-inspired - council democrats in the revolution had many debates 
about what exactly the workers’ councils were, how they should function, who should be 
represented or elected, and how this political form should relate to other (representative) 
democratic institutions.
The historiography of the German Revolution has, over the past hundred years, paid 
relatively little attention to the political theoretical dimension of the revolution. Most 
works focus on the achievements (or lack thereof) of the workers’ councils, political 
parties or political leaders. A number of works also highlight the role of well-known 
intellectual leaders who played a role in the revolution, such as Karl Kautsky, Eduard 
Bernstein and Rosa Luxemburg. What is missing in this literature is a picture of what 
ordinary revolutionaries thought. Who actually participated in the councils, how did they 
conceptualise their experiences and what actually happened to their political ideas? The 
research question that is central to this book is:
What is the role of, and mutual relationship between, intellectuals, intermediaries and 




I answered this research question by looking at four case studies from the German 
Revolution. These four major cities played an important and unique role in the revolution. 
The first case is the capital Berlin, where the most important representative bodies came 
together and where the (revolutionary) government was seated. This chapter also serves 
as a national background against which the three other (local) cases are depicted. The 
second case focuses on the capital of Bavaria, Munich. The third case study is Bremen, a 
north-west German port city where radical thinkers had already played an important role 
in the years prior to the revolution and where an independent council republic is being 
proclaimed. Hamburg, also a north-west German port, had a less radical working class, 
but a group of radical soldiers who developed far-reaching ideas about the democratization 
of the army. Three questions guide my research in these case studies:
How were councils established during the revolution, and who was able to influence 
this process?
How were the councils conceptualised and contested by various groups in relation to 
existing political institutions?
What ideas about democratic inclusion and exclusion were debated in the councils, and 
by whom?
This research not only contributes to our historical understanding of the German 
Revolution, but also aims to contribute to the development of theories about revolutions in 
general, and in particular the role of ideas in them. The emphasis is on the role of groups or 
networks of actors and the mutual contestation of their ideas. The three main groups that 
I distinguish here are professional thinkers, intermediaries and common revolutionaries. 
Professional thinkers are those who can make a living from their intellectual labour, 
intermediaries are the traders of ideas, local party leaders, trade unionists or the editors of 
newspapers. Common revolutionaries are factory workers, soldiers, shop assistants who, 
while involved in council politics and the debates therein, are not paid for their intellectual 
work. These are what Gramsci called organic intellectuals, common revolutionaries who 
produce political thought.
The chapter on Berlin shows that these organic intellectuals were indeed important 
in the German revolution. Not so much the well-known Spartacus group around famous 
intellectuals like Liebknecht and Luxembourg, but the Revolutionäre Obleute around people 
like Richard Müller were the driving force behind the development of the council democracy 
in the capital. The case also shows how the existing parties and unions found it difficult to 
get a grip on the councils, and that ideas about the councils arose from the experiences 
of common revolutionaries in strikes and uprisings. At the same time, the spontaneity 
of the development of council ideas caused advocates of council democracy to struggle 
to defend their concepts against opponents who could invoke long-standing and well-
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developed theories of, for example, representative democracy. My analysis of the National 
Council Congress that took place in Berlin also shows that many of the representatives did 
not blindly follow the party leadership, but did develop political ideas themselves, and that 
many defenders of the workers’ councils had a relatively strict distinction between council 
democracy on the one hand and representative institutions on the other.
In Bavaria, councils were initiated locally from the bottom up, without a clear script or 
central direction. In Munich, the initiative came from the soldiers’ councils, and workers 
later joined them. The leader of the revolution, Kurt Eisner, embraced the councils and 
made them part of his concept of “vibrant democracy”, bringing coherence and meaning 
to the multitude of different councils that existed in the city. At the same time, the case 
shows that the councils were mostly conceptually meaningful, while in reality they 
received little actual power from Eisner’s government. The battle over exactly what the 
councils should be and how they should function was mainly fought in the debates about 
the guidelines for the workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ councils that were drawn up. The 
debate was mainly along party lines, with the Independent SPD (USPD) that saw the 
councils as fundamentally opposite to representative democracy, while the Majority SPD 
(MSPD) saw them as complementary to existing institutions. In the end, the MSPD won 
this struggle, and the councils in Bavaria became more of an ombudsman than a form of 
self-government at work or in the barracks. The debates about the councils were mainly 
debates about democratic inclusion and exclusion. While the council democrats agreed 
on the political equality of the sexes, they disagreed on the equality of the classes. For 
example, there was a lot of discussion about whether the councils were only for workers, 
or whether other social classes could also be part of the demos.
The chapter on Bremen shows how complex and diffuse the relationship between 
council ideal and council reality was. The local council democrats saw the need to 
cooperate with the existing institutions, thereby also adopting existing hierarchies and 
structures. The conceptual struggle over the role and function of the councils was largely 
shaped along party lines. Within the group of communists we saw the beginning of the 
ideology of what will later become council communism: a radical rejection of any form of 
representation, both of parliamentarism and of party politics, in favour of workers’ self-
government in the workplace. Ideas from professional thinkers such as Anton Pannekoek 
and Karl Radek were used and further developed. The case of Bremen showed the role of 
organic intellectuals developing and contesting ideas in councils, as well as the role of 
intermediaries such as Johan Knieff spreading and popularizing them. There was a co-
production of political ideas by the different groups.
Hamburg, although similar in many aspects to Bremen, had a different revolutionary 
history. There were hardly any political leaders present in Hamburg at the time of the 
revolution, which meant that common revolutionaries and local intermediaries played 
an important role and the councils could develop beyond the control of trade unions 
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and parties. This changed during the revolution, and soon the councils were completely 
taken over by the existing representative bodies. The social-democratic idea of  a people’s 
army inspired the local soldiers’ council to decide to democratize the army, which was the 
impetus for the famous Hamburger Punkte. Furthermore, the debates in Hamburg were 
characterized by pragmatism and reactions to external developments, as a result of which 
a conceptual battle about democratic inclusion or the relationship between the councils 
and existing institutions hardly took place.
This dissertation concludes that the formation of the councils in all four cities has a 
basis in the strike wave of January 1918, and that it was mainly workers in the metal and 
arms industry who were involved. Initially, parties and trade unions had little control over 
these councils and the ideas that were discussed there. The councils were created from the 
bottom up and without central control. Informal networks of workers and soldiers played 
an important role and so it were common revolutionaries who were dominant at this 
stage. After this initial phase, they elected representatives to central councils, and with 
that the intermediaries and professional thinkers entered the councils. Notwithstanding 
this professionalization and bureaucratization, the councils offered disadvantaged groups 
an opportunity to make themselves heard and claim a place in self-government.
The conceptualization and contestation of councils, especially in relation to existing 
institutions, was one of the main points of contention in the revolution. The relationship 
between councils and parliaments in particular was constantly under discussion. My 
research shows that, unlike many later theorists of council democracy, most German 
revolutionaries did not consider these two forms of democracy to be mutually exclusive. 
Most delegates envisaged a mixture in which councils and a parliament would be 
complementary. The case studies also showed that in almost all cases parliamentary 
concepts and traditions were adopted, through the use of committees and, for example, 
Kurt Eisner’s Nebenparlement. Especially in the two free cities, Hamburg and Bremen, 
the new councils had to relate to the existing local institutions. The call for more direct 
forms of democracy came mainly from ordinary revolutionaries who were close to the 
workplace. In the debates about who could participate in the workers’ councils, the concept 
of dictatorship of the proletariat was very important. For the more moderates, this was a 
very negative concept in opposition to democracy, while radicals used the concept as a 
democratic ideal for the self-government of the working class.
As for this democratic exclusion and inclusion, my research shows that the councils gave 
rise to all kinds of politically marginalized groups to demand a say. Because the councils 
were based on the workplace, it was mainly people who were not directly associated with 
this workplace who were excluded from political power. Unemployed people, civil servants 
and women, among others, opposed this, but as my cases showed, this resistance was only 
successful to a very limited extent. The councils were not as democratically inclusive in 
practice as they are sometimes described in theory.
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Ordinary revolutionaries were most visible in the council movement when they 
challenged the concepts of political leaders through protests, demonstrations and in 
the establishment of the initial councils. In the debates themselves, delegates mainly 
reverted to existing concepts and concepts that were closely related to parliamentary 
politics, making the arguments for council democracy less self-evident and appealing. 
Nevertheless, the council movement of 1918 led to large groups in Germany becoming 
more assertive and calling the (new) political and intellectual leaders to account. Therein 




Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de Duitse Revolutie van 1918-1919. Tegen het einde van de 
Eerste Wereldoorlog ontwikkelde zich een golf van protesten en stakingen waarbij vrede, 
brood en het vertrek van Keizer Wilhelm II werden geëist. Toen, in deze ontvlambare 
context, de marineleiding eind oktober 1918 besloot om de Duitse vloot nog eenmaal de 
zee op te sturen om de superieure Engelsen aan te vallen, werd dit door de matrozen 
gezien als een Todesfahrt, een zelfmoordmissie. Ze weigerden dan ook uit te varen, en de 
muiterij op de schepen in de haven van Kiel leidde tot een reeks muiterijen en opstanden 
in verschillende Noordwest-Duitse havensteden. De opstand verspreidde zich over 
Duitsland en in de eerste weken van November waren vrijwel alle grote steden in handen 
van revolutionaire arbeiders en soldaten. Deze groepen organiseerden zich in arbeiders- 
en soldatenraden, waar werd gedebatteerd over de richting en invulling van de revolutie, 
en waar de belangrijkste besluiten over de postrevolutionaire samenleving zouden moeten 
worden genomen. De Keizer vluchtte naar Nederland en de toekomst van de Duitse staat 
lag open. 
De transitie van een sterk hiërarchisch keizerrijk naar een democratische republiek 
werd dus in grote mate vormgegeven door de ideeën en handelingen van ‘gewone burgers’, 
die betrokken waren bij de raden waarin ze experimenteerden met zelfbestuur. In dit 
proefschrift staan deze raden centraal, en dan vooral de ontwikkeling van politiek denken 
die in deze raden plaatsvond. Wat de raden vanuit politiek theoretisch oogpunt bijzonder 
interessant maakt, is dat deze nieuwe politieke vorm in die periode nog nauwelijks was 
getheoretiseerd. Dat wil zeggen: de raden waren niet alleen praktisch, maar ook conceptueel 
innovatief. De deelnemers aan dit democratisch experiment konden zich niet beroepen op 
bestaande ideeën over radendemocratie en moesten dus al het politieke en conceptuele 
grondwerk zelf uitvinden. De – vooral marxistische geïnspireerde – radendemocraten 
in de revolutie hadden dan ook vele debatten over wat de arbeidersraden precies waren, 
hoe ze zouden moeten functioneren, wie er moest worden vertegenwoordigd of gekozen, 
en hoe deze politieke vorm zich moest verhouden tot andere (vertegenwoordigende) 
democratische instituties. 
De historiografie van de Duitse Revolutie heeft de afgelopen honderd jaar betrekkelijk 
weinig aandacht gehad voor de politiek theoretische dimensie van de revolutie. De 
meeste werken besteden aandacht aan de verworvenheden (of het gebrek daar aan) van 
de arbeidersraden, de politieke partijen of de politieke leiders. Een aantal werken besteed 
ook aandacht aan de rol van bekende intellectuele leiders die in de revolutie een rol 
speelden, zoals Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein en Rosa Luxemburg. Wat ontbreekt in 
deze literatuur, is een beeld van wat de gewone revolutionairen dachten. Wie zaten er 
eigenlijk in de raden, hoe dachten ze na over hun ervaringen en wat gebeurde er eigenlijk 
met hun politieke ideeën? De onderzoeksvraag die centraal staat in dit boek is: 
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Wat is de rol van, en de wederzijdse relatie tussen, intellectuelen, tussenpersonen en 
‘gewone revolutionairen’ in de ontwikkeling van ideeën over democratie in de Duitse 
Revolutie van 1918-1919? 
Deze onderzoeksvraag heb ik beantwoord door te kijken naar vier casestudies uit de Duitse 
Revolutie. Deze vier grote steden speelden een belangrijke en unieke rol in de revolutie. De 
eerste casus is de hoofdstad Berlijn, waar de  belangrijkste vertegenwoordigende organen 
bij elkaar kwamen en waar de (revolutionaire) regering gezeteld was. Dit hoofdstuk 
dient ook als nationale achtergrond waartegen de drie andere (lokale) casussen worden 
afgeschilderd. De tweede casus richt zich op de hoofdstad van beieren, München. De 
derde casus is Bremen, een Noordwest-Duitse havenstad waar radicale denkers al in 
de jaren voorafgaand aan de revolutie een belangrijke rol hadden gespeeld en waar een 
onafhankelijke radenrepubliek wordt uitgeroepen. Hamburg, ook een Noordwest-Duitse 
havenstad, kende een minder radicale arbeidersklasse, maar juist wel een groep radicale 
soldaten die verregaande ideeën ontwikkelden over de democratisering van het leger. Drie 
vragen sturen mijn onderzoek in deze casestudies:
Hoe werden de raden opgericht tijdens de revolutie, en wie was in staat om dat proces 
te beïnvloeden?
Hoe werden de raden door verschillende groepen geconceptualiseerd en gecontesteerd 
in relatie tot bestaande politieke instituties?
Welke ideeën over democratische inclusie en exclusie werden besproken in de raden, 
en door wie?
Dit onderzoek draagt niet alleen bij aan ons historisch begrip van de Duitse Revolutie, 
maar wil ook bijdragen aan de theorievorming over revoluties in het algemeen, en in 
het bijzonder de rol van ideeën daarin. De nadruk ligt daarbij op de rol van groepen of 
netwerken van actoren en de wederzijdse contestatie van hun ideeën. De drie belangrijkste 
groepen die ik hierbij onderscheid zijn de professionele denkers, de tussenpersonen en de 
gewone revolutionairen. Professionele denkers zijn degenen die kunnen leven van hun 
intellectuele arbeid, tussenpersonen zijn de handelaren in ideeën, lokale partijleiders, 
vakbondsmensen of de redacteuren van tijdschriften. De ‘gewone revolutionairen’ zijn 
de fabrieksarbeiders, soldaten, winkelbediendes die weliswaar betrokken waren bij de 
radenpolitiek en de debatten daarin, maar die niet betaald werden voor hun intellectuele 
werk. Dit zijn wat Gramsci ‘organische intellectuelen’ noemde, ‘gewone revolutionairen’ 
die zich ontwikkelen tot producenten van belangrijke ideeën. 
Het hoofdstuk over Berlijn toont aan dat deze organische intellectuelen inderdaad 
belangrijk waren in de Duitse revolutie. Niet zozeer de bekende Spartakusgroep rond 
bekende intellectuelen als Liebknecht en Luxemburg, maar de Revolutionäre Obleute 
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rond mensen als Richard Müller waren de drijvende kracht achter de ontwikkeling van 
de radendemocratie in de hoofdstad. Ook toont de casus aan hoe de bestaande partijen en 
vakbonden maar lastig grip kregen op de raden, en dat ideeën over de raden voortkwamen 
uit ervaringen van gewone revolutionairen in stakingen en opstanden. Tegelijkertijd was 
de spontaniteit van de ontwikkeling van radenideeën de oorzaak dat voorstanders van 
radendemocratie moeite hadden om hun concepten te verdedigen tegenover tegenstanders 
die zich konden beroepen op lang bestaande en ontwikkelde theorieën over bijvoorbeeld 
representatieve democratie. Mijn analyse van het Nationale Radencongres dat in Berlijn 
plaatsvond laat bovendien zien dat veel van de vertegenwoordigers niet blind de partijleiding 
volgden, maar wel degelijk zelf tot de ontwikkeling van politieke ideeën kwam, en dat bij 
veel verdedigers van de arbeidersraden een betrekkelijk strikt onderscheid bestond tussen 
radendemocratie enerzijds en vertegenwoordigende instituties anderzijds. 
In Beieren werden de raden lokaal van onderop geïnitieerd, zonder een duidelijk script 
of centrale aansturing. In München ging het initiatief uit van de soldatenraden, en sloten 
arbeiders zich daar later bij aan. De leider van de revolutie, Kurt Eisner, omarmde de 
raden en maakte ze onderdeel van zijn concept van ‘levendige democratie’ waarmee hij 
coherentie en betekenis gaf aan de veelheid aan verschillende raden die er in de stad waren. 
Tegelijkertijd laat de casus zien dat de raden vooral conceptueel betekenisvol waren, maar 
dat ze in werkelijkheid maar weinig macht kregen van Eisner’s regering. De strijd over 
wat de raden precies moesten zijn en hoe ze moesten functioneren werd vooral gevoerd in 
de debatten over de richtlijnen voor de arbeiders-, soldaten-, en boerenraden die werden 
opgesteld. Hierbij liep het debat vooral langs partijlijnen, waarbij de Onafhankelijke SPD 
(USPD) de raden zag als fundamenteel tegenovergesteld aan representatieve democratie, 
terwijl de Meerderheids SPD (MSPD) ze zag als complementair aan bestaande instituties. 
Uiteindelijk trok de MSPD aan het langste eind, en werden de raden in Beieren meer 
een soort ombudsman dan een vorm van zelfbestuur op het werk of in de barakken. De 
debatten over de raden waren vooral debatten over democratische inclusie en exclusie. 
Hoewel de radendemocraten het eens waren over de politieke gelijkwaardigheid van de 
geslachten, waren ze het oneens over de gelijkwaardigheid van de klassen. Zo was er veel 
discussie over of de raden alleen voor arbeiders waren, of dat ook andere sociale klassen 
onderdeel mochten zijn van de demos. 
Het hoofdstuk over Bremen laat zien hoe complex en diffuus de relatie tussen radenideaal 
en radenwerkelijkheid was. De lokale radendemocraten zagen de noodzaak om samen te 
werken met de bestaande instituties, waardoor ook bestaande hiërarchieën en structuren 
werden overgenomen. De conceptuele strijd over de rol en functie van de raden werd 
grotendeels gevormd langs partijlijnen. Binnen de communisten zien de het begin van het 
gedachtengoed van wat later het radencommunisme zal worden: een radicale afwijzing 
van elke vorm van representatie, zowel van parlementarisme als ook van partij-politiek, 
ten faveure van arbeiderszelfbestuur op de werkplaats. Hierbij werden ideeën van denkers 
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als Anton Pannekoek en Karl Radek gebruikt en verder ontwikkeld. In Bremen zien we de 
rol van organische intellectuelen die ideeën ontwikkelend en contesteren in de raden, en 
ook de rol van intermediairs zoals Johan Knieff die deze verspreiden en populariseren. Er 
is sprake van een co-productie van politieke ideeën door de verschillende groepen.
Hamburg, hoewel in veel aspecten vergelijkbaar met Bremen, kende een andere 
revolutionaire geschiedenis. De casus laat zien dat de Russische revolutie voor de 
revolutionairen in Hamburg geen voorbeeld was, maar meer een schrikbeeld – en dat dus 
ook in deze casus geen revolutionair script klaar lag. Bovendien waren er in Hamburg 
nauwelijks politieke leiders aanwezig op het moment van de revolutie, waardoor lokale 
intermediairs een belangrijke rol speelden en de raden zich buiten de grip van vakbonden 
en partijen konden ontwikkelen. Dit veranderde echter tijdens de revolutie, en al snel 
werden de raden volledig overgenomen door de bestaande vertegenwoordigende organen. 
Het sociaal-democratische idee van een volksleger inspireerde de lokale soldatenraad 
tot het besluit om het leger te democratiseren, wat de aanzet vormde voor de bekende 
Hamburger Punkte. Verder waren de debatten in Hamburg gekenmerkt door pragmatisme 
en het reageren op externe ontwikkelingen, waardoor een conceptuele strijd over 
democratische inclusie of de relatie tussen de raden en bestaande instituties nauwelijks 
plaats vond.   
Dit proefschrift concludeert dat de totstandkoming van de raden in alle vier de 
onderzochte steden een basis heeft in de stakingsgolf van januari 1918, en dat het vooral 
arbeiders in de metaal en wapenindustrie waren die hierbij betrokken waren. Partijen 
en vakbonden hadden aanvankelijk maar weinig grip op deze raden en de ideeën die er 
werden besproken. De raden onstaonden van onderop en zonder centrale aansturing. 
Informele netwerken van arbeiders en soldaten speelden een belangrijke rol en het waren 
dus gewone revolutionairen die in deze fase dominant waren. Na deze initiële fase kozen 
zij vertegenwoordigers voor centrale raden, en daarmee deden de intermediairs en 
professionele denkers hun intrede in de raden. Tegelijkertijd met deze professionalisering 
en bureaucratisering, boden de raden een kans aan achtergestelde groepen om zich te 
laten horen en een plek in het zelf-bestuur op te eisen. 
De conceptualisering en contestatie van raden, met name in verhouding tot bestaande 
instituties, was een van de belangrijkste strijdpunten in de revolutie. Vooral de relatie 
tussen raden en parlementen stond voortdurend te discussie. Mijn onderzoek laat zien 
dat, in tegenstelling tot veel latere theoretici van radendemocratie, de meeste Duitse 
revolutionairen deze twee vormen van democratie niet als wederzijds uitsluitend 
beschouwden. De meeste gedelegeerden voorzagen een mengvorm waarbij raden en een 
parlement elkaar konden aanvullen. Ook toonden de casestudies aan dat in vrijwel alle 
gevallen parlementaire begrippen en tradities werden overgenomen, door het gebruik van 
commissies en bijvoorbeeld het ‘neveparlement’ van Kurt Eisner. Vooral in de twee vrije 
steden, Hamburg en Bremen, moesten de nieuwe raden zich verhouden tot de bestaande 
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lokale instituties. De roep om meer directe vormen van democratie kwam vooral van de 
gewone revolutionairen die dicht bij de werkvloer stonden. In de debatten over wie er 
mochten deelnemen aan de arbeidersraden, was het begrip dictatuur van het proletariaat 
erg belangrijk. Voor de meer gematigden was dit een zeer negatief concept dat tegengesteld 
was aan democratie, terwijl radicalen het concept juist gebruikten als democratisch ideaal 
voor het zelfbestuur van de arbeidersklasse. 
Wat betreft die democratische exclusie en inclusie, laat mijn onderzoek zien dat de 
raden aanleiding gaven aan allerlei politiek gemarginaliseerde groepen om inspraak op 
te eisen. Doordat de raden waren gebaseerd op de werkvloer, waren het vooral mensen 
die niet direct verbonden waren aan deze werkvloer die werden uitgesloten van politieke 
macht. Onder meer werklozen, beambten en vrouwen verzetten zich hiertegen, maar zoals 
uit mijn cases bleek was dit verzet slechts in zeer beperkte mate succesvol. De raden waren 
in de praktijk niet zo democratisch inclusief als ze soms in de theorie worden beschreven. 
De gewone revolutionairen waren het meest zichtbaar in de radenbeweging wanneer 
zij de begrippen van politieke leiders contesteerden door protesten, demonstraties en 
in de oprichting van de aanvankelijke raden. In de debatten zelf grepen gedelegeerden 
voornamelijk terug op bestaande concepten en begrippen die nauw verwant waren 
aan parlementaire politiek, waardoor de argumenten voor radendemocratie minder 
vanzelfsprekend en aansprekend bleken. Desalniettemin leidde de radenbeweging van 
1918 er toe dat grote groepen in Duitsland mondiger werden en de (nieuwe) politieke en 
intellectuele leiders ter verantwoording riepen. Daarin ligt de kern van de democratisering 





Vrijwel elk dankwoord dat dat men in proefschriften aantreft, begint met de constatering 
dat promoveren een eenzame aangelegenheid is. Hoewel dit voor een deel van het werk, 
zoals het onderzoek en het schrijven, ongetwijfeld het geval is, past die constatering 
eigenlijk niet bij hoe ik terug kijk op mijn tijd als promovendus. De afgelopen periode was 
er juist een die verrijkt was met bijzonder veel fijne ontmoetingen en interactie. Op deze 
plek in mijn proefschrift wil ik dan ook graag de tijd nemen om degenen de bedanken die 
mij de afgelopen jaren hebben ondersteund en geholpen. 
Allereerst gaat mijn dank uit naar mijn promotor en copromotor. Marcel Wissenburg en 
Joost Rosendaal hebben met bijzonder veel geduld mijn traject en werk als promovendus 
begeleid de afgelopen jaren. Jullie voorzagen mijn schrijfsels van het nodige kritische 
commentaar, wisten me telkens weer op het goede pad te helpen, lieten me de ruimte 
om nieuwe wegen te ontdekken, en gaven me op tijd het zetje dat ik nodig had als ik 
vast zat. Maar vooral herinner ik me de altijd gezellige (en smakelijke) bijeenkomsten 
op verschillende terrassen waar het gesprek al snel oversloeg van de thesis naar andere 
historische, politicologische of filosofische thema’s. Marcel, veel dank voor je getoonde 
flexibiliteit en openheid. De scherpte waarmee je mijn manuscript van feedback voorzag, 
en de manier waarop je de grote lijnen bewaakte als ik ze zelf niet meer zag, waren niet 
alleen leerzaam voor mijn thesis, maar zijn ook een inspiratie voor me in de omgang met 
studenten. Veel dank daarvoor. 
Daarnaast ben ik mijn collega’s bij de afdeling Politicologie van de Radboud Universiteit 
Nijmegen veel dank verschuldigd. Ik heb me binnen onze afdeling altijd zeer geborgen 
gevoeld en het is als promovendus ongelofelijk waardevol om als volwaardig lid van een 
team mee te kunnen draaien. Dagelijks kwamen collega’s buurten, koffie drinken, samen 
lunchen, praten over onderzoek, politiek of andere onderwerpen. Voor mijn gevoel zijn we 
als afdeling de afgelopen jaren alleen maar hechter geworden, en ik kan me geen fijnere 
collega’s wensen. Jullie maken de grens tussen collega en vriend bijzonder diffuus. Heel 
erg bedankt allemaal voor de steun en gezelligheid de afgelopen jaren, het voelt als een eer 
dat ik na dit promotietraject jullie collega mag blijven.   
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Een speciale vermelding moet ik, helaas, maken voor Thomas Eimer. Hij was tijdens 
mijn hele promotie onderdeel van die fijne groep collega’s die ik vaak sprak - op het werk, 
maar ook daarbuiten. Hij heeft me op veel vlakken geholpen en geïnspireerd, wat in deze 
thesis het meest concreet tot uitdrukking komt in het hoofdstuk over Bremen waarover 
we uitvoerig van gedachten wisselden. Maar zijn inspiratie ging veel verder dan dat: de 
gesprekken met Thomas gingen altijd ergens over en duurden vaak heerlijk lang, net zoals 
zijn omhelzingen na afloop. Helaas is hij op 6 april veel te jong overleden aan de gevolgen 
van kanker. Thomas, bedankt voor alles!
Naast de collega’s bij politicologie, waren ook mijn collega-promovendi bij de faculteit 
Managementwetenschappen een belangrijk onderdeel van mijn dagelijks leven. In de 
onvolprezen Thomas van Aquinostraat 5 was het erg fijn om dagelijks koffie te drinken 
met de groep promovendi (van wie de meesten inmiddels zijn uitgevlogen). Bedankt voor 
de vele uren die we samen hebben gelachen, de frustraties die we hebben gedeeld, en de 
mooie avonden en weekenden die we samen doormaakten. Daarnaast was het geweldig 
om samen met jullie mijn blik te verruimen in de leesgroepjes, filmavonden, discussies die 
we hadden. Ook de kamergenoten (van wie velen inmiddels vrienden zijn, dat samen op 
kantoor zitten creëert toch een band) die ik afgelopen jaren heb versleten wil ik danken. 
Melisa Soto wil ik danken voor de levendige discussies over Cuba, Puerto Rico, en de 
balans tussen thuis en werk. In ons nieuwe kantoor in het Elinor Ostrom Gebouw was het 
goed toeven met Rutger Blom en Lianne Visser. We kregen alle drie kinderen tijdens ons 
promotietraject, en dat gaf onze tijd samen als kamergenoten een bijzondere dimensie. Veel 
dank voor het gezelschap en de leuke gesprekken over ouderschap – vooral in combinatie 
met academische ambities. Mijn eerste kamergenoot, nog in TvA5, was Joost Fledderus, 
die me niet alleen (tevergeefs) liet zien hoe je efficiënt promoveert binnen de vier jaar die 
er voor staan, maar me ook kennis liet maken met de liefde voor de racefiets. Mooi dat je 
nu je rol als meesterknecht ook waarmaakt bij mijn promotie. Bedankt voor de fijne tijd 
samen op kantoor, op de fiets, in het zwembad, en zelfs op vakantie met de kinderen!
Bernd Bonfert, although our time together in Nijmegen was fairly short, we sure made 
up for it in terms of company. Thanks for the great insights in social movement theory, 
critical theory and our countless fruitful discussions in reading groups, panels and at 
New Year’s Eve! Daniel Polman, hoewel je nooit mijn kamergenoot bent geweest, hebben 
we heel veel met elkaar opgetrokken de afgelopen jaren. Je begon net voor mij met je 
promotie, en was ook net voor mij klaar – in alle opzichten een voorbeeld dus! Ik kijk met 
ongelofelijk veel plezier terug op onze tijd op de uni, maar ook alle conferenties samen, de 
concertbezoeken, de festivals, en de uitjes met de kinderen – bedankt voor je vriendschap!
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Tijdens zo’n promotietraject zijn er behalve de zeer waardevolle dagelijkse ontmoetingen, 
ook veel mensen die je regelmatig weer tegenkomt. Uiteraard kan ik ze niet allemaal 
benoemen op deze plek (het boekje is al omvangrijk genoeg), maar een aantal wil ik er 
toch uitlichten. James Muldoon, thank you for your interest in my work and our many 
great debates on the history and theory of council communism. It was such an honour 
to be able to edit the book with you, and I thoroughly enjoyed our meetings over the past 
few years that I learned so much from. I am really grateful for the academic opportunities 
and advises that you gave me, and for the most enjoyable nights out in Exeter, Leiden 
and Hamburg. Thanks a lot! Benjamin Ask-Popp Madsen, I think nor hope that I will 
ever again co-write an article with someone for a couple of years. It sure was a bumpy 
but interesting ride. I really enjoyed our discussions in Copenhagen and online, and look 
forward to work with you (on shorter projects) in the future again. Evert van der Zweerde 
ben ik ook veel dank verschuldigd. Ik heb erg veel geleerd van onze geweldige gesprekken 
(onder meer over Hegel!) op de racefiets, maar ook van onze reizen en projecten met de 
Honours Academy. Het was zo inspirerend om je aan het werk te zien met studenten, en 
ik genoot van hoe ze met je wegliepen. Wat heerlijk dat we de komende jaren, samen met 
onder anderen Mathijs, weer mogen samenwerken voor Vive la Commune! 
Over de commune gesproken, veel van mijn vrienden ken ik nog uit de Achterhoek, 
onze eigen kleine bubbel in het Oosten. Ook jullie ben ik veel dank verschuldigd, voor 
de aangename afleiding tijdens onze (mannen)weekenden en de fijne avonden samen. 
Bedankt ook voor jullie geduld en slechts lichtelijk verveelde blikken als ik weer een keer 
over die dode Duitsers begon. Martijn, jou wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken. Jij stond aan 
de wieg van dit project, en ik zie het nog steeds als een onrechtvaardigheid en gemis dat 
we het niet samen hebben kunnen uitvoeren. Ik hoop dat je tevreden bent met wat ik er 
van heb gemaakt, en ben enorm trots dat je mijn paranimf wil zijn vandaag. Chris, je komt 
dan wel niet uit de Achterhoek, maar toch voelt het alsof we elkaar al minstens net zo lang 
kennen. Je hebt gedurende dit hele project veel voor me betekend, met je slimme vragen 
en onze discussies over onze linkse hobby’s, maar natuurlijk ook op persoonlijk vlak. Heel 
erg bedankt dat je er altijd was, vooral ook op de momenten dat het niet zo goed met me 
ging. 
Tsja, en dan zijn de laatste regels altijd voor de belangrijkste mensen - en voor de clichés. 
Allereerst mijn schoonfamilie. Jullie spelen al heel lang een belangrijke rol in mijn leven, 
in goede en minder goede tijden. Ik ben enorm dankbaar voor jullie steun en gezelligheid, 




Lieve zusjes, heel erg bedankt voor jullie interesse en steun de afgelopen tijd. Ik ben super 
blij met jullie en trots dat we ook dit moment samen kunnen delen. 
Pa en ma, het is een cliché om te zeggen dat dit boekje er zonder jullie niet was geweest, 
maar onder dat cliché kom ik hier niet uit. Natuurlijk in de eerste plaats door de 
mogelijkheden die jullie me, financieel en emotioneel, hebben geboden om me tijdens 
mijn studie en daarna te ontplooien. Maar daarvan zou je nog kunnen zeggen dat het past 
binnen de ouderlijke taken en verwachtingen. De manier waarop jullie de afgelopen jaren 
volstrekt onbaatzuchtig en met zoveel liefde en zorg hebben bijgesprongen om ons gezin 
draaiende te houden, zodat Naline en ik ons werk min of meer naar behoren konden doen, 
was absoluut onvoorstelbaar. Jullie eindeloze kilometers heen en weer tussen Steenderen 
en Nijmegen, meerdere keren per week… ik krijg mijn gevoel van dankbaarheid niet in 
woorden uitgedrukt. Ik had me geen fijnere ouders kunnen wensen, en de kinderen geen 
lievere opa en oma. Ik kan alleen maar hopen dat jullie trots zijn op dit resultaat, en ik 
wens dat ik ooit dezelfde zorgzame aandacht aan jullie kan geven als dat nodig is. 
Naline, lieve Naline. Mijn jeugdliefde. Meer dan de helft van mijn leven ben ik al met je 
samen, en ik kan me oprecht geen voorstelling maken van hoe ik deze promotie (of wat 
dan ook) zonder je zou kunnen doen. Wat geweldig dat we ook deze periode samen hebben 
mogen mee maken. Het was een hectische tijd, met gelukkig heel veel mooie maar ook 
zware periodes. Het was druk, voor ons allebei, maar we zijn elkaar niet kwijtgeraakt. 
Bedankt voor al je geduld met me, voor je begrip en je inlevingsvermogen als ik weer eens 
een paar weken naar het buitenland moest voor onderzoek, en jij met de kinderen achter 
bleef. Bedankt voor al je zorgzame aandacht en liefde als ik die nodig had. Bedankt ook 
voor al je veel te kritische vragen over mijn werk, en dat je me af en toe helpt om nee te 
zeggen. Ik ben zo trots dat we nu allebei ons proefschrift af hebben, en ik kijk uit naar een 
toekomst vol innige afhankelijkheid .
Lieve Hannah en Jacob, jullie zijn best lastig soms - zonder jullie was dit proefschrift er 
een stuk eerder geweest. Maar jullie zijn het mooiste wat me is overkomen, en ik heb zo’n 
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